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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines whether the incorporation of labor rights provisions 
into trade agreements promotes labor rights enforcement in developing 
countries.  It draws on the international relations literature on transnational 
advocacy as the starting point to ask how labor’s allies engage the trade 
mechanisms as potential tools for promoting labor rights in supranational arenas.  
Using original data, field observation, primary documents and interviews with key 
participants, I examine how transnational labor rights advocates have engaged 
these institutions through a research design that pairs quantitative analysis of the 
NAFTA labor side agreement, with qualitative examination of a number of the 
NAFTA cases and a set of labor violations cases in Puebla, Mexico.  The 
empirical chapters discuss the ways that transnational labor rights advocates 
engage the labor rights enforcement mechanism as they attempt to secure a 
review of their petitions from the quasi-judicial bodies charged with investigating 
labor rights compliance.  Transnational support has led to outcomes for labor that 
include firm-level redress of labor rights violations and institutional changes 
within Mexico.  The implication for this work is that where labor clauses have had 
an effect on labor rights practices within states, it has been at the intersection of 
transnational civil society and international institutions.  The research suggests 
that the process of engaging the petitions mechanism can persuade or coerce 
states into enforcing labor rights commitments, and emphasizes that 
transnational advocacy provides a crucial element to realizing labor rights 
enforcement where domestic efforts are weak.   
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 1 
Chapter One: 
Transnational Advocacy Networks and Trade-Based 
Labor Rights Conditionality 
 
 
 Violations of the internationally-recognized fundamental rights at work are 
concentrated among the countries of the Global South.1  More than 127 million 
children work in developing countries, especially in the South Asian states, where 
60% of child labor is found.  Though the sheer number of child laborers is lower 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 30% of all African children are put to work, mainly 
in agriculture (International Labor Organization 2006).  Children account for more 
than 50% of the incidence of forced labor in the world, though modern-day 
slavery for adults is alive and well for 12 million people, almost 150 years after 
the United States fought a civil war to end the practice (International Labor 
Organization 2005).  In Latin America, the right to organize is circumscribed in 
some states by national laws that limit the rights of association among public 
sector workers, and for those who have the legal right to form unions, economic 
crisis and reform policies have decimated unions in the region, creating 
additional limits to worker’s organization (García 1993; Infante 1991; Roberts 
1996; Weeks 1999b; Weeks 1999a).  In the aftermath of neoliberal reform, 
                                            
1
 While the identification of exactly which labor rights are fundamental rights has itself been 
subject to intense debate, “labor rights” here refers to those established as fundamental rights 
by the International Labour Organization’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work: the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, freedom from 
forced labor, the abolition of child labor, and protection from discrimination in occupation and 
employment.  See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2000) for a review of the debate on defining 
labor rights, Leary (1996) for the argument on minimum definitions of core labor rights as 
established by the International Labour Organization, and Chan (1998) for the argument for 
maximum definitions as follows the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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developing countries across the globe have embraced export orientation and 
created export-processing zones where freedom of association has been tightly 
restricted (Frundt 1999; Hathaway 2002a; Gordon 2000; Anner 2007).   
 What has changed, however, is the degree to which global labor violations 
have become cause of concern to the general public over the course of the last 
two decades.  A number of highly publicized cases brought the stories of 
substandard working conditions and wages to a US audience becoming 
increasingly concerned about how their consumer goods were made in foreign 
countries (Harrison and Scorse 2003).  Across the globe, consumers were 
suddenly left wondering if children in Bangladesh or Pakistan wove their carpets, 
or how exactly Indonesian women sewing Nikes for a dollar a day fed their 
families.2  Though ratification of the eleven fundamental labor rights conventions 
on forced labor, child labor, freedom of association, discrimination at work, and 
minimum standards of employment is nearly universal, these examples give us 
clues that labor rights practices within states often fall short of the promises 
governments have made to protect them.  
 This dissertation investigates the possibilities for protecting labor rights 
globally by placing labor rights enforcement mechanisms at supranational levels 
of governance, by linking labor rights conditionality to trade agreements.  Using 
                                            
2
 The cases that are considered milestones in the anti-sweatshop movement of the 1990s are 
Nike in Indonesia (Hartman and Wokutch 2003, IRCC 1998, Connor 2004), the Gap in El 
Salvador (Anner 2003), the KIMI/ Kathie Lee child labor campaign in Honduras (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2003), Phillips Van Heusen in Guatemala (Frundt 2002), Disney in Haiti (National 
Labor Committee 1997), Levi’s (Radin 2003), and the El Monte raid in California (Su 1997). 
See also IRCC (1998) and Ross (1997).  
 3 
trade-based mechanisms to promote labor rights enforcement represents only 
one way to institutionalize worker protections globally, yet it is a method that is 
gaining ground as trade policy among the major players has shifted to 
incorporate labor rights provisions.3  In both the US and the EU for example, 
trade-based social clauses have been nearly universally appended to trade 
agreements since the mid-1990s, and negotiation authority in the US is 
contingent on securing an agreement on workers’ rights protections (Weiss 2003; 
Hafner-Burton 2009).  Even agreements between regional powers feature social 
clauses, such as the Mercosur agreement in South America. 
 Though some trade agreements already specify the recourse available for 
the breach of trade rules that protect intellectual property and investors’ rights, 
the incorporation of labor standards into trade agreements represents an 
emerging area of trade policy.  The integration of a social charter on the rights of 
workers into the World Trade Organization, as envisioned during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, has failed (De Wet 1995; Alben 2001; Ehrenberg 1996; 
Moorman 2001).  Meanwhile, some states have moved forward by incorporating 
versions of social charters into regional and bilateral agreements, each with a 
differing institutional design and enforcement potential.4  Though a number of 
                                            
3
 Other methods include the use of corporate codes of conduct and monitoring to promote labor 
standards for individual firms, strengthening union structures through cross-border union 
organization, and the use of consumer-based brand boycotts.  See Frundt (1998) for a review 
of these models.  
4 These include multilateral agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Mercosur, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the EU Social Labour Declaration; bilateral agreements, 
including trade pacts between the US and Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, 
 4 
comparative case studies have discussed how the trade-based mechanisms can 
enhance worker’s protections within individual states (Kay 2005; Williams 2003; 
Williams 1999; Weiss 2003; Finbow 2006; Compa 2001; Graubart 2008; 
Douglass, Fergusson, and Klett 2004), very few have identified systematically the 
conditions that lead to the successful resolution of labor rights violations across 
states under the terms of these agreements, and only a handful of studies have 
considered how to best engage the mechanisms provided by the trade based 
institutions to promote the successful resolution of labor rights violations (Frundt 
1998b; Finbow 2006; Compa 2001; Graubart 2008).5  
 This study examines whether the incorporation of labor rights provisions 
into free trade agreements improves labor rights enforcement in less-developed 
states.  If we are most interested in whether these clauses are effective tools for 
promoting labor rights enforcement, it is imperative to investigate two dimensions 
of efficacy: implementation and outcomes.  Implementation refers to the process 
by which the rules of conditionality are applied to partner states.  This 
dissertation investigates implementation first to underscore the political dynamics 
that condition the enforcement of labor rights clauses.  As such, it analyzes how 
the mechanisms that enforce compliance are engaged by states and non-state 
actors.  Second, effectiveness must be measured against the kinds of resolutions 
                                                                                                                                  
Oman, Bahrain, and South Korea; pending agreements with Peru, Panama and Colombia; 
and the Canada-Chile and Canada-Costa Rica agreements.  Unilateral trade promotion 
initiatives with labor clauses include the US and the EU Generalized System of Preferences 
programs, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the 
Andean Trade Promotion Act/ Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. 
5
 The notable exception is Frundt (1998). 
 5 
of labor rights violations that are possible within the agreements.  To measure 
these outcomes, we must understand how states respond at the domestic level 
once the labor enforcement mechanisms are applied.  Once state practices are 
under scrutiny, do states make an effort to improve compliance with the trade-
based labor rights guidelines?  Do social clauses have a demonstrable effect on 
minimizing labor rights abuses among workers, improving enforcement of labor 
law, or promoting respect for labor standards among trade partners?   
  This dissertation attempts to unravel the puzzle of whether trade 
liberalization can lead to greater labor rights protection through linking labor 
rights enforcement to trade agreements by asking the following questions.  First: 
 
 Under what conditions are social clauses most effective at promoting 
 labor rights enforcement? 
 
The answer to this question depends primarily on how the clauses are 
implemented, and therefore calls for an analysis of the enforcement mechanisms 
of these agreements.  Thus, I ask: 
 
 How are the mechanisms of social clauses engaged by states and non-
 state actors?  What are the factors that determine whether cases of labor 
 rights abuses are accepted for review by states?  
 
 6 
Efficacy depends further on the outcomes these clauses can promote within 
states.  To assess outcomes, I ask: 
 
 How do states comply with the rules of trade-based labor rights 
 conditionality, to what degree do they implement changes that promote 
 labor rights enforcement, and when?   
 
 To answer these questions, I test the mechanisms that determine whether 
or not allegations of labor rights violations are accepted for dispute resolution in 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side 
agreement of NAFTA.  The analysis of this social clause will uncover not just how 
the enforcement mechanisms are used, by whom, and to what consequence in a 
number of specific cases, but will also assess the usefulness of pursuing trade-
based labor rights conditionality to protect labor rights in less-developed states 
more generally.  
 
The Effects of Globalization on Labor Rights Protections 
 The debate over linking labor rights and trade centers on whether labor 
rights protections have been weakened by the increased economic 
interdependence among states.  Previous quantitative work on the effect of 
economic integration on labor rights protection shows different effects across 
time and country, as well as within different arenas of economic globalization 
(Mosley 2008; Hafner-Burton 2005).  A number of studies have supported the 
hypothesis that globalization in general exerts positive effects on labor rights 
 7 
protection.6  For example, participation in the global economy is positively 
correlated with government respect for political rights and civil liberties (Richards, 
Gelleny, and Sacko 2001), and labor rights specifically (Cingranelli 2002; Kucera 
2002; Mosley and Uno 2007).  Higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
particular is positively correlated with higher levels of labor rights protection 
(Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; Cingranelli 2002; Kucera 2002; Rodrik 
1996), greater respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining rights 
(Mosley and Uno 2007), wage compliance (Harrison and Scorse 2003), and 
increases in income (Bazillier 2007).  Other studies show that higher levels of 
FDI are associated with the reduction of child labor, but partially due to self-
selection, as international firms would rather invest in countries where the 
incidence of child labor is already lower (Kucera 2002; Neumayer and de Soysa 
2006).  These studies all suggest that the presence of multinational firms in less-
developed states may have a positive effect on labor rights, because global firms 
bring with them international standards of business and corporate best practices 
that are sensitive to labor rights issues (Santoro 2003; Mosley 2008).  As such, 
globalization, and especially the spread of multinational business into less-
developed states, has had a positive effect on labor rights protections.  
 The counter perspective argues that globalization is not only associated 
with increased poverty and inequality in less-developed countries (reviewed in 
                                            
6
 Globalization here refers to the worldwide phenomenon of technological, economic, political and 
cultural exchanges that describe how states and societies are becoming more intertwined with 
each other as a result of economic integration.  For a review of the debate over defining and 
measuring globalization, see Kudrle (2004).  
 8 
Pangalangan 2002), but competition for investment engendered by freer capital 
flows leads to the erosion of domestic labor standards (Mosley and Uno 2007; 
Rodrik 1997; Cingranelli and Tsai 2003). The “race to the bottom” thesis 
suggests that national leaders in developing countries face incentives to relax 
regulations in order to attract international investors, which exacts downward 
pressure on labor standards and wage rates globally (Harrison and Scorse 2003; 
Pangalangan 2002; Elliott 2000a), and creates comparative advantages in labor 
costs among less-developed states (Rodrik 1996).  Some scholars argue that 
trade competition has already shifted away from primarily North-South to South-
South competition for trade and investment, where the dynamics are different 
(Chan and Ross 2003).  Here, countries that already endure low wages and poor 
working conditions will use lax labor regulation to attract foreign direct investment 
away from other poor countries competing for the same investment (Gordon 
2000; Ross and Chan 2002).  What was once the floor on wages and working 
conditions a government could offer potential investors instead becomes the 
acceptable ceiling (Klein 2000).  Because the “race to the bottom” is triggered by 
competition for trade and investment, trade agreements are increasingly seen as 
the best arena for promoting common standards (Ross and Chan 2002). 
  Empirical support for a race to the bottom thesis is still thin (Kucera 2002; 
Rodrik 1996; Cingranelli and Tsai 2003; Basinger and Hallerberg 2004), in part 
because of the difficulty of collecting disaggregated cross-national 
measurements of labor outcomes, especially wages (Mosley 2008).  Moreover, 
these studies are limited in that the quantitative research is still in its early 
 9 
stages.  Thus far, econometric models have been unable to provide convincing 
explanations of the effect of globalization on poverty and inequality in general 
(Wade 2004), much less account for the concomitant erosion of wages and 
working conditions as capital concentrates in states with selective labor 
protections, like China (Chan 2001; Chan and Ross 2003; Ross and Chan 2002).  
Concerns about labor costs are at the core of investment decisions for many 
firms (Cowie 1999).   
 Meanwhile, a number of case studies provide evidence from some 
developing nations that suggests that the “race to the bottom” is speeding up as 
economic integration moves forward, and especially in labor-intensive models of 
development.  For example, in the processing zones established to facilitate 
exports, labor standards are sometimes subject to selective regulation, leading to 
substandard working conditions (Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Klein 2000; Frundt 
1999; Frundt 1998b; Gordon 2000).  Testimonial accounts of poor working 
conditions, artificially low wages, health and safety risks, and labor repression 
that have accompanied labor rights campaigns against major US brands lend the 
impression of widespread gross abuses (Hartman and Wokutch 2003; National 
Labor Committee 1997; Harrison and Scorse 2003).  Labor costs can influence 
firms’ decisions to move production from industrialized nations like the United 
States to Latin American countries and finally to Asia, where the weakest labor 
protections and lowest labor costs offset increases in transportation expenses 
(Ross and Chan 2002; Goodman and Blustein 2004).  According to this 
 10 
perspective, globalization is responsible for weakening labor protections in the 
developing world.  
 
Linking Trade and Labor Rights 
 The first variant of the argument for linking trade agreements to labor 
rights conditionality comes as a reaction to the race to the bottom dynamic 
(Rodrik 1996).  The perception in the industrialized states is that labor rights 
abuses are perpetrated in less-developed states to gain an unfair comparative 
advantage in trade, not because of wage differentials based in labor productivity, 
but from policies that artificially suppress wages in less-developed states (Rodrik 
1996).  Trade-based conditionality is a way to reestablish the minimum standards 
of employment for all workers party to trade agreements, in an effort to protect 
the most vulnerable workers from the pressures of competition.   
 The second variant of the argument for linking trade and labor rights 
compares the “hard” enforcement mechanisms of trade agreements to the “soft” 
standards of human rights and labor rights regimes (Graubart 2008; Hafner-
Burton 2005; Rodrik 1996; Abbott and Snidal 2000).  Compliance with 
international conventions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 
ILO labor rights conventions are strictly voluntary (Collingsworth 2002).  By 
contrast, the membership mechanism of the WTO can enforce the trading rules 
by making their transgressions punishable (Rosen 1992; Elliott 2000b; Burtless 
2001).  According to this argument, if labor rights standards are used as a 
comparative advantage in trade by states, labor standards should be subject to 
 11 
dispute resolution just like tariff assessments, intellectual property rights, and 
investment rules (Ehrenberg 1996; Moorman 2001).  When labor conditionality is 
attached to trade agreements, labor rights compliance becomes enforceable 
through dispute resolution as for other trade issues, and consequences are 
important enough to discourage breaking the rules.  States that relax labor 
standards face strong incentives to improve labor rights performance and 
conform to policies supported by industrialized countries, or suffer the potential 
costs of trade sanctions (Rodrik 1996).  Further, trade based conditionality can 
provide incentives for compliance, as states that meet the prescriptions of labor 
rights conditionality can be rewarded with market access.7 
 One result of the failure of states to protect labor rights at the domestic 
level is the emergence of alternative models for protecting workers rights that 
bypass state involvement.  Among these alternatives are consumers’ 
movements, corporate responsiveness, and cross-border labor organizing.8  
These models attempt to enforce state compliance through the efforts of non-
                                            
7
 The best example of how market incentives can lead to compliance with labor rights 
conditionality was the Cambodian-US textile quota agreement.  Cambodia was awarded with 
increased quotas on textile exports to the US when ILO factory monitoring showed 
improvement on labor rights protections.  See Polaski (2003, 2004), Becker (2005), and Wells 
(2006). 
8 I do not cover these alternative strategies here.  For more on brand boycotts, see Klein (2000), 
Elliott and Freeman (2003), IRCC (1998), and Ross (1997).  For corporate codes of conduct, 
see Compa and Hinchliffe Darricarrere (1996), IRCC (1998), Seidman (2007), Elliott and 
Freeman (2003), Braun and Gearhart (2004), Hartman and Wokutch (2003), Radin  (2003), 
and Rosas (2003).  For cross-border labor organizing in Central America, see Frundt (2002, 
1999, and 1998), Anner (2003), Kidder (2002), and Armbruster-Sandoval (2003), and for 
Mexico, Hathaway (2002), Cook (1997), Kay (2005), Williams (2003 and 1999), and Babson  
(2002).  
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state actors, ironically eroding the role of the state further, as they in most cases 
remove responsibility for labor rights protection from the state to individual 
companies and manufacturers.9  The proposal for linking trade to labor rights 
conditionality seeks instead to strengthen the roles of the state in promoting labor 
rights by placing the burden of protection, monitoring, and enforcement back in 
the hands of governments, and thus reestablishes the state as the central actor 
responsible for protecting labor rights globally (Seidman 2004).  
 
Transnational Advocacy  
 These strategies offer different approaches to addressing labor rights 
concerns, but what they share is that all prominently feature non-state actors as 
key participants in models that seek to strengthen labor rights protections 
globally.  While the rise of non-state actors in the international system is not new 
(Keohane and Nye 1977), the redistribution of power between states, non-state 
actors and international institutions in the interstate system is more recent, 
caused in part by the decline of state power, and the arrival of non-governmental 
organizations in those areas of social policy where states can no longer manage 
to provide services (Mathews 1997: 53).  
 Tarrow (2001) acknowledges that the gap left by the decline of states 
provides space for non-governmental forms of collective action to develop, 
whether as social movements, non-governmental organizations, or transnational 
                                            
9
 They also may weaken unions, usurping the roles unions play in enforcing workplace rules and 
monitoring workplace practices when they are taken on by NGOs (Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; 
Braun and Gearhart 2004). 
 13 
networks (Tarrow 2001: 2).  As such, the constituencies of global civil society can 
include social interaction across many types of actors, including business 
associations, educational partnerships, and even personal connections 
(Warkentin 2001).  Transnational advocacy networks are emerging as part of this 
global civil society.  These are dense social networks of political activists 
operating across national borders, differentiated from other transnational groups 
by their motivation by “principled ideas” and values (Keck and Sikkink 1998:5).  
They are distinct from other groups, as these “undertake voluntary collective 
action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest” 
(Price 2003).  Further, “advocates plead the causes of others, or defend a cause 
or proposition” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8), and therefore have an overt political 
agenda that other networks may not share, even when they too are organized 
transnationally.   
 The literature suggests that the purpose of transnational advocacy 
networks is to multiply the channels of access of domestic groups to international 
arenas by forming linkages across borders.  At the domestic level, groups within 
states face a government that violates rights, or refuses to recognize rights, 
creating a political conflict.  Keck and Sikkink note that advocacy networks are 
most likely to form when channels to resolve conflicts between domestic groups 
and their governments are blocked, or where these channels are insufficient to 
resolve the conflict.  Transnational groups will then actively seek political support 
outside of state borders to make their plea for redress, a mechanism described 
as the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Whether these calls will be 
 14 
answered by advocates is further dependent on whether activists believe that 
assisting domestic groups will further their missions or campaigns, and are willing 
to develop networks around them.    
 In order to mobilize support for domestic groups facing a politically 
repressive situation, transnational advocacy networks engage in four types of 
political strategies, only sometimes bringing all of them into play (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998).  Information exchange is at the core of transnational advocacy.  
When transnational advocacy networks support domestic groups, they serve as 
the messengers between states and the international system, and between 
domestic and international actors, in transmitting information about rights 
violations from one level of governance to another.  With access to on-the-
ground sources, networks are able to generate politically useful information from 
within states, and exchange information between local groups facing the 
repression and international audiences watching the repression unfold.  
Advocacy networks act as both the messenger and interpreter of that 
information, able to “quickly and credibly generate politically useful information 
and move it to where it will have the most impact” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  The 
credibility of the information about an evolving situation is key to assembling 
international allies.  With access to local sources, transnational advocates can 
provide first-hand accounts from affected populations that lend legitimacy to their 
claims.  
 Framing the information by creating symbols that capture the meaning of 
the violations is a second strategy (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  As networks collect 
 15 
information from trusted sources within states, they provide interpretations of that 
information that promote a version of events that will resonate with the intended 
audience.  Transnational advocates try to establish through framing that the 
rights violation is intentional, that states are ultimately responsible for the 
violation, and that the issue could be resolved through changes in state behavior.  
Framing is particularly effective when networks can include an identification of 
right and wrong, as these issue characteristics evoke strong emotions, which 
promotes the recruitment of activists (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  In order to 
promote their interpretation, advocates generate visible symbols for abuses that 
can substitute for complex issues.  Symbols that expose the immorality or 
hypocrisy of state actions can draw the attention of supporters, bring negative 
publicity to bear on states, and build pressure on states to change their policies.  
 When faced with transnational pressure, states may gradually implement 
superficial reforms at first to deflect criticism away from their behavior, even as 
they continue to violate rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  When 
transnational advocates still cannot persuade states to change their policies 
through normative arguments and pressure, they can then adopt a third strategy, 
leveraging more powerful actors and institutions, including other states, to 
increase the costs of non-compliance with the norm (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Cardenas 2004).  As governments begin to change their behavior, advocates 
employ a fourth strategy, accountability politics.  Advocates seek ways to keep 
states consistent between their discourse and actions, holding them accountable 
to an international audience as promises made by states are kept through 
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changes in behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Continued pressure from a 
transnational network can precipitate political learning, and push states to accept 
international norms (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  Eventually, norm 
compliance becomes habitual practice, and states continue to act in accordance 
with that norm (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
 When applied to labor rights advocacy, some transnational network 
strategies become more useful than others.  While information exchange and 
framing are again important strategies advocates can use to draw attention to 
cases of labor rights violations, the linkage of labor rights to trade agreements 
has special implications for the other two strategies, leverage and accountability.  
First, the social clause and its conditions provide additional sources of leverage 
advocates can use to promote changes in labor rights practice, because labor 
rights performance may complicate trade relations.  Even states that prefer to 
violate workers’ rights should begin to respond to calls to improve labor rights 
practices, if only for instrumental reasons as a way to protect market access.  
Second, the mechanisms that promote accountability are included in the 
agreements.  Worker protections may be strong on paper but enforcement of the 
law may be inadequate, whether due to weakened capacity to conduct workplace 
inspections (Angeles Villarreal 2008), or as tacit government policy.  Trade 
agreements require states to meet those obligations, and then provide the 
complaint mechanisms that transnational advocates can use to promote 
accountability. 
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 The application of the transnational advocacy model to trade-based labor 
rights conditionality underlines how a common purpose among states and 
transnational advocates -- the improved protection of labor rights-- can emerge 
from divergent motivations.  States may strive to protect labor rights, not because 
they value them intrinsically, but because they are concerned about how labor 
rights violations may impact their trade relations with other states.  When labor 
rights are enforced at the supranational level, economic concerns like market 
access and trade sanctions, and concerns over reputation within the system of 
states can push states toward norms compliance.  The leverage provided 
through labor conditionality clauses obliges states to respond to the normative 
arguments presented by transnational advocates, and to commit to stronger 
labor rights enforcement.  
  Transnational advocacy networks organize most effectively around issues 
that feature two especially compelling characteristics; reports of bodily harm to 
vulnerable individuals, and restrictions on equality of opportunity (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998).  Labor rights advocates understand this as well, and they play up 
these two characteristics in the ways they frame labor rights abuses.  For 
example, labor rights campaigns routinely feature stories of industrial accidents 
or the long-term effects of poor safety regulations that put workers’ health at risk 
(Williams 1999), and a number of networks have formed in response the killings 
of labor unionists (Frundt 1987; US-LEAP 2007).  Labor networks stress equality 
of opportunity to gain support when they emphasize women that face sexual 
harassment on the job in campaign materials (Hertel 2003), or how migrant 
 18 
workers endure poor working conditions because their immigration status 
implicates their access to legal channels (Chan 2001). 
  Participation at the local level is crucial to lasting labor campaign 
successes (Anner 2003a; Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Frundt 2002; Kidder 
2002).  The nature of cross-border labor solidarity has been that weaker 
domestic groups are joined by activists from elsewhere to strengthen their hand 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), and fostering local level competence in the organization 
assures that the gains of campaigns can be maintained once partners leave to 
pursue other issues.  Where efforts are made to develop a local base, whether 
through incorporating local groups in the campaign decisions, organizing workers 
in the factory, or establishing labor rights organizations, abuses are ended, 
wages and benefits increase, and unions and workers’ organizations are 
strengthened in the long term (Anner 2003a). 
 
Labor Rights Networks   
 Most of the research on transnational advocacy favors four issue areas 
where lasting networks have formed, including human rights, women's rights, the 
rights of indigenous peoples, and environmental issues.  The selection of these 
issue areas is especially suited to reflect the normative turn in international 
relations theory in the 1990s emerging at the same time (Tarrow 2001), as 
examples drawn from these issue areas clearly support the contention that 
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states’ interests could be constituted externally through social learning.10  Yet, 
transnational organization is also driven by material interest, as the earliest work 
on transnational economic relations makes clear (Keohane and Nye 1974; Nye 
and Keohane 1971).11  The work on transnational labor rights advocacy attempts 
to explain transnational networks around material interests at times, but also 
features dimensions of principled interest in labor rights protection that are fully 
amenable to the normative bias of the transnational advocacy model. 
  Keck and Sikkink suggest that the alliances between non-governmental 
organizations and unions are not transnational advocacy networks.12  It is not 
that these authors outright rejected transnational labor solidarity as an important 
example of transnational advocacy so much as they did not analyze it, 
mentioning only that labor internationalism is better considered an extension of 
unionism, except where transitory support groups against union repression 
formed in the 1980s and 1990s (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  We might assume that 
Keck and Sikkink saw labor rights concerns promoted by labor unions 
exclusively, and therefore bounded by material interests, not principles and moral 
values.  Yet, when unions form cross-border partnerships, research tells us they 
                                            
10
 Some important examples include the international land mines ban (Price 2003), compliance 
with human rights regimes (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), environmental campaigns (Bosco 
and Rivera 2009 and Khagram 2004) and international feminist organizing (Marx Ferree and 
Tripp 2006, and Mogdaham 2005).  
11
 New work in transnational relations that emphasizes material interests include studies on 
transnational linkages in finance (Park 2005), managerial practices (Roberts, Jones, and 
Fröhling 2005), and intellectual property rights (Sell and Prakash 2004). 
12
 The book devotes just two sentences and one footnote to the subject, on page 15 (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998).  One of the major critiques of the book has been that it ignores analyzing any 
material-based transnationalism (Tarrow 2001), especially transnational labor (Hertel 2006).   
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focus their concerns less on wage differentials and more on labor standards and 
working conditions, much like transnational labor rights advocacy networks 
(Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Stillerman 2003).13   
 Organized labor has increasingly pursued transnational solidarity as 
unions lose numbers as a result of economic integration --and therefore domestic 
political influence and access to the policy arena (Hathaway 2002a; Kay 2005; 
Murillo and Schrank 2005; Seidman 2004; Stillerman 2003; Tilly 1995; Boswell 
and Stevis 1997; Anner 2002).  By the 1990s, labor internationalism changed 
fundamentally when it surfaced as “social movement unionism,” by which trades 
unions reached out to form horizontal alliances with women’s groups, 
environmental organizations and other social actors outside of the workplace 
context (Babson 2002b; Scopes 1992; Waterman 1991; Nissen 2003).  US 
unions never fully adopted social movement unionism, but still formed linkages 
with social movements in the early 1990s as a reaction to NAFTA (Hathaway 
2002a; Cook 1997; Kay 2005; Boswell and Stevis 1997; Singh 2002), and more 
so after 1995 with a change of leadership to a more internationally-oriented 
coalition at the AFL-CIO.   
 An emphasis on union alliances as the major form of transnational labor 
advocacy obfuscates the emergence of labor solidarity networks fronted by 
NGOs, which and may or may not include labor unions as partners and 
collaborators.  The literature on transnational labor rights advocacy has not 
helped clarify here, as previous work tends to treat unions and NGOs as similar 
                                            
13
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
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organizations when they choose transnational strategies (Williams 2003; 
Williams 1999; Stillerman 2003), when in fact unions and NGOs face very 
different opportunities and constraints in their decisions to purse transnational 
linkages.  As such, the factors that explain transnational solidarity among labor 
unions are very different from those that explain transnational linkages among 
labor rights NGOs.    
 In contrast to network emergence among NGOs, union transnationalism 
responds to the domestic structures of labor’s relationship to the economic 
system, rather than ideational factors.  Most importantly, the decision to pursue 
transnational linkages among unions lies in whether union centrals can rely on 
state structures to weather the consequences of economic pressure, or if the 
channels of state support for unions are blocked.  Therefore, union responses 
are tied first to domestic political structures, and most importantly, the form of 
labor incorporation to the political system (Murillo and Schrank 2005; Anner 
2002).  In countries where systems of labor incorporation were led by states or 
political parties (Collier and Collier 1991), unions can draw on domestic political 
structures to navigate the pressures of economic globalization, and so are less 
likely to adopt transnational strategies (Murillo and Schrank 2005; Anner 2002; 
Anner 2003b).  Not only is respect for labor rights stronger in terms of the 
industrial relations framework, but unions have access to labor policy as 
recognized political actors in tripartite structures, and can enjoy substantial 
influence in the political system through ties to political parties.   
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 The response by labor to the pressures of globalization has been to draw 
upon these areas of influence to generate protectionist policies or compromises 
with the state that maintain labor’s political influence, even given declining 
unionization rates (Anner 2002; Anner 2003b).14  A number of studies of union 
support for neoliberal economic reform have established that unions turn inward 
to become more entrenched in state structures to maintain political influence in 
parties and government as union membership wanes, including in the states 
most marked by corporatism, like Argentina (Murillo and Schrank 2005; Murillo 
2000), Venezuela (Murillo 2001; Burgess 1999), and Mexico (Murillo 2001; 
Murillo 2000; Burgess 1999; Zapata 1993).  
 However, not every union central has access to domestic structures to 
resolve their conflicts.  Unions in states where labor was weakly incorporated into 
state-building projects, or where labor was altogether demobilized, do not 
necessarily have the same access to domestic political structures (Murillo and 
Schrank 2005; Anner 2002; Anner 2003b).  There may be few domestic 
institutions to appeal to where the system of labor justice is weak and 
underfunded, or inspections are rare due to reduced state budgets.  Under these 
conditions, where domestic structures that labor could appeal to either do not 
exist or are hostile to labor, unions are more likely to choose transnational 
strategies (Anner et al. 2006, 2002, 2003b; Murillo and Schrank 2005).    
                                            
14
 In turn, unions receive a payoff for continued support of state policies, even when they hurt 
labor, first through union-friendly labor reform (Murillo and Schrank 2005; Anner et al. 2006) 
and second through the continued distribution of political favors to unions.  See Murillo (2001, 
2005) for Mexico and Argentina.  
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Persuasion and Coercion in the Trade and Labor Linkage 
 Transnational pressure, organizational dynamics, and actor strategies 
may predict when transnational labor rights advocacy is effective in pressuring 
states to promote labor rights, but these factors cannot predict which states will 
give in to transnational pressure.  While normative concerns about the need to 
protect labor rights may drive transnational labor activism, states may be far 
more instrumental in the ways that they respond to these arguments.  State 
response to transnational pressure varies according to the degree to which 
states are susceptible to moral pressure and material leverage from the outside 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998), and how domestic policymakers weigh the incentives 
for compliance against the costs of continued violation (Cardenas 2004). 
 State compliance with labor rights guarantees, especially when tied to 
trade conditionality, responds to a different logic than state compliance with 
human rights treaties.  Human rights treaties lack clear channels for enforcement 
as the councils established to monitor compliance often lack the capacity to do 
so, or the mechanisms to induce compliance are absent (Hill 2009).  Instead, 
states are allowed to self-monitor and report, with predictable results.  Even 
when states report violations, international organizations are powerless to punish 
violations other than to file a formal complaint.  Essentially, the enforcement of 
compliance is voluntary, and states could sign onto human rights commitments 
without ever intending to comply with their recommendations.  Recent work on 
human rights compliance indeed shows that government ratification is followed 
by either no change in human rights protections (Camp Keith 1999; Hafner-
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Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002b), or worse, some countries that ratify 
human rights treaties commit more human rights violations than before 
ratification (Hill 2009; Hathaway 2002b).   
 Though commitment to labor rights conventions suffer from the same 
enforcement weaknesses overall (Olson 2001; Collingsworth 2002), once tied to 
trade agreements, labor rights commitment follows the hard enforcement 
mechanisms provided by trade regimes to protect commercial rights, intellectual 
property, and investors rights.15  Worker protections may already be written into 
constitutions and domestic labor law, but might not be enforced by states.  Trade 
agreements compel states to meet those obligations, and often provide the 
complaint procedures that transnational advocates can use to keep states 
accountable to their public commitment to improve labor rights enforcement.16  
Because signing onto labor rights conditionality is the price of admission to trade 
cooperation, even states that disregard labor rights would cooperate here, 
because non-compliance can potentially have serious implications for trade 
relationships, especially market access.  As such, establishing labor rights 
                                            
15 Though certainly labor rights and environmental standards are not protected as vigorously as 
the rights of commercial actors.  
16
 Even when there are no established institutions for citizen participation in the review process, 
advocates find creative ways to push for reviews of state practices.  For example, the US-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement did not establish either a review process or an institution to 
receive requests for review.  Yet the AFL-CIO and the National Labor Committee, working 
separately, were able to convince the Office of the US Trade Representative to take a closer 
look at labor rights in Jordan in 2006 by publishing an exposé of the Jordanian garment sector 
while concurrently sending petitions for review to each of the US offices that had reviewed 
labor rights conditionality in previous agreements (Greenhouse and Barbaro 2006; National 
Labor Committee 2006). The AFL-CIO petition is on file with the author.  
 25 
conditionality through trade regimes supplements the persuasive aspects of 
transnational advocacy with a coercive capacity to enforce state compliance.  
 Coercion is likely to provide stronger incentives for compliance than 
persuasion alone, as persuasive tactics require that advocates successfully 
convince actors to change their preferences for violation (Hafner-Burton 2005).  
Coercion induces compliance by shifting the costs of continued violation and 
changing the gains from adopting better practices for states, without the 
attendant, more difficult condition to also change actor’s preferences (Cardenas 
2004; Hafner-Burton 2005).  Labor conditionality clauses oblige states to accept 
the normative arguments presented by advocates, and to commit to stronger 
labor rights enforcement, whether or not they embrace the norm itself.  Where 
they are compelled by treaty to enforce labor laws, and where the cost of not 
doing so involves important economic consequences like potential trade 
sanctions, states may at least take note.  
 Whether or not transnational advocacy networks are successful in 
promoting political change is in part determined by the calculations made by 
states of the perceived costs of continued violation and the benefits of norm 
compliance presented by transnational advocates (Cardenas 2004).  Advocates 
can raise the costs of non-compliance for states, while at the same time 
generating social support for positive changes.  Continued social pressure by 
transnational civil society can precipitate political learning and push states to 
either accept international human rights and labor rights norms (Risse, Ropp, 
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and Sikkink 1999), or lead them to at least implement their prescriptions in order 
to retain preferential trade relations.  
 
The Mexican Case 
 Freedom of association has long been tumultuous in Mexico because of 
the historically close ties between the state and PRI-affiliated unions.  The legacy 
of the political incorporation of labor, the corporatist system, and union rivalries 
all appear in the NAALC cases against Mexico, where violation of freedom of 
association is by far the most common complaint.  Mexico’s history of labor 
incorporation during the 1930s is a classic example of incorporation through 
radical populism (Collier and Collier 1991).17  In the unstable years following the 
Mexican Revolution, the popular sectors were organized into mass associations 
and linked to the post-revolutionary Mexican state through alliances that both 
constrained mass politics and provided political support and revolutionary 
legitimacy for the new government.  As the best-organized social actor, labor’s 
support was crucial to regime consolidation in Mexico (Collier and Collier 1991; 
Middlebrook 1995).  By the 1930s, unions allied with the state were consolidated 
into a united confederation of trade unions, the Confederación de Trabajadores 
Mexicanos (CTM), and incorporated during the Cárdenas years into the mass 
party, eventually known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).   
 Unions benefited considerably for their acquiescence to state control over 
organized labor and their political cooperation in state-building.  Among these 
                                            
17
 Of the 24 cases filed in Mexico, 18 list the right to freedom of association as the main labor 
principle raised in the case. 
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benefits, state support for union organization was sustained through two 
favorable labor clauses.  An exclusion clause mandated that employers could 
only hire unionized workers, effectively creating a closed shop (Middlebrook 
1995).  Only one union was recognized in each workplace in practice, and that 
union held exclusive rights to bargain the collective contract.  While these two 
clauses favored the consolidation of union representation among state allies, 
they also created limits on the right to organize outside of the state corporatist 
structure dominated by the CTM.  
  The relationship between labor unions and the State suggests that unions 
in Mexico would continue to draw on state channels to solve labor disputes, 
rather than turn to transnational allies.  Mexico is thus an unlikely case to show 
the embrace of transnational alliances among unions, yet transnational 
relationships between US and Mexican unions and NGOs have increased since 
the negotiation of the NAFTA invigorated cross-border alliances in the three 
countries (Boswell and Stevis 1997; Singh 2002; Kay 2005, Hathaway).  One 
explanation is that not all unions are incorporated to the state-labor nexus.  Since 
the 1990s, a number of unions independent from government sponsorship have 
emerged, culminating in the establishment of a rival union central, the Union 
Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT), in 1997 (Hathaway 2002a).  The labor relations 
system in Mexico, designed to favor unions allied to the state, both creates 
conflict over freedom of association that appears in the NAALC cases, but also 
pushes independent unions to seek transnational support.  Unions that exist 
outside of the corporatist structure often face discrimination at Mexico’s tripartite 
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labor board structure in cases that challenge collective rights, as the labor 
representative often is designated by the state Governor from leaders of the 
CTM.  Thus, workers wishing to register an independent union, contest election 
irregularities, or otherwise challenge the conduct of the official unions must 
confront those same unions at the labor board.  Nascent worker organizations 
face two of three votes against them before they even approach the board with 
the specifics of their case.18  In these cases, domestic channels for workers 
redress are blocked due to political rivalries, leading some unions to pursue 
transnational linkages with other unions, and labor rights and human rights 
NGOs.  
 The corporatist unions derail attempts to form independent unions in 
economically important industries through the use of protection contracts, 
collective bargaining agreements negotiated by CTM union bosses for plants 
before they begin to hire workers.  These contracts fulfill the single unionized 
workforce clause (Quintero Ramírez 2001; Curtis and Gutierrez 1994), but 
nevertheless, the union only exists on paper (Cornelius and Craig 1991).  
Workers may not know they are represented by a union until they have a 
legitimate complaint against the firm and the union representative appears and 
steps in to negotiate at terms favorable to the company.  Under these conditions, 
dissident unions may reach out to transnational allies.  Not surprisingly, the 
workers organizations that tend to pursue transnational NGO linkages in Mexico 
are often those in consumer-driven production chains in the maquiladora sector, 
                                            
18
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
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and especially in textiles, where protection contracts are widely used.  I turn to 
these examples in Chapters Three and Four. 
  
Methods, Data, and Research Design 
 The research design allows for the investigation of these issues by 
locating the study at global, interstate and domestic levels of analysis.  First, 
investigating how pressures on states from the international level are filtered into 
domestic politics at federal, subnational, and local levels of governance offsets 
the level of analysis problem by which the preponderance of global and interstate 
approaches masks domestic variance in the response to these pressures (Singer 
1961).  Second, the dissertation consciously employs mixed methods to 
maximize the explanatory power of analyses located at both international and 
domestic levels.  The quantitative portion of the dissertation analyzes the 
enforcement of one trade-based social clause, the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation (NAALC).  A small-N quantitative study is designed to test the 
role of transnational advocacy on case acceptance and outcomes.  Under the 
NAALC, any citizen or group can file a complaint with a National Administrative 
Office (NAO) regarding labor law enforcement in Canada, Mexico, or the United 
States.  This model is a small-N statistical analysis relying on cross-tabulations 
and probits of the factors that predict case review, meant to draw out the patterns 
of enforcement of the clause based on the record of 37 cases through 2005.   
 One advantage of analyzing a small data set is that the study allows for 
more refined collection of data on the cases in question than would be possible in 
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a large-N study.  For example, the petitions on NAFTA provide information about 
the individual cases that can be collected and tested systematically for their 
effects, such as the depth of transnational organization, the comparative level of 
labor rights violations in each factory or workplace, and qualitative assessment of 
the petition information.  As such, the patterns of interaction uncovered by the 
statistical analysis can be further developed through case study.  Nesting 
comparative case studies at the subnational level within statistical analyses 
allows for the disaggregation of national level data that may mask local variation, 
allows unique case factors to come through the explanation, and overall guards 
against the limitations of using quantitative and qualitative methods alone (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994; Snyder 2001). 
 Locating the qualitative analysis in one state, Mexico, controls for a 
number of historical, cultural, socio-economic and political variables (Snyder 
2001).  Most of the cases analyzed here center on Mexico’s experience with 
NAFTA’s labor side agreement, and as such, the system of labor relations is 
similar for all cases.  Workers in most of these cases were organized under 
collective contracts held by unions of the CTM.  In response to deteriorating 
working conditions and the inability of the corporatist unions to provide effective 
representation to solve them, efforts to organize independent unions surfaced 
during the late 1990s, bringing the attention of US, Canadian, and European 
labor rights solidarity groups.  The differences among these cases are the degree 
of transnational support available to local worker’s organizations, the strategies 
and venues that workers and their supporters employed to realize the 
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unionization effort, and the ways that Mexico responded to varied transnational 
strategies in different cases.  The case studies further disaggregate how labor 
leaders and transnational actors selected the strategies they used to press their 
claims on labor rights abuses, how they chose among different venues for 
making those claims, and the conditions under which some strategies were more 
effective than others for addressing violations, especially the consequences of 
using trade-based mechanisms compared to other available venues. 
 The data for the dissertation was collected from a number of original and 
secondary sources.  Primary material includes open ended interviews with key 
participants in the NAALC cases analyzed here, including US labor unions; US, 
Mexican and Canadian labor rights solidarity groups, and the Commission for 
Labor and Human Rights of the Tehuacán Valley; the National Administrative 
Offices of the NAFTA labor side agreement in the US and Mexico, and 
representatives of the tri-national Committee for Labor Cooperation, and the 
leadership and rank-and-file members of the nascent workers’ organizations that 
appear in Chapters Three and Four.  
 Primary documents include union registration documents, newspaper 
accounts of the NAALC process and case filings in the US and Mexican press, 
published interviews and written testimony from workers collected by others, and 
transcription of correspondence between advocacy network members.  The 
NAFTA data set and chapters on the NAFTA cases draw on the original petitions 
submitted to the NAALC process and supporting documentation, including 
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supplementary annexes, public hearing transcripts, and correspondence 
between NAOs, case sponsors and targeted companies.   
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized into six chapters.  Following this introductory 
chapter, Chapter Two, “Transnational Actors and Labor Rights Enforcement in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement,” speaks directly to the role 
transnational advocates play in enforcing labor rights at the interstate level of 
analysis.  In this chapter, I analyze the factors that determine whether cases are 
reviewed by the tri-national labor dispute bodies established by the NAFTA labor 
side agreement.  I test rival hypotheses on transnational participation, case 
merits, and case framing to show that while transnational advocacy is a key 
factor that explains which cases are reviewed by the national NAFTA panels, 
case framing can help secure a review during the NAALC process.  
 Chapter Three, “Persuasion, Coercion and the Domestic Costs of 
Compliance: Evaluating the NAALC Resolutions,” presents a comparative study 
of five cases brought to NAFTA labor arbitration to look more closely at the 
interaction between interstate and domestic levels of analysis.  It reviews the 
transnational sources of pressure on Mexico to promote labor rights enforcement 
in the NAFTA context to explain why Mexico acceded to transnational pressure in 
some cases, but not in others.  It examines the domestic factors that may explain 
Mexico’s uneven response to the NAFTA process, especially democratization 
and the role played by the labor clause mechanism as the vehicle for crystallizing 
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domestic labor rights demands, to explain the reform of labor rights policy and 
practices within Mexico in some of the cases, and government intervention in 
others. 
  Chapter Four, “The Impacts and Limitations of Transnational Labor Rights 
Advocacy: Lessons from Puebla, Mexico,” presents a comparative case analysis 
culled from the Mexican fieldwork and is located at the subnational level of 
analysis.  The cases include three maquiladora assembly plants that 
manufacture footwear and apparel for the US.  The chapter analyzes how 
transnational support and the choice of strategies transnational networks 
followed conditioned the outcomes in the selected attempts to organize 
independent unions in the garment export sector.  While the struggle at 
Kukdong/Mexmode was the center of an international labor rights campaign, a 
joint petition regarding Tarrant and Matamoros was ultimately submitted to 
NAALC arbitration.19  Comparison of how these strategies unfolded in each case 
clarifies the roles of transnational actors in promoting labor rights enforcement, 
and evaluates the contribution that trade-based mechanisms may add to the 
realization and process of local level labor struggles as compared to other 
available strategies.  
 Finally, the conclusion will review the evidence presented in the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses to more fully assess the efficacy of the 
                                            
19 The Kukdong factory changed its name to Mexmode after the independent union was granted 
registration.  It is popularly referred to as Kukdong. Tarrant Ajalpan and Matamoros Garment 
are separate firms, but are the subject of a single NAALC petition, referred to here as the 
Puebla case.  
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trade-labor linkages in promoting labor rights enforcement, and the roles that 
transnational advocates play in enforcing them.  It also discusses why the trade-
based methods are more promising avenues for protecting labor rights globally 
than other transnational strategies, especially those that target firms, not states, 
and suggests that further research on the institutional design of enforcement 
clauses is in order.  
 
Conclusions 
 Following Mexico’s experience with the NAALC from case submission to 
review, and from resolution at the domestic level to local level impact sheds light 
on the broader questions of the dissertation.  One, the analysis of the review of 
cases presented in the next chapter investigates when and how specific 
instances of labor rights violations may provoke an investigation into a country’s 
labor rights practices.  The review of Mexico’s response to transnational 
advocates at the domestic and subnational levels in Chapter Four illustrates the 
completing interests in compliance that condition whether a state will improve 
labor rights enforcement.  Finally, the review of  local-level effects that are 
included in Chapter Five assess the extent to which institutional remedies 
translate into gains for workers, thus allowing us to measure the efficacy of the 
NAALC across both measures, implementation and outcomes.  
 More generally, this research holds important implications for the 
theoretical literature on the effects of globalization on labor rights and the role of 
transnational advocacy in promoting labor rights enforcement, and it promises to 
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offer new insights on the value of linking social clauses to trade agreements.  
The project bridges the work on transnational advocacy and labor rights, 
expanding the transnational advocacy framework to include cross-border labor 
solidarity, and applying the models to trade-based social clauses.  This work also 
addresses the theoretically significant interaction of transnational labor rights 
advocacy and international institutions associated with economic cooperation, 
and brings them together to understand the roles that non-state actors can play 
in enforcing international institutions. 
  The dissertation offers an in-depth study of how less developed states 
manage pressures to improve labor rights enforcement at the global, interstate 
and subnational levels of analysis.  Methodologically, the research bridges 
methods of inquiry to offset some of the limitations of any of them alone.  
Quantitative analysis establishes the broad patterns of labor rights enforcement, 
while the comparative case studies explore in greater detail the role of actors and 
strategies in labor rights enforcement at the domestic level in Mexico.  Mixing 
methods connects the research to other disciplines, and draws in ideas from a 
number of areas, including political economy, democratization, and human rights.  
  Finally, the research offers an argument for pursing the trade and labor 
linkage through trade policy.  Proposals that focus on the state potentially cover a 
wider range of workers than just those that work in factories that produce goods 
for well-known consumer brands, or make the most compelling cases that attract 
the attention of Northern activists.  This work will evaluate the effectiveness of 
labor conditionality clauses as one possible method for protecting labor rights 
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globally, potentially prescribing ways to interconnect less-developed nations with 
the industrialized world as economic integration blazes forward, without also 
sacrificing labor rights.  
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Chapter Two:  
Transnational Advocates and Labor Rights Enforcement  
in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
 In considering the impact of trade-based social clauses on domestic labor 
rights protection more broadly, I investigate the enforcement mechanisms of 
these clauses in the context of one agreement, the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side agreement to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.  Negotiated by Mexico, the United States and Canada at 
the end of the NAFTA trade negotiations, the NAALC agreement on labor and a 
sister agreement on environmental cooperation are the supplemental 
agreements that promote tri-national cooperation on trade-related aspects of 
areas not normally considered trade issues.  
 Though labor unions and their allies in the US and Canada pressed for a 
labor side agreement that would create new North American labor standards and 
include hard enforcement mechanisms like the ones that were attached to 
NAFTA’s commercial provisions, the agreement that was eventually ratified fell 
short of their expectations.  The NAALC only mandates that labor protections 
already established under national labor laws are enforced, and does not create 
new labor standards (Franco Hijuelos 2001; Compa 2001).20  The NAALC does 
specify formal complaint proceedings and dispute resolution for labor rights 
violations.  Under the NAALC statutes, any citizen or group can file a complaint 
with a National Administrative Office regarding labor law practices by a NAFTA 
                                            
20
 Though the NAALC mandates that states must only uphold their own labor laws, some authors 
argue that the NAALC establishes regional labor standards in practice.  See Kay (2005). 
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partner.21  Once the allegations of labor rights violation are reviewed, states can 
mandate resolutions meant to promote compliance with the NAALC’s 11 labor 
principles, including meetings between Ministers of Labor, evaluation by a 
Committee of Experts, formal panel arbitration, and in some cases, trade 
sanctions. 
   I evaluate the possibilities for enforcing the NAALC agreement by 
analyzing the mechanisms that determine whether or the not petitions alleging 
labor rights violation are accepted for review by the NAOs, as established in the 
NAALC agreement.  As such, the analysis attempts to answer two major 
questions.  First, how are the mechanisms of social clauses engaged by states 
and non-state actors?  Second, what are the factors that determine whether 
cases of labor rights abuses are accepted for review by states?  
 The chapter draws on the roles that transnational advocacy networks play 
in promoting political change within states, especially in the area of labor rights 
advocacy.  Labor rights solidarity groups, US, Mexican, and Canadian unions 
and their transnational allies are at the forefront of testing the labor rights clause 
through the petitions process established by the NAALC.  Though most theories 
on transnational advocacy shun interpretations that center on actors that are 
motivated by material interests, I show that linking trade and labor rights 
guarantees combines material interests with normative pressures, and that the 
                                            
21
 These offices were established by the NAFTA agreement to promote consultation and 
cooperation on labor issues in all three states.  In the US, the NAO is now known as the Office 
of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA).  I will refer to it as the US NAO to stay consistent with the 
parallel institutions in Mexico and Canada. 
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ideational frameworks of transnational advocacy are suitable for explaining 
transborder political action around labor rights issues.  The NAALC is an 
appropriate case to use to study these issues because nearly all US trade-based 
labor clauses since the NAALC respond in some way to the NAALC structure 
and institutions (Weiss 2003), allowing us to anticipate how these mechanisms 
may and may not function in subsequent agreements.  Further, because the 
agreement was signed 15 years ago, it yields a number of cases from which to 
draw conclusions, and an opportunity to examine NAO decisions over time.   
  Using original data constructed from all petitions submitted to NAALC 
arbitration since 1994, I present an empirical analysis that establishes the broad 
patterns of case acceptance through 2005.  I pose rival hypotheses about the 
petitions process, proposing that when transnational advocates are involved in 
labor rights arbitration, petitions will be reviewed more often than when submitted 
by groups without such linkages.  I then consider the content of the petitions to 
discuss how the presentation of information in them, especially violence and the 
use of worker testimony, accounts for decisions to accept some cases for review 
but not others.  While the social clause has been criticized for its limited 
jurisdiction, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and failure to redress firm-
level grievances (Singh 2002; Hovis 1994; Robinson 2002; International Labor 
Rights Fund 1995; Bensusán 2002), this analysis concludes that even weak 
social clauses produce their own political dynamics that can lead to greater 
attention to workers’ rights protections within states. 
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Norms, Transnational Advocacy and Political Change  
 As contact between states has deepened with the expansion of 
international trade, contact between citizens has coalesced around economic, 
social, cultural and political issues.  Transnational advocacy networks have 
emerged as part of this internationalization of civil society.  These are networks 
of political activists operating across national borders, differentiated from other 
transnational groups by their motivation by “principled ideas” and values (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998).  Network participants have taken advantage of the 
opportunities for cross-cultural communication afforded by globalization to forge 
relationships with those who share a commitment to these political causes, 
wherever they are located.  
 Transnational advocacy networks serve three purposes in the international 
system: they provide information on rights violations within states; they legitimate 
the claims of opposition groups, thus strengthening those claims; and they 
challenge states to change their behavior (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999:5).  As 
such, transnational advocates play an important role in disseminating information 
about rights, and the violation of rights by states, from international audiences to 
states at the domestic level.  While working to establish international support for 
opposition groups facing rights violations, transnational advocates serve as 
conduits of information to a larger community about political conditions within 
states, offering a credible alternative to government sources (Keck and Sikkink 
1998).  In engaging violating states, transnational advocacy networks provide 
information about international norms, socializing them to adopt behaviors that 
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are more acceptable to an international community (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999:5).  By showing states that international audiences perceive their behavior 
negatively, networks can persuade states to change their policies and behavior. 
 The authors of this framework conclude that the process of state 
socialization around human rights practices is generalizeable across regions and 
political regimes (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  As such, the transnational 
advocacy model can be extended theoretically to describe norm socialization 
around other issue areas, as anticipated by the authors themselves (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  Though Keck and Sikkink questioned whether 
alliances between trade unions are representative of transnational advocacy 
networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), such networks have emerged around labor 
rights and labor standards much as they have around other “principled issues”, 
like human rights.  For transnational labor rights advocates, labor rights are 
human rights, and provide a natural extension to the model.22 
 
Labor Side Agreement Arbitration  
 Each state is bound to manage the NAALC process according to the 
procedural guidelines established by the Agreement (NAALC 1993).  As 
consultative bodies, the NAOs of each state see their roles as primarily one of 
                                            
22 The labor rights listed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights include the right to work 
under favorable conditions, including equal pay for equal work, pay that supports human 
dignity, and the right to rest; prohibition on slavery or servitude; and the right to free 
association and the right to join and form trade unions to protect these rights (UDHR 1948: 
articles 23-24).  For more on maximum versus minimum definitions of labor rights and human 
rights, see Leary (1996) and Chan (1998, 2001). 
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information sharing and tri-state cooperation around technical issues, rather than 
as adversarial bodies ready to assign blame to states or firms for workers rights 
abuses.23   
 Individual NAO offices do have some independence to interpret states’ 
obligations under the agreement.  As such, participation by the Mexican 
government in cooperative activities has been hampered by an especially narrow 
interpretation of Mexican responsibilities, suggesting that the tensions between 
integration and sovereignty presented by the NAALC still color Mexico’s 
cooperation with the United States around labor rights.24  In contrast, the US 
takes a broad interpretation of the kinds of actions that the office may take while 
reviewing petitions, including holding public hearings and conducting in-country 
investigations (much to Mexico’s protests), neither of which are included in the 
text of the agreement.25  Canada takes a lesser role in the NAALC, as much of 
Canadian labor law is left to the provinces that have ratified the NAALC 
agreement, resulting in fewer cases overall against Canada.26  
                                            
23
 Interviews, US NAO, Washington, D.C., 2007, the Committee for Labor Cooperation, 
Washington D.C., 2007, and the Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS), 
Subcoordinación de Política Laboral Hemisférica (the Secretariat for Labor and Social 
Security, Sub-coordinator for Hemispheric Labor Policy, referred to subsequently as the 
Mexican NAO), Mexico City, Mexico, 2006.  See also Franco Hijuelos (2001). 
24  Interviews, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Washington, D.C., and the Mexican NAO, 
Mexico City, Mexico, 2006.  Weiss (2003)discusses how the NAALC agreement was very 
carefully crafted to reference the protection of state sovereignty in the language and design of 
the agreement. 
25
 Interviews, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Washington, D.C., and the Mexican NAO, 
Mexico City, Mexico, 2006. 
26
 Though the principles of NAALC nominally hold across the country, and the Canadian NAO 
participates fully in the review process, jurisdiction for complaints depends on provincial 
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 In filing a complaint, petitioners must show that cases meet procedural 
criteria for adjudication, demonstrate that the allegations form a pattern of abuse, 
and establish that the government failed to uphold its domestic labor law through 
its actions.  Complaints cannot be filed with the NAO in the state where the 
alleged violation takes place, to ensure an independent review.  
If the petition is accepted for review, the NAO starts a formal investigation of the 
case and the allegations, collecting more information from the petitioners and 
from the NAO of the targeted country.  The NAOs at times hold public hearings 
on the submission and the issues raised within it, which can include testimony 
and written affidavits from witnesses and experts, statements from the firms 
involved, and reports on the relevant labor laws from the NAO of the targeted 
state.  Finally, the NAO makes a public report on how issues raised in the petition 
should be addressed under the auspices of the agreement.   
 NAO offices can suggest four types of redress, which are in turn limited by 
the category of violation.  For submissions involving child labor, wage disputes, 
or health and safety violations, the full range of remedies is available, including 
Ministerial Consultations, further evaluation by a Committee of Experts, formal 
panel arbitration, and if still unresolved, trade sanctions (NAALC 1993: 15-24; US 
Department of Labor n.d).27  Submissions concerning forced labor, minimum 
employment standards, discrimination, workers’ compensation, or protection of 
                                                                                                                                  
cooperation, and only Manitoba, Alberta and Prince Edward Island have ratified the 
agreement.  
27
 Franco Hijuelos (2001) offers a more detailed discussion of the significance of the Committee 
of Experts. 
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migrants are limited to Ministerial Consultation and expert evaluation (NAALC 
1993).  Freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to 
strike are afforded the least redress, as they are subject only to Ministerial 
Consultation.  In effect, the different categories of resolution mean that the 
process favors the protection of individual rights, rather than collective labor 
rights.  There are no provisions in the NAALC agreement that allow the NAALC 
institutions to intervene in labor disputes in other states.  
 The petition acceptance stage is important to the process because not 
only does acceptance determine whose claims will be heard, potentially 
legitimizing the allegations made by groups about labor rights violations (Frundt 
1998b; Graubart 2008), but a number of studies of transnational labor advocacy 
have argued that just filing a petition presents a threat to alter the trade 
relationship, and thus is the part of the process where states seriously consider 
making policy changes.  In states as diverse as Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, Bangladesh, and Swaziland, the pressure on states marshaled by just 
the filing of a labor rights petition brought about significant changes in how labor 
rights are enforced within those states (Frundt 1998b; Douglass, Fergusson, and 
Klett 2004).  For these reasons, this analysis addresses the filing and review 
stages of the NAALC process.  Chapter Three analyzes the outcomes of the 
NAALC cases in detail. 
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Data and Indicators 
 The NAALC is one of the few trade-based labor rights clauses that include 
formalized institutional mechanisms for dispute resolution.  Thirty-seven cases of 
labor code violations were filed under the labor side agreement through 2005.  
The unit of analysis for the data is a petition filed at an NAO in the US, Mexico or 
Canada.  Overall, twenty-six petitions claim challenges to freedom of association, 
16 petitions concern health and safety violations, either exclusively or as part of a 
range of issues, six petitions involve the rights of migrant workers in the US, and 
two concern child labor.  In four cases, submissions were filed simultaneously in 
two NAO offices for concurrent reviews.  Petitions filed in separate NAOs are 
considered separate cases in the data.  Cases where secondary issues were 
added in a later submission are also included as separate cases.28  Every petition 
that has been submitted for review through 2005 is included in the data.  A full list 
of the cases, where they were submitted, the issues presented in them, and their 
resolutions appear as Appendix A. 
 To test the importance of transnational advocacy on the decision to review 
a case, cases are coded by whether or not the petition was filed by transnational 
advocates.  Cases are coded as transnational when either of the following two 
conditions holds.  First, petitions are co-sponsored by groups that while based in 
one country, have an organizational presence, such as a field office or staff, in 
                                            
28 For these cases, the NAOs considered the additional claims as separate issues, even if they 
occurred in the same factory or workplace already under review.  For example, Han Young is 
included in the data set once for the original submission on freedom of association and again 
for the later addendum on health and safety. 
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another country.  This rule categorizes as transnational those cases where 
petition sponsors are non-governmental organizations based in Canada, for 
instance, but have programs in Mexico, as well as petitions sponsored by groups 
that have a global  presence, such as Human Rights Watch.  The second 
condition is that petition sponsors have formed an organizational linkage with 
another group in a different country, even if both groups are nominally based in a 
single country themselves.29  Co-sponsorship of the NAALC petitions assumes a 
working relationship between filing groups, including the sharing of information 
and institutional resources to produce the petition, and local participation in the 
case in the country where the violations allegedly occurred.  Cases are coded as 
national cases when neither of these conditions hold.  For example, when 
sponsors are based wholly in the US, Canada, or Mexico they are coded as 
nationally based groups.  They are also coded as nationally based groups when 
sponsors do not demonstrate organizational ties to groups in another country.  A 
dichotomous variable was created where petitions sponsored by transnational 
advocates are coded as 1, and all others are coded as 0.30  
 Information on petition sponsorship is drawn solely on the petition 
sponsors list provided in every Public Submission.  It is possible that the petition 
                                            
29
 One example would be a petition jointly sponsored by a group based only in Mexico and a 
group based only in Canada. 
30
 Data was collected from the Public Submission for each case, the petitions submitted by the 
sponsors to the NAOs for a possible review.  Information on whether or not a complaint was 
accepted for review appears in abbreviated form in Status of Submissions under the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, published by all NAOs, but in this case collected 
mainly from the US office, and continuously updated on their website at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm#iia16.  
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sponsorship information influences whether the NAO takes the submission under 
review, and filing groups certainly are aware of this.  For example, the US groups 
who developed the Washington Apples petition refrained from formally 
sponsoring the petition as a matter of strategy (Compa 2001).  Also, the AFL-CIO 
Solidarity Center in Mexico is often involved in developing and even writing 
petitions that they then do not sponsor publicly, to remove any possible negative 
influence that AFL-CIO sponsorship of petitions might have in Washington.31  For 
this reason, information on formal petition sponsorship is part of the filing strategy 
among groups, and therefore coded only from the petition as presented to the 
NAO.  
 
Theoretical Expectations on the NAALC Process 
 The transnational advocacy literature and its application to labor rights 
advocacy generates a number of rival hypotheses for the study.  Drawing directly 
from the theoretical insights, we would first expect that when transnational labor 
advocacy groups sponsor petitions, these petitions are more likely to be 
accepted for review.  Further, theory suggests that transnational groups have 
access to the most current information about an unfolding situation in another 
country through their contact with the affected groups.  The discussion on 
transnational strategies in Chapter One suggests that this information will be 
framed in the petitions in ways that persuade NAOs to take the petitions under 
                                            
31
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 2006.  
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consideration.  Therefore, the second hypothesis for this study is that that 
framing of information in the petitions will also determine NAO outcomes.  
 At the same time, if the intent of the NAALC process is to promote 
discussion around recurrent labor rights violations in any of the participating 
states (Franco Hijuelos 2001), we would expect that the petitions reviewed by the 
NAALC would include those with the most egregious cases of labor rights 
abuses, or those cases where labor rights violations are particularly pervasive.  A 
third, rival hypothesis for the study is therefore that petitions about cases with 
merit would be more likely accepted for review.  In sum, though we expect that 
transnational advocates should be more effective at engaging the NAALC 
mechanisms compared to other groups as in hypothesis one, we diverge on the 
underlying reasons for that expectation around the questions of effective tactics, 
as in hypothesis two, or the sponsorship of more severe cases of labor rights 
abuse, as in hypothesis three.  
 Simply having a petition accepted for review in the NAALC process is an 
important stage both theoretically and empirically, and may have an effect on 
labor rights practices independent from any resolution or outcome of the process.  
Petition filing or acceptance generates political dynamics at the local level that 
can provoke changes in state behavior (Hathaway 2002a; Finbow 2006; 
Graubart 2008).  For example, once state practices have been opened up to 
international scrutiny by networks, states focus their energies on denying those 
charges, or otherwise maneuvering to diffuse international criticism (Risse, Ropp, 
and Sikkink 1999).  In the resulting relaxation of state repression, a space for 
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organization opens.  Domestic groups begin to mobilize again, but this time with 
the support of transnational advocates and their allies, who are watching how 
governments will respond.  By placing violating states on the defensive, 
transnational advocates widen the opening for domestic mobilization, reinforcing 
pressure on states from the international community with pressure from its own 
citizens (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  For these reasons, this analysis will 
focus on petition acceptance, though I will review the general outcomes of cases 
at the end of the chapter, and in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Case Acceptance 
 In the first stage of the process, advocates decide to file a petition at an 
NAO alleging the violation of any of the eleven labor rights principles of the 
NAALC agreement.  To date, thirty-seven petitions have been filed, 24 about 
Mexico, 11 about the US and 2 about Canada.  Transnational actors filed twenty-
seven petitions, while nationally based groups filed 10.32  The NAO has made a 
decision on whether or not to review the petitions in thirty-five cases, while two 
cases are pending.  Twenty-five of the petitions, or 68.6%, were accepted for 
review, while ten petitions were rejected.  
 At its most general, the transnational advocacy literature suggests that 
transnational support bolsters domestic groups as they attempt to reach their 
political goals.  As such, the first hypothesis is that it is more likely that petitions 
sponsored by transnational groups are accepted for review than petitions 
                                            
32
 National actors submitted 4 cases on the US and 6 cases on Mexico, while transnational 
advocates submitted 7 cases on the US, 18 on Mexico, and two on Canada.  
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sponsored by nationally based groups.  Table 1 features the cross-tabulation of 
petition acceptance by the sponsor, including national or transnational groups:  
Table 1: Petition Acceptance 
 transnational national  
accepted 22 88.0% 
3 
30.0% 25 
declined 3 12.0 % 
7 
70.0% 10 
 25 10 35 
Pearson X2 (1)= 11.77, p=.001 
 There are important differences in acceptance rates when we consider the 
sponsorship of the NAALC petitions.  Petitions submitted by transnational 
advocates were accepted for review almost three times more often than for 
nationally based groups.  As the table shows, twenty-two of the total twenty-five 
petitions submitted by transnational advocates were accepted for review, or 88% 
of petitions.  By contrast, petitions filed by nationally based groups were 
accepted for review only 30% of the time.  Nationally based groups had three 
petitions accepted, while seven petitions were denied review.  These results are 
statistically significant, at p< .001 for the chi-square test.   
 The data lend support to the first hypothesis, and establish that 
transnational advocacy groups are more successful than other groups in 
securing reviews from an NAO, a finding that bolsters the results of other studies 
of transnationalism.  However, it also presents the challenge of accounting for 
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this outcome across competing explanations.  Are transnational advocates 
somehow more effective at crafting petitions and framing the information 
presented in them, as theory suggests?  Or, are they choosing to sponsor 
especially strong cases of labor rights abuse?   
 
Case Selection 
 During the total fifteen years that the labor side agreement has been in 
effect, just 37 petitions have been filed, mostly about Mexico.  This is surely not 
indicative of the total breadth of labor code violations in Mexico, or the United 
States for that matter, but symptomatic of how submitters determine which cases 
to bring to arbitration.  Because developing a petition uses resources and a 
substantial time commitment, one might assume that cases are chosen based on 
the expectation of positive resolutions by their submitters.33  Yet, this is not 
necessarily the only motivation, as groups that have filed at the NAALC 
                                            
33
 The common wisdom is that as legal proceedings, cases require professional consultation and 
legal services, extensive fact checking and interviews with involved individuals, transcription 
and translation, as well as other tasks that divert organizational resources.  Additionally, cases 
may languish for two years or more as the proceedings move from submission, to acceptance, 
to resolution and implementation.  Groups in Mexico may be concurrently engaging domestic 
channels, appealing to federal or state courts outside of the labor board system, and filing 
injunctions.  In sum, filing a petition and waiting for resolution assumes a significant outlay of 
resources, time and energy.  Although this surely describes the experience of a few groups, 
others describe the process as generally simple and straightforward, especially when they 
have the information and evidence to build a case readily available, because they tend to file 
on those cases they already know intimately.  Interviews, Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, 
Canada, 2005, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, 2006, Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador (CAT), Puebla, Mexico, 2006, and International Labor Rights Forum, Washington, 
D.C., 2007. 
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sometimes also submit petitions in order to test the process, whether to ask the 
NAOs to consider labor issues previously ignored, or to push the process toward 
higher-level resolutions, such as invoking a panel of experts (Finbow 2006).  
Further, submitters may use the NAALC only as a forum to attract publicity to 
specific labor struggles, without any expectation that the NAALC process might 
solve the local labor dispute, which is ultimately out of its scope.34  In any event, 
not all petitions are accepted for review.   
 If the NAALC process is designed to promote cooperation among states 
on labor rights enforcement issues, we would expect that an NAO would be more 
likely to take petitions under consideration based on the merits of the case.  
Given the many reasons petitioners may bring cases, if transnational advocates 
have their petitions reviewed more often than other groups, it may be due to their 
case selection criteria, and that transnational advocates are selecting more 
viable cases for arbitration.  Therefore, the second hypothesis for the study is 
that cases that have the most merit should be most often accepted for review.  
Here, I operationalized case merits across two dimensions: the severity of 
abuses, and the degree of labor rights violation.  To measure the degree of 
violation, I generated a count variable of the number of NAALC principles 
allegedly violated in each petition, of the eleven labor rights principles 
established in Annex 1 of the agreement (NAALC 1993:32-34).  The number of 
violations listed range from one principle to 10, with the mean number of 
violations at 3.  Across the second dimension, severity of abuses, I coded any 
                                            
34
 Interviews, Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador (CAT), Puebla, Mexico, and AFL-CIO Solidarity 
Center, Mexico City, Mexico, 2006. 
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mention of violence in the petition as a proxy measure for the degree of labor 
rights violation.  A report of violence in a petition-- meaning any act of bodily 
harm inflicted on workers, or threat of bodily harm to workers-- indicates that the 
labor situation may have become serious enough to provoke violent acts against 
workers.35  While 25 petitions do not mention violence, violence was cited in 12 
petitions.  
  Table 2 shows the results of a cross-tabulation of the perceived severity 
of abuses on petition acceptance.  The table also lists each case across these 
two variables, where the petitions that were sponsored by transnational actors 
appear in bold italics print.  Thirty-five cases are included in the model, as an 
additional two cases have not yet been decided.   
 The left side of the table lists the petitions that mention violence.  Of the 
eleven petitions that report violence, ten were accepted for review, as in the top 
left cell.36  As expected, when cases where labor rights violations seem 
particularly serious are submitted to the NAALC, they are more often accepted 
for review.  Of the eleven petitions that mentioned violence, all but one was 
sponsored by transnational advocates. This relationship is statistically significant 
at the 10% level with a chi-square of 2.98.  
                                            
35 This is a dichotomous measure, and specifically includes verbal or physical threats; coercion, 
intimidation and surveillance; beatings and assault; the use of weapons; and targeted acts of 
violence. 
36 The one petition that was rejected was the Yale/ INS immigration case, submitted to both the 
Canadian and Mexican NAOs by transnational advocates in 1998.  Canada rejected the 
petition after the US committed to revise a Memorandum of Understanding between the US 
Department of Labor and Immigration and Naturalization as part of the resolution with the 
Mexican NAO, prior to the Canadian review. 
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Table 2: Petition Acceptance, Violence and Case Selection 
                                                      VIOLENCE 
 violence cited no violence cited 
                                       
 Sprint 
ACCEPTANCE Sony North Carolina 
 
Yale INS Mc Donald’s 
 
SOLEC Gender 
 
Puebla SUTSP 
 
ITAPSA Auto Trim 
accepted ITAPSA Canada Puebla Canada 
 
Maxi-Switch Honeywell 
 
TAESA H2B Visa Workers 
 
Han Young I GE I 
 
DeCoster Egg GE II 
 
 Han Young II 
 
 Hidalgo 
 
 NY State 
 
 Apples 
 
10/11 15/24 
 
 Duro Bag 
 
Yale INS Canada Tomato 
 
 ASPA Canada 
 
 ASPA 
declined  Flight Attendants 
 
 LPA 
 
 Coahuila 
 
 Rural Mail Carriers 
 
 Labor Law Reform 
 
1/11 9/24 
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  The data show that even for the 24 petitions that do not mention violence, 
as on the right side of the table, transnational advocates still seem to have 
greater success in securing a review by the NAO.  Among the petitions where 
there was no violence reported, just two of the nine petitions filed by nationally-
based groups were accepted for review, while the remaining thirteen petitions 
that were accepted were filed by transnational advocates.  This suggests that 
while citing violence may make a case more viable for NAO review, transnational 
actors are still more successful at getting their petitions accepted, whether or not 
violence is reported in the petition, and that transnational advocates may craft 
petitions that are ultimately more likely to be accepted for review.   
   
The Role of Worker Testimony 
 If transnational advocates are not necessarily backing the worst cases of 
labor rights abuse at the NAALC, what explains the comparative success of 
transnational advocates in engaging the NAALC process?  The theoretical 
framework suggests that transnational advocates not only have direct access to 
local groups, but also engage in different strategies to mobilize that information.  
The presentation of information about the case and the framing of its meaning in 
a petition should convince the NAO that the case is worth investigating.  
 In field interviews, US NAO officials described their general criteria for 
considering petitions.  Among these, the US NAO privileged the legitimacy and 
accuracy of the claims made by petitioners.  The US office tends to pursue cases 
only if they have a sense that they will be able to substantiate the claims in the 
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petition with evidence once a full review is under way.37  The petition gives the 
first indication of whether the claims presented within could be confirmed.  
Testimony by workers provides especially relevant information.  Not only do 
workers provide the most accurate and credible source of information on 
violations from the affected parties for any NAO, but worker testimony in itself 
signals the possibility of corroborating the allegations with credible evidence 
during a subsequent full review.38  If a petition features testimony by workers in 
the text, or includes signed affidavits, the US NAO assumes that the filing groups 
already have workers on hand to provide additional information to them, submit 
evidence, or to testify at public hearings.39   
 Given these claims, we would expect that the use of testimony would 
affect whether or not petitions are accepted for review, leading to a third 
hypothesis for the study.  We expect that petitions that feature worker testimony 
should more often be accepted for review than petitions that do not feature 
testimony.  Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the inclusion of worker 
testimony and petition acceptance:
                                            
37
 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
38
 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
39
 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
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Table 3: Worker Testimony and Petition Acceptance 
 worker testimony no testimony  
accepted 14 93.3% 
11 
55% 25 
declined 1 6.7% 
9 
45% 10 
 15 20 35 
Pearson X2 (1)=6.17, p= .013 
 
 The use of testimony in the petitions is very much associated with 
transnational advocates, yet only about half of all transnational petitions feature 
testimony.40  According to the table, 55% of the petitions that do not feature 
worker testimony to support their claims were accepted for review.  By way of 
contrast, of the 15 petitions that featured worker testimony, all but one was 
accepted for review, or 93.3%.  These include not just 13 petitions filed by 
transnational groups, but also the two petitions filed by nationally based groups.  
These cases, the 1998 Apple case and the 2001 New York State case, represent 
two of the three cases filed by nationally based groups that were accepted for 
review by an NAO for the entire NAALC case set.  This finding supports the 
                                            
40
 Only two out of ten petitions submitted by nationally based groups include testimony.  A cross-
tabulation of the relationship of transnational sponsorship and use of testimony was positive 
and statistically significant at the 10% level, with a chi-square of 3.02.  Thirteen cases filed by 
transnational actors included testimony, while 14 cases did not. 
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hypothesis that framing tactics affect outcomes, operationalized here by the use 
of worker testimony. 41 
 Groups without a transnational organizational reach may be able to furnish 
the same kinds of “on the ground” information about violations that is the 
hallmark of transnational strategies, but they cannot obtain direct access to 
affected workers to testify about the violations without first developing strong 
organizational ties to groups in the targeted state.  Nationally based groups have 
not developed the relationships with workers in another country that would allow 
them to collect and document labor rights violations through worker testimony, 
and thus their petitions do not include it.  
 
Multivariate Models 
 Thus far, the analysis has investigated the competing hypotheses of case 
framing and case merit, and suggests that the comparative success of 
transnational groups in securing a review is due to the way cases are crafted, 
and especially by including worker testimony in the petitions.  However, 
testimony, violence, and transnationalism may overlap in significant ways in the 
case set, as workers who testify to working conditions in the petitions may 
mention violence as part of that testimony.  Drawing attention to physical 
violence in workplace disputes, for example, may be used as a framing technique 
by transnational advocates, to either cast labor rights violations more directly as 
                                            
41
 The limitations posed by a small case set preclude testing the contextual information presented 
in petitions, such as word choice or word counts, that would be necessary to evaluate more 
directly the content of the petitions. 
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human rights violations, or to distill complex workplace issues into visible, simple 
symbols for an international audience (Seidman 2007).  For these reasons, I 
performed multivariate models to analyze the independent effects of 
transnationalism, testimony and violence.  The first model is a three-way cross-
tabulation of these variables, as shown in Table 4: 
Table 4: Three-Way Tabulations 
 
transnational national 
violence cited 90% 100% 
accepted 
no violence cited 86.7% 22.2% 
violence cited 10% 0% 
violence 
declined 
no violence cited 13.3% 77.8% 
testimony 92.3% 100% 
accepted 
no testimony 83.3% 12.5% 
testimony 7.7% 0% 
testimony 
declined 
no testimony 16.7% 87.5% 
 First, the table shows the clear differences in acceptance rates between 
sponsors when petitions included citations of violence or testimony and when 
they do not.  When petitions mention violence, both groups have higher 
acceptance rates.  Here, nationally based groups had all submitted petitions 
accepted for review, while transnational advocates had a 90% rate of 
acceptance.  When petitions include testimony, again nationally based groups 
have all their petitions accepted, and transnational groups had 92% of their 
petitions accepted.  
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 The picture is very different, however, for petitions that do not include 
worker testimony or mention violence.  For these cases, transnational 
involvement is clearly important.  Even when no violence is cited, 87% percent of 
petitions sponsored by transnational groups are accepted for review, while only 
22% of petitions sponsored by nationally based groups are reviewed.  Similarly, 
without testimony, transnational groups have an 83% acceptance rate, while 
nationally based groups only have 13% of their petitions accepted for review. 
Together the data show that while inclusion of either violence or testimony in 
petitions is associated with higher rates of acceptance for transnational 
advocates, these groups already enjoy high rates of acceptance, even when they 
do not include testimony or violence.  For nationally based groups however, the 
mention of either testimony or violence in the petitions is key to securing an NAO 
review: without this information, the majority of their petitions are denied. 
 This analysis establishes that even when controlling for testimony and the 
mention of violence, transnational sponsorship conditions petition acceptance.  
Table 10 shows the results of a probit analysis that looks further at these 
relationships.  In this model, the dependent variable is again whether or not the 
petition is accepted by an NAO, and the independent variables are 
transnationalism, testimony, and both dimensions of case merit: the severity of 
abuse and the degree of violation.  
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Table 5: Probit Analysis of Petition Acceptance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 β mfx β mfx β mfx β mfx 
transnational 
advocates 
1.65** 
(.61) 
.54** 
(.19) 
1.50** 
(.57) 
.51** 
(.19) 
1.66** 
(.60) 
.55** 
(.19) 
1.73** 
(.58) 
.58** 
(.18) 
worker 
testimony 
1.15* 
(.67) 
.30* 
(.15) 
1.00 
(.64) 
.28* 
(.16) 
1.24* 
(.66) 
.32** 
(.15)   
severity of 
abuse 
(violence) 
.47 
(.72) 
.12 
(.17) 
.21 
(.64) 
.06 
(.18)   
.75 
(.68) 
.20 
(.15) 
degree of 
violation 
(principles) 
-.21 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.04)   
-.19 
(.14) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.16 
(.13) 
-.05 
(.04) 
constant -.29 (.59)  
-.80 
(.48)  
-.29 
(.60)  
-.178 
(.54)  
                                log likelihood =-12.4    log likelihood=-13.5      log likelihood=-12.7     log likelihood=-14.1 
N=35                                                                                                          **=p <.05      *= p <.10   
 
 The table shows both the full model and the restricted models, along with 
the marginal effects of each variable.  In the full model, Model 1, transnationalism 
is statistically significant at p< .05, as expected.  Testimony is significant at the 
10% level.  In the marginal effects, the likelihood that a petition is accepted 
increases by 54% when petitioners are transnational groups, all other variables 
held constant at their mean.  Testimony is significant in the marginal effects as 
well.  When petitions include worker testimony, the probability that the petition is 
accepted for review increases by 30%, all other variables held constant at their 
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mean.  Neither measure of labor rights abuse is significant in either the probit 
estimation or the marginal effects.42   
 These results generally hold for the restricted models as well.  In the first 
restricted model, Model 2, the degree of violation variable is removed, leaving a 
multivariate model that includes transnationalism, testimony and violence.  In this 
model, while transnationalism is significant and remains a strong predictor of 
petition acceptance in the marginal effects, testimony is not significant in the 
probit estimation, though it is again significant in the marginal effects, at the 10% 
level.  When petitions feature worker testimony, the probability that the case is 
accepted increases by 28%, all other variables held constant at their mean.  In 
this restricted model, transnationalism and testimony are both significant 
predictors of petition acceptance, though transnationalism is the dominant factor.  
As before, violence is not significant.  
 In the next restricted model, Model 3, violence is removed.  Again, 
transnationalism is a significant and strong predictor of petition acceptance.  
Testimony is again significant in the estimation, and becomes significant at the 
5% level in the marginal effects, meaning that when petitions feature testimony, 
the probability that they are accepted for review increases by 32%, all other 
variables held constant at their mean.  As in the full model, the principles variable 
is not significant either in the model, or in the marginal effects. 
                                            
 
42
 Including the degree of violation was never significant in any probit, either alone or with 
violence, or in alternative forms, such as an interaction with violence, or as a dichotomous 
variable.  Nor are they collinear.  The correlation value for transnational and testimony is .29, 
for testimony and violence is .39, for transnational and violence is .23, and for violence and 
principles is .20. 
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 In the final model, Model 4, testimony is removed.  Here, transnationalism 
is significant in both the estimation and the marginal effects, and here is where 
transnationalism has its greatest effect on petition acceptance.  When a petition 
is sponsored by transnational advocates, the probability that it is accepted for 
review increases by 58%, all other variables held constant at their mean.  Neither 
violence nor the principles variables are significant in the estimation, or in the 
marginal effects. 
  The probit model provides further support for the hypothesis that groups 
with transnational organizational reach are more successful in engaging the 
NAALC process.  This analysis shows that even when controlling for case merits 
and testimony, transnationalism is still the most important factor in predicting 
whether a petition will be accepted for review by an NAO.  Further, the effect is 
increased through the inclusion of worker testimony.   
 The probit model gives insight to the explanatory role of the rival 
hypotheses.  According to these models, transnationalism and case framing 
differentiates between successful and unsuccessful attempts to secure a review 
from an NAO.  The data suggest that it is unlikely that case merits, whether 
measured as severity or prevalence of labor rights abuses, affect whether or not 
petitions are reviewed under the NAALC process.  Rather, transnationalism, and 
the use of framing strategies employed by transnational advocacy networks, can 
overwhelm any potential effect of the merits of the case. 
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Case Resolutions  
 Once petitions are filed and cases are reviewed, how are labor rights 
violations resolved within states?  The most common resolution in the NAALC 
process for petitions that are reviewed is an agreement between states to 
conduct Ministerial Consultations.  Twenty-two cases of the 32 that have reached 
this stage of the process have resulted in Ministerial Consultations.  No cases 
have moved beyond the Consultations stage to others that would require 
stronger public commitments to labor rights enforcement by states, but neither 
are most cases submitted to the NAALC thus far eligible for resolution beyond 
Ministerial Consultations, including the majority of cases about Mexico.43  In nine 
of the 22 cases that were resolved through Ministerial Consultations there has 
been no further action.  Yet, in the 13 that remain, there have been plant-level 
resolutions that favor labor, important outreach programs mandated by NAALC to 
inform citizens about their rights at work in the US and Mexico, and in some of 
these cases, governments made institutional changes to their labor policies and 
practices that favored labor.  I review these resolutions and speculate as to why 
they were resolved with outcomes that provoked policy changes while other 
cases did not in the next chapter.   
 Some evidence from Mexico suggests that simply engaging the NAALC 
process might precipitate on-the-ground improvements for workers.  In 
interviews, workers and labor organizers expressed that once the factory owners 
                                            
43 The majority of cases filed against Mexico allege violations of the freedom of association, which 
under the NAALC statutes are resolved only through Ministerial Consultations.  No other 
levels of arbitration apply to these cases.  
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knew that a petition had been submitted to the NAALC, conditions began to 
improve inside the factories.44  Labor organizers reported that they were no 
longer harassed at work, while workers said that the petition submission led to 
better treatment by supervisors, and marked the end of forced overtime, a major 
issue in some cases.45  Groups that have participated in the NAALC process 
have stated that though they may believe the NAALC as an enforcement body is 
“toothless,” the process itself is helpful for garnering international attention to the 
labor rights violations or union drives as they unfold.46  The labor clause thus 
provides at minimum another avenue to broadcast the labor rights abuses to 
outside audiences, even when there is little chance that the NAALC will solve the 
incident on the factory floor.47  That channel for mobilization points to the 
usefulness of the process to local workers, regardless of whether of not the 
NAALC can resolve labor rights violations at the plant level. 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter investigates how the trade mechanisms meant to protect 
labor rights are enforced, and discussed how these institutions are engaged by 
different social actors.  I reviewed the cases brought to arbitration under the 
NAALC to show that when transnational advocates sponsor petitions they are 
                                            
44
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006; CAT field organizer, 
Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006; and interview, SUITTAR leader, Altepexi, Puebla, 
Mexico, August 20, 2006. 
45
 Interviews in Ajalpan, Altepexi, Puebla, and Tehuacán, Mexico, 2006. 
46
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, 2006. 
47
 Interview, Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, Canada, 2005. 
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more often accepted for review.  Further analysis of the effects of transnational 
organizational ties, case selection, and the framing of petitions suggested that 
the different rate of success was due not to case selection, but by including 
information in the petition that signals to an NAO that a formal review is feasible.  
The data analysis discusses the use of testimony and the case merits to show 
that transnational partnerships can make some cases viable through the use of 
information, especially by including worker testimony.  Though transnational 
groups are successful in securing reviews whether or not the labor rights 
violations were extensive or severe, or whether or not testimony was included in 
the petition, for nationally based groups the mention of either testimony or 
violence in the petitions is key to securing a review.  Finally, the probit analysis 
further investigated the rival hypotheses of the paper to show that it is unlikely 
that case merits have an effect on petition acceptance.  Rather, framing 
strategies were much more important to explaining patterns of petition 
acceptance among transnational advocates. 
 This analysis implies that the usefulness of the NAALC is not in the 
strength or weaknesses of its enforcement mechanisms, but in the way that 
different groups engage the process to shed light on labor rights issues and 
cases.  The analysis presented here cannot predict how cases would have been 
resolved in the absence of the labor clause, or if case outcomes are due to the 
labor clause rather than other strategies simultaneously employed by non-state 
actors, it is limited to describing the ways that the labor clause has been engaged 
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by civil society, and why some groups are more successful at getting their claims 
reviewed than others.   
 This chapter also shows that the emergence of a transnational civil society 
and the linkage of labor standards to trade agreements are complementary 
processes.  Trade agreements focus efforts around common goals and provide 
political opportunities for activists to come together over trade issues (Stillerman 
2003; Adams 1997).  As networks emerge, they can mobilize social, political, and 
economic pressure on states in support for greater labor rights protections.  
Social clauses give legal standing to the allegations made by non-state actors, 
thus legitimizing their claims in international arenas (Graubart 2008), and provide 
an institutional mechanism for redress that groups can access.  Furthermore, 
violating states have incentives to respond to complaints in order to retain 
preferential trade relations.  Linking labor standards to trade agreements can 
create the dynamics that could lead to stronger labor rights enforcement, even 
among states that prefer to violate workers rights.  
 Labor guarantees have become an enduring feature of trade agreements.  
However, in the current models, governments do not enforce the labor clauses 
until asked to do so by civil society, transnational or otherwise.  As such, the 
potential efficacy of trade-based labor clauses in strengthening labor protections 
depends in some ways on the inclusion of mechanisms for citizen input, even 
though the complaint process may be insufficient to protect workers rights as 
much as labor and its allies might have hoped.  This analysis of the NAALC 
argues that the labor clause reaches its highest potential for protecting labor 
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rights when transnational labor rights activists engage the mechanisms, and that 
therefore the enforcement mechanisms offered by trade-based social clauses 
can be important tools for labor advocates.  They will become more important as 
trade agreements --and with them, labor rights clauses—continue to multiply.  
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Chapter Three:  
Persuasion, Coercion and the Domestic Costs of Compliance: 
Evaluating the NAALC Resolutions 
 
 The previous chapter investigated the factors that determine whether 
petitions filed under the dispute mechanism of the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation are accepted for review by the offices charged with labor 
rights compliance in NAFTA.  That analysis established that petitions filed by 
transnational advocacy networks were more likely to be accepted for review than 
petitions filed by other actors, and further, that the comparative success of 
transnational groups lies in the framing of information in the petitions.  The 
transnational advocacy model, with its emphasis on case framing and information 
politics, can help explain why some cases attract the attention of the tri-national 
labor dispute offices, causing them to look further into the allegations of labor 
rights abuses with a formal review.  Yet, can transnational organization also 
influence whether or not states respond to calls for labor rights compliance in the 
outcomes stage?  Once under review, how are these submissions resolved by 
state actors?  
 There are two schools of thought regarding the effectiveness of the 
NAALC labor side agreement in promoting labor rights enforcement.  The more 
prominent arguments are negative, and based largely on the experiences of filing 
the first few test cases, when the United States refrained from punishing Mexico 
for freedom of association violations, and the legitimacy of the process itself was 
called into question.  Since these early cases, critics of the NAALC continue to 
argue that the side agreement has made few inroads in protecting workers 
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because the mechanism lacks sanctioning power, that resolutions such as 
Ministerial Consultations do not go far enough in mandating changes to labor 
practices, and that governments lack the political will to enforce it (Singh 2002; 
Hovis 1994; Robinson 2002; International Labor Rights Fund 1995; Bensusán 
2002).  
 More recently, a second school of thought has emerged to make the case 
that the outcomes of the NAALC may not have provided the direct redress of 
local level labor rights disputes that advocates and unions initially hoped would 
materialize, but nonetheless, the agreement is still useful for promoting labor 
rights within states.  The adherents of this school argue that the NAALC lacks 
enforcement power due largely to its institutional design, where each partner was 
more interested in negotiating an agreement that respects state sovereignty, 
rather than one that had real sanctioning power (Weiss 2003; Dombois 2002; 
Bensusán 2004).  As such, avenues of redress are limited for collective rights 
like freedom of association, and trade sanctions are underspecified and limited in 
application.  Others note that even though the enforcement mechanism is weak, 
a major accomplishment of the NAALC is that the agreement precipitated cross-
border solidarity among unions and groups in civil society that has been 
unprecedented in US-Mexican relations (Hathaway 2002a; Cook 1997; Kay 
2005; Williams 1999; Babson 2002b; Compa 2001; Stillerman 2003; Bandy 2004; 
Babson 2002a; Juárez Núñez 2002a).  
 A number of scholars of the NAALC have worked past the emphasis on 
outcomes to investigate the ways the cases have moved through the process, to 
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demonstrate that the NAALC process itself matters in promoting labor rights 
enforcement, especially in Mexico (Compa 2001; Graubart 2008).  While the 
range of case resolutions in the NAALC so far have been limited to government–
to-government consultations and cooperative activities, in a number of instances 
domestic level political dynamics spurred by the cases produced outcomes that 
went beyond the kinds of resolutions envisioned by the agreement.  In some 
cases, the political dynamics that emerged out of individual NAALC cases has 
opened dialogue about labor rights in Mexico, legitimizing actors within Mexico 
that had previously been excluded from policy discussions (Graubart 2008), 
allowing them to push for --and secure-- reforms in specific aspects of labor 
rights enforcement (Finbow 2006; Hertel 2006a).  
 In a few cases, the NAALC process helped to promote resolutions that 
solved labor disputes at the local level.  In some, the NAALC process promoted 
important reforms in Mexican labor rights policies and practices.  In many other 
cases however, there was no remedy to affected workers, let alone a policy 
response.  The puzzle lies then in assessing why some NAALC cases against 
Mexico resulted in favorable outcomes for labor, while other cases did not.  This 
chapter analyzes the NAALC case outcomes to answer the third set of questions 
of the dissertation:  Which states comply with the rules of trade-based labor 
rights conditionality, to what degree do they implement changes in positive 
directions for labor, and why?  
 The transnational advocacy literature again provides some clues.  
Transnational advocacy networks can shift the costs to states of continued 
 72 
violation on one hand, or the benefits of compliance on the other, by applying 
both ideational and material strategies.  Transnational advocacy networks 
pressure states to improve labor rights practices using moral arguments that 
emphasize norms, shared values, and beliefs to persuade states.  By filing at the 
NAALC, transnational advocates can also engage the trade mechanisms that 
enforce the conditionality clause, introducing additional material costs in the form 
of trade sanctions, as a way to coerce states into compliance.  While persuasive 
tactics require that advocates convince governments and agents to change their 
preferences for violation (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), coercion induces 
compliance by changing the cost-benefit calculations by states for continued 
violation (Cardenas 2004).  In turn, policymakers will respond to these moral and 
material pressures according to political preferences and domestic incentives for 
compliance.  Thus, the outcomes in the cases filed against Mexico vary 
according to how the federal government responds to international demands for 
labor rights enforcement on one hand, and domestic preferences to continue to 
violate labor rights on the other.  
 This chapter begins by presenting the set of resolutions of all the NAALC 
cases through 2005, and problematizing why some cases receive little redress, 
while other cases have precipitated changes in labor rights protections within the 
three NAFTA states.  I then discuss how transnational advocates combine both 
persuasion and coercion to induce states to conform to international norms 
around labor rights, and how those pressures are received differently at the 
federal and subnational levels of government.  An analysis of the freedom of 
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association cases filed against Mexico illustrates the causal mechanism that I 
propose for predicts compliance through policy change at the federal level, 
continued violation at the local level, and interventions by federal actors in 
specific cases.  The chapter then looks further into the content of these policy 
changes by presenting case studies drawn from the set of NAALC cases filed 
against Mexico.   
 I consider mainly Mexico’s experience with the NAALC in this chapter 
because of the three states, Mexico needed the most improvement in promoting 
collective labor rights under its industrial relations regime, and so the discussion 
of regional standards during the NAALC negotiations focused on raising labor 
standards in Mexico to the US and Canadian levels (Cook 1997; Mayer 1998).  
While the Mexican Federal Labor Law (LFT) is more ambitious than either 
Canadian or US labor codes in terms of protecting workers’ individual and 
collective labor rights, Mexico suffers most from uneven enforcement.48  This is 
reflected in the NAALC case set as well, where most of the cases --24 of 37-- are 
filed against Mexico.  If NAFTA has any effect on how governments enforce labor 
rights, it is best measured in the Mexican case, and the number of NAALC cases 
available about Mexico can be analyzed to trace the domestic dynamics of labor 
rights improvement under the agreement.  
                                            
48
 Even Mexico recognizes this as such. In interviews, the Mexican NAO stated that labor rights 
enforcement is one area where it was acknowledged that improvement is needed, but that the 
Secretariat for Labor and Social Welfare was working towards better enforcement by 
increasing the number of workplace inspections each year.  Interview, the Mexican NAO, 
Mexico City, Mexico, 2006. 
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 The chapter demonstrates that even when the NAALC cannot address 
workplace concerns in the short-term, the filing process can create the political 
dynamics within states that generate long-term effects, including changes in 
labor rights policy and practice.  In effect, the side agreement created 
opportunities for transnational advocates that arguably set Mexico on a path to 
better labor rights enforcement through generalized norms compliance, 
independently of how strong or effective the agreement itself was in terms of 
sanctioning poor compliance.  This chapter seeks to account for these effects. 
  
The NAALC Case Resolutions 
 Once petitions are filed and reviewed at the NAALC, how are cases of 
labor rights violations resolved?  Through 2006, 25 cases of 37 have been 
accepted and have passed through the resolution stage, while another 10 cases 
were rejected by an NAO for review.49  As described in Chapter 2, NAOs can 
mandate a number of possible outcomes, but these are limited further by the 
categories of violation charged in the petition.  These resolutions include 
Ministerial Consultations, evaluation by a committee of experts (the ECE), panel 
arbitration, and if still unresolved, trade sanctions.  Table 6 below shows the 
distribution of these resolutions across all of the cases submitted to the NAALC. 
 
                                            
49
 Two cases are pending the decision on review, and are not included here. 
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Table 6: Distribution of NAALC Case Resolutions 
Resolutions 
 frequency percent of cases 
Declined  Review 10 27.1% 
Ministerial Consultations 22 59.4% 
consultations with no further action 9  
outreach 3  
policy change 6  
firm level redress 4  
Evaluation by Committee of Experts  0 0 
Panel Arbitration 0 0 
Trade Sanctions 0 0 
Pending cases 5 13.5% 
                                                             37                   100% 
 
 One of the most important critiques of the NAALC process has been that 
the resolutions do not go far enough in punishing states when they contravene 
the NAALC labor rights principles (Hovis 1994; Robinson 2002; Bensusán 2002).  
Certainly, the table bears this out, as no cases to date have moved to review by 
a panel of experts, or discussion of trade sanctions, or any other resolution that 
would require stronger actions to promote labor rights enforcement by 
governments.  As the table illustrates, the most common resolution is to conduct 
Ministerial Consultations.  These are meetings called between the Ministers of 
Labor of the relevant states to discuss issues specific labor rights enforcement 
issues, such as health and safety standards or freedom of association.  
 Ministerial Consultations sometimes result in cooperative activities to 
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address how the violations presented in the case might be resolved, including 
binding tri-national agreements (US Department of Labor n.d. [a]).  Though 
Ministerial Consultations are the weakest option for enforcing labor rights, they 
are firmly within the spirit of the NAALC as a consultative, rather than adversarial 
body.50  In addition, most of the cases submitted to the NAALC thus far have not 
been eligible for resolution beyond Ministerial Consultations, including the 
majority of cases about Mexico.51  Under the NAALC statutes, freedom of 
association cases can be resolved only through Ministerial Consultations 
(NAALC 1993), and no other levels of arbitration can apply to these cases.   
 The table shows that even among the cases that have resulted in 
Ministerial Consultations, the resolution that occurs at the domestic level can go 
beyond the scope of the NAALC formal resolutions.  In nine of the 22 cases that 
were resolved through Ministerial Consultations, there has been no further action 
on the cases beyond discussion and dialogue between governments.52  Yet, in 
the 13 that remain, the NAALC submission may have helped precipitate 
improvements in labor rights protections in the short and long-term, and 
especially in Mexico.  For example, in three cases that formally ended in 
                                            
50
 Interviews, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007, and the 
Mexican NAO, July 2006.  
51
 Seventy- two percent of all cases submitted to NAALC list freedom of association as the core 
violation.  
52
 In two of these cases, the Puebla submissions to the US and Canadian NAOs, Ministerial 
Consultations on freedom of association are still pending between the US and Mexico 
(Interview, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007). In the 
additional cases, the NAO determined that Ministerial Consultations would resolve the issues 
for varied reasons specific to the case in question.   
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Ministerial Consultations, the governments agreed to hold public outreach 
sessions where the labor rights conflict occurred.53  Though most forums 
mandated by Ministerial Agreements are conferences and workshops for 
government officials, academics and practitioners, the outreach sessions –often 
led by the groups that filed the original complaint-- are used to publicize workers’ 
rights under the federal labor law, and are directed at workers.  This is significant, 
not just because the outreach sessions imitate the kind of outreach workers’ 
rights organizations and community groups have been trying to do for years at 
the factory gates or in workers’ homes, but now these efforts are practiced at the 
invitation of the Mexican government.  
 Further, in four cases, the labor rights situation at the plant was resolved 
in ways that favored labor once advocates filed NAALC petitions.  In these cases, 
independent unions won legal recognition, yet they were not always successful in 
bargaining the collective contract with management.  Finally, the table shows that 
in six cases, the US or Mexico committed to a change in labor policy or 
enforcement practices, which I argue here were precipitated as a result of 
discussions around specific violations showcased in the NAALC submissions.  
As the table illustrates, some cases were resolved through concrete reforms, 
others through plant-level changes, and still others had little resolution aside from 
promises to talk about labor rights enforcement.  How do we account for this 
wide range of resolutions, and what can the NAALC process tell us about how 
states choose to respond to transnational pressures? 
                                            
53
 Examples include “The Protection of Labor Rights of Women in North America” in Puebla, 
Mexico in 2000, and “Women Workers, Know Your Rights!” in Washington State in 2000. 
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Coercion and Compliance in the Mexican Case 
  Shared ideas about state identities –what types of states engage in what 
sorts of practices- can lead states to choose among policy prescriptions 
(Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996).  Shifting state identities can 
theoretically cause policy change within states alone, but often advocacy for 
policy change is the mechanism that causes real transformation (Finnemore 
1996).  Using persuasive strategies, advocates encourage some state identities 
and not others by creating in- and out-groups, stating clearly that states that 
continue to break norms will be treated as outcasts in the international system, 
while states that accept and practice shared norms will be considered full 
members of the international community (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; 
Kowert and Legro 1996).  Transnational advocates promote behavior change by 
politicizing issues, and disseminating norms around what sorts of behavior can 
be expected from liberal states, thus allowing states to signal their preferred 
identity by taking on those behaviors (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; 
Joppke 1998; Haas 1989).   
 Transnational pressure can be effective in pressuring some states to 
change their behavior towards greater respect for citizens’ rights, including labor 
rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998), but pressure alone cannot predict which states 
will give in to transnational arguments.  While transnational advocates are 
motivated by normative concerns about labor rights protection, and have 
developed sophisticated strategies to push states towards norms compliance, 
states vary considerably in the ways that they respond to these arguments.  The 
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“crucial determinant” for assessing whether and when transnational networks 
influence states is determined by how vulnerable those states are to 
transnational pressure (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Sources of transnational 
pressure include ideational strategies, where advocates provide moral arguments 
to persuade states to change their preferences for violation, as well as material 
strategies by which they leverage material costs on states for continued violation.  
 States are more susceptible to the persuasive strategies presented by 
transnational advocates when they are sensitive to their international reputation 
in the international community of liberal states.  These states are acutely aware 
of how they are perceived by other states, and will change their own behavior in 
order to reflect an image more in line with international standards (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 1996; Price 1998; Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 
1998; Gurowitz 1999).  Further, the states most susceptible to international 
persuasion are the newly democratic states and those in transition, like Mexico, 
as these states are the most eager to establish democratic legitimacy in the 
international system (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Graubart 2008). 
 Transnational pressure can also include material strategies designed to 
present costs to states that do not respond to the persuasive strategies.  In these 
cases, the inclusion of the labor side agreement to the trade accord provides the 
source of economic leverage.  At the same time that transnational advocates 
apply moral pressure on states to convince them to change their preferences 
towards labor rights protection, they can also engage the dispute resolution 
mechanisms to threaten states with market sanctions unless they improve labor 
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rights enforcement.  Because labor rights violations can have consequences for 
the trade relationship, and in NAFTA, potential trade sanctions, the labor clause 
supplements the persuasive aspects of transnational advocacy with the coercive 
capacity to enforce compliance.   
 Whether or not persuasion or coercion is effective in promoting 
compliance with labor rights protections further depends on competing domestic 
interests, including first, incentives for compliance as calculated by policymakers,  
and second, the preference for continued violation (Cardenas 2004).  Within 
states, individual policymakers compare calculate the costs of compliance within 
the persuasive/ coercive framework presented by transnational advocates.  
However, interest in compliance at one level of government may clash with the 
objectives of political actors at subnational levels of government, and further, 
may cut across material and ideational impulses.  
 
Mexico’s Democratic Evolution  
  This analysis argues that as democratization takes root, Mexico has 
become more vulnerable to international pressure to protect labor rights, and in 
turn, more open to responding to international criticism through labor reform.  To 
test this argument, we first must establish that Mexico is sensitive to its 
international image.  The evolving democratic transition, especially during the 
Zedillo sexenio, can provide clues as to how Mexico’s interest in generating a 
favorable international reputation is reflected in the shift from hegemonic party 
rule to electoral democracy. 
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 During the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), the 
guiding foreign policy interest was to develop the evolving political and economic 
relationship with the United States, of which the negotiation of NAFTA was the 
crowning achievement of the administration (Covarrubias Velasco 1999; 
Alejandre 1995).  Prior to the Salinas sexenio, bilateral relations were marked by 
conflict, rather than cooperation.  Politically, Mexico continually defended itself 
from US criticism of the domestic policies of most concern to its neighbor, 
including immigration policy, drug interdiction, security, and rule of law 
(Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2009).  Economically, Mexico was 
preoccupied with maintaining import substitution industrialization than trade with 
the US, almost until the ISI project collapsed in the early 1980s (Baer and 
Weintraub 1994).  Only after the shift to neoliberal economic reform in the middle 
of the 1980s was Mexico interested in an economic partnership with the US, and 
only then, to avoid being locked out of a trade relationship given that the US was 
actively cultivating bilateral relationships with Central American and Caribbean 
States (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2009).  Thus in the late 1980s, the 
Salinas administration oversaw a complete reversal of Mexican foreign policy 
principles into a new diplomacy (Alejandre 1995).  Where Mexico’s participation 
in international forums and in its relationships with individual states had been 
limited by the guiding principles of non-intervention and state self-determination 
in foreign policy, by the end of the 1980s Mexico had instead started to emerge 
as an important player in regional politics.54  
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 For Mexico’s participation in the Contadora group, see Castañeda (1985), and for Mexico’s 
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 Salinas wanted to change the character of US-Mexican relations as well, 
but believed it would only be possible if he could sanitize Mexico’s international 
image (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2009).  First, reliance on electoral 
fraud as the mechanism of PRI political control was becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain as domestic electoral conflicts became internationalized.  In 
1989, the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) filed a complaint with the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission on electoral fraud in the 1985-1986 state 
elections (Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
1989-1990) and approached a number of Republican senators in the US to 
discuss the conduct of elections in Mexico (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 
2009; Baer and Weintraub 1994).  The Partido de la Revolución Democrático 
(PRD) followed suit, approaching the Democrats about electoral fraud in the 
controversial Presidential election of 1988 (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 
2009).  Given the highly politicized context of the trade agreement, it was almost 
natural that the ensuing debates in the US would touch on whether the United 
States should be awarding authoritarian governments with trade accords (Mayer 
1998; Baer and Weintraub 1994).  Thus, Mexico’s authoritarian tendencies were 
getting in the way of more important policy objectives, especially economic 
integration.   
 While Salinas was mostly interested in promoting only economic 
liberation, the momentum for political liberation was difficult to slow (Covarrubias 
Velasco 1999).  It was becoming increasingly clear that Mexico would have to 
                                                                                                                                  
addition to the US-Cuba debate, see Covarrubias Velasco (2003). 
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pull back its adherence to non-intervention as the pretext for avoiding criticism 
and permit a discussion of its domestic policies, including democratization 
(Chabat 1997).  The Zedillo administration (1994-2000)  responded in 1996 with 
a sweeping electoral reform that promoted free and fair elections, and in effect 
widened the democratic opening (Klesner 1997).   
 This discussion suggests that Mexico would be especially susceptible to 
moral pressure for change on labor rights practices given its demonstrated 
interest in creating and maintaining a democratic image during the late 1990s 
through changes in human rights policy (Covarrubias Velasco 1999; Alejandre 
1995; Negrín 2008).  However, the effects of economic leverage on preferences 
within Mexico may be mixed in the NAFTA case.  Though theory suggests that 
trade-based conditionality serves as the more effective coercive element than 
persuasion (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), and especially so in the Mexican 
case, the dispute mechanism of the NAALC in some ways was never designed to 
lead to trade sanctions in practice.55  References to cooperation and consultation 
run throughout the text of the side agreement, and the spirit in which it is invoked 
is one of fact-finding rather than condemnation.  Governments instead 
emphasize that there are many steps of negotiation and cooperation between 
states to solve disputes before trade sanctions are discussed, and so far, these 
channels have been adequate to resolve labor issues in NAFTA, without 
resorting to trade sanctions.56  Even then, the section on when and how trade 
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 Whereas 68.2% of Mexican exports were destined for the United States in 1970, by 2007, 
82.1% of all Mexican exports went to the US (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2009).  
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 Interview, US NAO, November 2006, and the Mexican NAO, July 2006. 
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sanctions will be applied for labor conditionality is the least detailed section of the 
agreement (NAALC 1993).  At the same time, if the design of the agreement and 
the implicit understanding among states is to avoid trade sanctions, their 
inclusion in the agreement gives all states reason to be cautious.  The 
anticipation of possible trade sanctions may at least moderate behavior and 
encourage compromise during negotiation over labor issues.   
 Where economic leverage may come into play more forcefully is at the 
subnational level, where foreign investors encourage local leaders to allow labor 
rights violations when doing so promotes business interests.  NAFTA, and the 
economic reforms that groomed the Mexican economy for its passage, opened 
the Mexican economy further to foreign investment.  In this, corporate control of 
labor unions has been an important factor in attracting foreign investment, in part 
by guaranteeing labor peace (Quintero Ramírez 2001; Sklair 1989).  Labor 
relations in Mexico are dominated by the corporatist unions, and to the extent 
that governments can control labor relations through the CTM, they are able to 
establish a favorable climate for foreign investment.  Thus at least at the state 
level, governments face incentives to continue to violate labor rights, and most 
notably, limit the right to organize a union of workers’ choosing, to continue to 
attract and keep foreign investors.   
 Figure 1 presents a graphic representation of transnational pressures, and 
the competing preferences around norm compliance that can result from differing 
political interests at the national and subnational levels: 
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Figure 1: Transnational Strategies and State Response 
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reinforcing the persuasive strategies (in that the NAALC publicizes rights 
abuses), introduces coercive strategies based in economic leverage.  Mexico 
should be susceptible to these coercive strategies because trade with the US is 
the engine of the Mexican economy, and Mexico’s most important concern in its 
bilateral relations with the United States (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 
2009; Alejandre 1995).  We should assume that the Mexican government would 
rather address any critiques from international bodies on issues that are less 
important to them, like labor rights, rather than risk threats to economic 
integration.  
 However, transnational pressure is experienced differently at national and 
subnational levels within Mexico because the reputational costs and material 
costs that transnational advocates leverage on the Mexican government are 
borne differently by federal and state agents.  In the NAALC, states have signed 
onto an agreement committing them to enforce their labor laws, but the cases 
center on examples where practices contradict those commitments.  In effect, a 
NAALC filing increases the reputational costs for states.  While at the federal 
level, an interest in maintaining the veneer of democracy, or alternatively, an 
interest in avoiding reputational costs, may motivate the central government to 
choose compliance, among subnational actors, the costs to reputation for non-
compliance are minimal.  Advocates may blame the central government for lack 
of enforcement, or the very firms where violations occur, but rarely are state 
governments implicated in labor rights abuses.  Reputational costs are low for 
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state-level agents, leading these actors to prefer to continue to violate labor 
rights.  
 The material costs for violation, as applied by transnational advocates, 
reinforce the preference for continued violation at the subnational level.  While 
the allegations of labor rights violations in almost all cases centered on actions 
that occurred at a workplace factory or firm, the NAALC agreement holds states 
responsible for enforcing labor rights protections, not the firms that violate them.  
In essence, case filings take federal actors to task for irregularities in the 
enforcement of labor laws once labor conflicts erupt, and state governments can 
easily avoid the blame for violations that happen in their jurisdiction.  Further, 
while federal governments may take the threat of trade sanctions seriously 
because trade is an important component of economic growth, at the state level, 
leaders instead face incentives to maintain a favorable climate for foreign 
investment (Sklair 1989), and will continue to violate labor rights when they 
believe that doing so helps attract capital.  Even when federal actors prefer 
compliance, state-level governments are more concerned with the immediate 
effects of losing foreign investors if they cannot maintain control over labor, which 
perversely creates high costs for compliance, and provides the incentives to 
continue to violate labor rights (Sklair 1989; Quintero Ramirez 1997).  
 
State Response across the Mexican Cases 
 The NAALC process thus presents the Mexican government with the 
dilemma of how to weigh the costs and benefits of compliance against other 
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domestic political concerns and the interests of actors at subnational levels.  As 
pressures from transnational advocates to comply with the labor rights clause 
mount, central governments must decide how to respond to both their 
international critics and political subordinates.   
 If the labor rights event that provokes transnational pressure is caused by 
actions at the federal level, the democratizing center considers the international 
criticism as a sign that some improvement is in order.57  Because federal agents 
bear responsibility for actions that caused transnational advocates to become 
involved, and because federal actors ultimately have policy control over resolving 
these situations, they will use policy tools to respond to charges levied by 
transnational advocates.  By answering international critics with reform of policy 
or practices, and ultimately, compliance, Mexico sends the signal that its 
intention is to improve labor rights enforcement, even if in practice, the reforms 
are limited.   
 These interests are complicated by the relationships between federal and 
state governments.  Though Mexico is on the path of an evolving 
democratization, there is little to suggest that the emergence of political pluralism 
at the national level translates automatically to democracy at the state level 
(Gibson 2005).  Rather, one common aspect of the last wave of democracy has 
been that national level transitions resulted not in further democratization among 
state governments, but in the consolidation of authoritarianism at the subnational 
level (Gibson 2005).  Mexico is no exception to this process, as the slow 
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 Interview, Commission for Labor Cooperation, Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007; Interview, NAO 
of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico, July 16, 2006. 
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weakening of political control by the center reduced the accountability of local 
actors to those elites in a number of states.  In Mexico, authoritarian local actors 
tightened control in some states, but these states exist side-by-side with 
democratic state governments, resulting in a patchwork of democratic and 
authoritarian enclaves within a nominally democratic federal system (Cornelius 
and Craig 1991; Gibson 2005).   
 Even given democratization at the federal level, PRI ties to labor have not 
unraveled, and the CTM is still by far the most important labor central.58   As 
such, democratization has had a weak effect on labor politics at the local level.  
Local authoritarians are more likely to use union support to bolster their political 
influence, and thus more likely to try and maintain control over labor relations in 
their states.  This control is exercised first through the labor relations system, as 
the selection of the union representative at the labor board is almost exclusively 
drawn from the corporatist unions, given their preponderance in Mexican 
organized labor.  Where PRI governors use their right of appointment to the labor 
board system to shore up political influence, the other two seats on the board 
may also be appointed from the ranks of PRI officials, thus creating an overlap in 
political alliances that reinforces interest in minimizing competition over union 
representation when doing so favors PRI-backed unions.   
 Where the central power is charged with representing Mexico in the 
international system, but the actions of state-level authoritarians complicate 
efforts to create the image of an emerging liberal democracy, local actors create 
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 Nearly 90% of the unionized workforce is represented by unions affiliated with the Congreso de 
Trabajo (CT) labor central, and nearly all of these are CTM unions (O'Boyle 2002).  
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a disjuncture between official discourse and domestic practices.  In turn, the 
inconsistencies between governmental promises and actions are easy targets for 
transnational advocates, who can use them as examples it their attempts to 
promote consistent norm adoption (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  When state-
level actors complicate efforts to comply with labor rights conditionality, federal 
actors could take the opportunity to upbraid their political subordinates (Gibson 
2005), and force compliance.  This suggests that federal actors will intervene in 
local level struggles when those states’ practices create reputation costs for the 
federal government, especially when they impugn the image of a democratic 
Mexico, creating reputational costs that the federal government wishes to avoid.   
 It is not that federal agents wish to promote union democracy, but the 
international costs to the democratic project are higher than the domestic costs of 
intervention.  Further, intervention creates a welcome opportunity to discipline 
political subordinates, moreso if the state executive represents a rival political 
party.  If the labor rights event occurring at the state-level does not create 
reputational costs for the federal government, as when it does not become 
internationalized by transnational advocacy groups,  it is less likely that federal 
agents will intervene, especially when continuing to violate labor rights creates 
political stability for foreign investors.  
 Table 7 presents the full set of freedom of association cases against 
Mexico that passed through the entire NAALC process to test these propositions:  
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Table 7: Resolutions of Freedom of Association Cases Against Mexico 
Subnational 
Authoritarians NAALC case  State 
state 
executive sector 
jurisdiction campaign government 
action 
SUTSP   Mexico City PRI (1995) government federal no 
reform 
(reversal) 
ITAPSA   Mexico PRI (1996) maquila federal yes 
reform 
(policy change) 
TAESA   NATIONAL (1996) airlines federal no reform (change in practice) 
Maxi-Switch  Sonora PRI (1996) maquila local no 
reform 
(intervention) 
Han Young  Baja California 
PAN 
(1997) maquila local yes 
reform 
(intervention) 
Sony Tamaulipas PAN (1993) maquila local no none 
Honeywell/ GE I, II Chihuahua PAN (1992) maquila none no none 
Puebla Puebla PRI (2000) maquila local yes none 
Hidalgo Hidalgo PRI/ PVEM (2005) maquila local yes none 
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 First, each of the cases here lists freedom of association violations as the 
major claim.  The second column identifies which state the labor rights violation 
took place.  We would expect that freedom of association violations would 
emerge in PRI states, given the political interest of the PRI in maintaining 
hegemonic control over organized labor.  However, reliance on foreign 
investment as the model of Mexican development suggests that even in states 
held by the PRD or PAN, executives still prefer to maintain control over 
organized labor to stabilize the investment climate --especially where foreign 
investment is concentrated, including the maquiladora sector-- and would support 
efforts to limit union competition through the labor board system.  A second 
aspect of subnational authoritarianism therefore encompasses sectors where 
foreign investment is concentrated.  
 Jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of the labor board, which is divided 
among federal or state jurisdiction according to industrial sector.  The campaign 
column identifies whether or not a brand-based campaign coincided with the 
NAALC filing, and therefore describes whether labor rights advocates attempted 
to mobilize persuasive strategies in addition to coercive ones.  This variable is 
complicated by transnational support, as the persuasive strategies would almost 
universally be applied only for cases where transnational labor rights advocates 
are involved.  The last column describes the response from the federal 
government in resolving these cases.  
 First, the table shows that the response by the Mexican government to 
resolve the cases includes either policy reform, or no response, and further, the 
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policy response includes resolutions from intervention, to policy reversal, to 
policy change.   
 The table illustrates first that freedom of association cases indeed emerge 
in those states where there are important maquila sectors, where foreign 
investment is highly concentrated.  As expected, party rivalry between federal 
and state executives, or political incentives are less important for explaining 
variance in the ways Mexico responded to the cases than economic incentives. 
The first cases listed are those cases where jurisdiction for the labor rights event 
is federal, and responsibility for labor rights violations was caused by actions by 
federal level actors.  The expectation for these cases is that because the 
responsibility for the violation lies with federal officials, federal agents will 
respond to transnational pressure using the policy tools available to them.  In the 
SUTSP, ITAPSA and TAESA cases, the federal labor board was responsible for 
limiting freedom of association in each case, and whether or not persuasive 
strategies were also mobilized, the NAALC process led the Mexican government 
to respond with policy reform.  In the SUTSP case, this meant the reversal of an 
earlier labor board ruling on union representation.  After ITAPSA, the Mexican 
government mandated changes in the use of secret ballot elections and began 
the public union registry, and after TAESA, allowed separate craft union 
representation for airline stewards.   
 Across the cases where the local labor board was responsible for the 
violation of the right of association, the response by the federal government was 
mixed.  The causal mechanism suggests that the Mexican government would 
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force policy change by intervening at the labor board in cases where state-level 
actors created reputational costs for the federal government for their actions.  
This mechanism explains the intervention at Han Young, where the NAALC 
petition was accompanied by a widespread consumer campaign against the 
Hyundai Corporation in the United States, which publicized the Han Young case 
to an international audience (Williams 2003), but does not explain the Maxi-
Switch resolution, where an intervention was least likely, yet occurred.  I explain 
these two cases in greater detail in the case study section.  
 Among the remaining local cases, Sony and Honeywell/ GE I and II, we 
would expect that given local preferences to continue to violate freedom of 
association, as long as state-level actors did not increase reputational costs of 
the government, federal agents would not get involved in these cases.  The two 
Honeywell/ GE cases are slightly different in that as the first NAALC cases, 
submitters prepared petitions that implicated firms’ actions, not the Government 
of Mexico as the NAALC requires, and so the NAO could not identify whether the 
local labor board was at fault.  Even so, where there was no campaign to raise 
the costs for the Mexican government for allowing violations, the violations 
continued and there was no attempt to rectify them in all three cases, as 
expected.  
 Most of the NAALC cases, and almost all analyzed here, take place in the 
years before 2000, when the PRI holds the presidency.  Under hegemonic party 
rule, we would expect the federal government to support CTM prerogatives and 
act in ways to limit challenges to CTM representation.  The last two cases, the 
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Puebla and Hidalgo cases, are two cases where the dynamics may be different 
because they occurred in the years after party rotation, when the PAN, rather 
than the PRI, held the presidency.  The theory suggests that motivations to limit 
freedom of association through the labor board would be especially strong in 
these states, as party rivalry between federal and state executives would 
reinforce the incentives of state actors to limit unionization for economic reasons.   
 In these two states, even with consumer-based campaigns leading the 
NAALC submissions and raising the reputational costs to the federal 
government, neither state nor federal agents stepped in to resolve the conflict 
during or after the NAALC process.  The PAN might have tried to find ways to 
isolate the CTM as the main base of popular support for the PRI, if it were not a 
party backed by business interests.  The Fox Administration’s proposal for labor 
reform, the Abascal Plan, suggested little to change the tripartite labor board 
structure or the use of the secret ballot, and instead sought to introduce 
flexibilization into labor contracts in ways that were so blatantly hostile to unions 
that the proposal provoked its own NAALC petition.59   
 In sum, the table shows that the causal mechanism described here 
predicts policy response by the Mexican government across the range of cases.  
As expected, federal agents will use policy tools to promote labor rights 
compliance when violations are the result of federal actions, and will force 
compliance at the state level when those actors increase reputational costs for 
                                            
59
 The case was filed by the Washington Office on Latin America and 21 additional labor rights 
and human rights NGOs alleging that the Abascal proposal violated the principles of the 
NAALC.  The US NAO rejected the petition for review. 
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the federal government.  When the federal government does not face these 
costs, which here simply means when transnational advocates do not also apply 
persuasive strategies, like campaigns, the federal government does not attempt 
to force compliance, and local actors are free to continue to violate labor rights.  
Finally, the analysis here also suggests that these dynamics can explain case 
resolutions across the range of freedom of association cases against Mexico 
under conditions of PRI hegemony, but the Puebla and Hidalgo outliers tell us 
that under conditions of party competition, state response may be different, and 
we could test these propositions with additional cases when and if they become 
available.   
 
Federal Response: Changes in Policy and Practice 
 What kinds of policy responses did Mexico choose to pursue in the federal 
cases?  The ITAPSA and TAESA cases were two submissions that were formally 
resolved through Ministerial Consultations, but the NAALC process began a 
dialogue around labor rights in Mexico than ultimately led to policy reforms and 
changes in labor practices that encouraged freedom of association. 
 
ITAPSA  
 At ITAPSA, workers were concerned about the unsafe and unhealthy 
working conditions they experienced inside the factory.  Workers described 
routine exposure to solvents, asbestos, and unsafe levels of noise in the plant, 
and were denied proper safety equipment to protect themselves.  The machinery 
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in the factory was not properly maintained, causing a number of grisly industrial 
accidents (US Department of Labor 1997c).  Even though the Mexican 
Secretariat for Labor and Social Security (STPS) inspected the plant twice a year 
and imposed fines and restrictions, the firm refused to make the improvements 
that would create safer working conditions.  The CTM plant union was wholly 
unresponsive to worker’s concerns, so they began to negotiate representation 
with the independent industrial union STIMAHCS in 1997.  
 In the weeks leading to the election, STIMAHCS supporters were fired for 
supporting the independent union drive, and in the days before the election, 
some were threatened with bodily harm if they voted against the CTM (US 
Department of Labor 1997c).  At the election itself, STIMAHCS supporters were 
threatened with violence and a number of voters were beaten, all of which was 
witnessed by the local labor board, which not only did not intervene, but also 
certified the election in favor of the CTM (Hathaway 2002a).  In the months that 
followed, workers won an injunction allowing them to return to work, but the labor 
board refused to reinstate them, which the workers attributed to political bias.  
 The ITAPSA workers filed a petition at the US NAO citing violations of 
freedom of association in the conduct of the labor board during the organization 
drive, election and aftermath, and added the health and safety concerns that 
sparked the union drive.  The ITAPSA case has the distinction of featuring the 
greatest number of sponsors, as a tri-national Alliance of workers at Echlin plants 
in the US, Mexico and Canada joined the petition, along with a number of human 
rights and labor rights groups from all three states.  A second petition was filed 
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with the Canadian NAO on April 6, 1998, and accepted for review on June 4, 
1998, as the US investigation went forward.  
 While in the course of the review the US NAO recognized that the 
allegations of labor board impropriety were both accurate and outside the letter of 
Mexican labor law (US Department of Labor 1998a), the highest level of 
resolution for freedom of association cases under the NAALC is Ministerial 
Consultations.  Both the US and Canadian NAOs suggested Ministerial 
Consultations to resolve the issues, and the Mexican Minister of Labor, Carlos 
Abascal, met with Ministers from both states repeatedly through 2003 (US 
Department of Labor n.d. [b]).  At the plant, health and safety conditions 
improved after the plant was purchased by another company, the Dana 
Corporation, but the union organizing drive ultimately collapsed (Graubart 2008).  
 While the resolution of the case at the plant level fell far short of what the 
submitters and workers had hoped for, in the long term, the ITAPSA case helped 
to promote important changes in labor policy within Mexico.  As part of the 
Ministerial Consultations, Ministers of Labor from Mexico and the United States 
drafted a joint Ministerial Declaration.  In it, the Government of Mexico agreed to 
an action plan where the promotion of the secret ballot in recuento union 
elections, and a publicly available collective contract registry were the first two 
points of accord.  The STPS developed two websites for the contract registry.  
One allows the public access to union registration lists and documents.60  The 
other is a searchable database of collective contracts, so that anyone can 
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investigate who holds bargaining rights within individual factories, and in some 
cases, access copies of the registration paperwork and organizational statutes.61   
 The validation of this perennial issue by the Mexican Minister of Labor in 
an NAO Joint Declaration changed the debate on labor reform in Mexico in ways 
that favored the independent labor movement (Graubart 2008).  Whereas 
discussion of labor reform had always previously been an internal matter 
conducted among the STPS policy elites, the CTM, and the Mexican business 
peak association Coparmex, now the UNT was invited to participate in the policy 
discussions (Zapata 2006; Graubart 2008).62  Citing the Joint Declaration and 
Mexico’s stated intention to promote the secret ballot, labor lawyers were able to 
extract a commitment from the government to include freedom of association in 
any policy agenda around labor reform (Graubart 2008).  The secret ballot has 
not been addressed in formal labor reform proposals, as the Mexican 
government continues to argue that nothing in the federal labor law currently 
prevents the use of secret ballots if all actors in elections agree.  Even so, the 
Federal Labor Board in Mexico City started to employ secret ballots consistently 
by 2002 (Hathaway 2002a), and there is some evidence to suggest that local 
labor boards are allowing the use of the secret ballot more readily (Maquila 
Solidarity Network 2002).  
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62 Interview, the Mexican NAO, Mexico City, Mexico, July 16, 2006.  
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TAESA 
 In 1999, flight attendants at TAESA Airlines filed an NAO petition in the 
US alleging freedom of association violations over the ongoing struggle to 
establish a separate craft union for flight attendants.  According to the petitioners, 
mismanagement caused working conditions to deteriorate after the transfer of 
ownership of the airline in 1994, leading not just to workplace conflicts, but grave 
disregard for passenger safety (US Department of Labor 1999b).  In response, 
some flight attendants sought union representation with ASSA, the flight 
attendants union affiliated with the UNT.  The federal labor board, whose labor 
representative was selected from the CTM, ruled repeatedly against ASSA’s 
request for an election on separate craft union representation for flight attendants 
at TAESA (US Department of Labor 1999b; Alcalde 2004).  After two years, the 
labor board relented, but scheduled an election that would include all TAESA 
employees, not just the flight attendants.  At the March 22 election, flight 
attendants voted overwhelmingly for ASSA, but the majority of the 1500 TAESA 
workers, already represented by the CTM, voted against them.  As in other 
NAALC cases, the vote was a public voice vote, and ASSA supporters were 
subsequently harassed, threatened, and fired over their union vote after the 
election (US Department of Labor 1999b).  
 The TAESA flight attendants eventually took their claims to NAALC 
arbitration, filing a petition jointly with the AFL-CIO’s Association of Flight 
Attendants on November 10, 1999.  The public hearings in Washington revealed 
not just a litany of attempts to block the independent union from registering and 
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stories of worker intimidation on the day of the vote, but shocking accounts of 
grave disregard for passenger safety and alarmingly inadequate airplane 
maintenance (US Department of Labor 2000).  The NAALC process ended in 
Ministerial Consultations, but there were some important secondary effects on 
Mexican practices in the craft representation cases that followed TAESA, even 
though the immediate labor situation at TAESA was not resolved favorably.  For 
example, when flight attendants at Aerocaribe went on strike in 2000 over the 
same issues flight attendants faced at TAESA, the Mexican government allowed 
separate voting on craft union representation for the flight attendants “to avoid a 
new round of international scrutiny” (Compa 2001).  Workers at Aerocaribe 
stated that the TAESA petition gave them added leverage with the company to 
take their claims seriously when they too went on strike over craft representation 
(Graubart 2008).   
 On the day before ASSA submitted the NAO complaint, a TAESA plane 
crashed after takeoff en route to Mexico City, killing 18 people (Martínez 2001).  
The resulting federal inquiry in Mexico corroborated the fight attendants’ 
allegations of extreme disregard for passenger safety and careless plane 
maintenance that was listed in the petition (US Department of Labor 2000).  
Though vindicated, the flight attendants were further hurt when TAESA’s license 
to operate was suspended until the company met the safety requirements 
ordered by the government after the crash.  TAESA did not attempt to address 
these concerns, but instead suspended operations, fired half the workforce, and 
fell into bankruptcy (Martínez 2001).  In 2001, as the NAALC case ended, the 
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flight attendants were still fighting to collect the full severance pay legally 
mandated under the federal labor law, rather than the three months pay offered 
by the CTM.  
 At both ITAPSA and TAESA, actions taken by the federal labor board to 
deny freedom of association motivated the decision to file the NAALC 
submissions.  As the cases went through the process, the NAALC outcomes 
informed how the Mexican government dealt with future cases.  By addressing 
the issues through a change in policy in union registry procedures, and changes 
in practice in the handling of subsequent disputes, the Mexican government 
could demonstrate to the international community that it was aware of the 
freedom of association issues, and was addressing them where they were 
directly responsible for their resolution, through policy reform.  
 
Local Interventions 
 In both of these cases, the central government intervened in the labor 
conflict to resolve them in ways that favored the independent unions.  These 
cases show that plant-level resolutions are possible in the NAALC, but that these 
kinds of short-term gains may be limited, given international capital mobility and 
the ability of investors to circumvent both state regulation and transnational 
pressure.  
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Han Young  
 Workers at Tijuana’s Han Young plant began a campaign to affiliate with 
the independent union STIMAHCS in 1997.  Although workers at the plant were 
represented by the CROC, a corporatist protectionist union, workers believed this 
union did not accurately represent them in a dispute over the payment of profit 
sharing during May of 1998 (US Department of Labor 1997a).  Eventually, they 
contacted the STIMAHCS union about an affiliation under the union’s national 
registry.  On August 6, STIMAHCS filed paperwork with the local labor board 
requesting an election to assign the collective contract.  After two aborted 
hearings, the election date was set for October 6.  
 Even with massive election irregularities designed to favor the official 
union, the independent union won enough votes to win title to the collective 
contract, but the local labor board refused to certify the election results (Williams 
2003).  The attorney general’s office then intervened, issuing injunctions against 
the labor board to prevent them from certifying the election in favor of the CTM, a 
move that is highly irregular in Mexico (Williams 2003).  This prompted the union, 
the Support Committee for Maquila Workers, Mexico’s National Association of 
Democratic Lawyers, and the International Labor Rights Fund to file a petition 
with the US NAO on October 28, 1997 alleging violations of the freedom of 
association in the conduct of the labor board (US Department of Labor 1997a).  
The case was accepted for review by the US NAO on November 17, 1997.  
 Under pressure from the federal government to find a solution, the 
governor of Baja California met with the Secretary General of the CROC to work 
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out a compromise, which included his accepting a parcel of land for personal use 
in exchange for removing the CROC from Han Young (Williams 2003:534-535).  
The federal government and state government of Baja California then mediated a 
solution with representatives from the October 6 union, the Tijuana labor board, 
and Han Young management.  In exchange for dropping the NAO complaint and 
all other legal proceedings --most of which revealed how the local labor board 
colluded with the factory owner to prevent the independent union from 
registering-- a second union election was to be held.  Han Young was to reinstate 
all workers dismissed for union activities (US Department of Labor 1998b).  With 
the CROC out of the picture, and with the labor board agreeing to certify the 
election results, STIMAHCS was declared the winner of the second election, and 
the labor board registered the independent union in January (Faulkner 2004).  
Han Young thus marked the first successful bid by an independent union to gain 
collective bargaining rights in the border region.  
 However, it became clear very quickly that the plant did not intend to 
negotiate a contract with the independent union, possibly under pressure from 
the maquiladora association to limit independent unionization in the sector, or 
from the local CTM (Williams 2003).  Williams cites that rumors circulated in 
Tijuana charging that state officials and maquila industry representatives met 
with Han Young’s owner, threatening to push him out of Tijuana if he negotiated 
with the union (Williams 2003), triggering a “war of attrition” between the factory 
owners and local government.  The independent union went on a two-year strike 
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over contract negotiations, but to avoid more strife, Han Young closed and 
moved to another part of Tijuana. 
 Submitting a case set off a series of events that led the federal 
government to intervene at the local level.  In the context of subnational 
authoritarianism, a democratizing federal government faces incentives to contain 
local conflicts and keep them private (Gibson 2005).  The Han Young case 
featured an extensive mobilization to publicize the violations in the US, and the 
participation of transnational advocates in the case made that privacy impossible.  
Once the NAALC process presented the stories of systematic harassment of 
independent unionists in the international arena, the federal government faced 
reputation costs brought on by actions taken at the state level.  Seeing an 
opportunity to challenge peripheral authoritarians, and further, challenge the PAN 
Governor, the federal government exercised its political prerogatives to intervene 
at the local labor board.  
 Activists involved in the Han Young case credited cross-border pressure 
given the impending NAALC hearings with the success in persuading the local 
board to give in and recognize the union (Faulkner 2004).  Although Han Young 
workers seem to have lost this case in a “long, slow defeat” as the factory 
eventually closed and relocated (Williams 2003), the case was considered a 
success by some observers because the union and its allies were able to push 
the local labor board to grant its registration even under in the context of outright 
repression and illegal firings  (Hathaway 2002a; Campaign for Labor Rights 
2004).  In the review of the case, the US NAO made a scathing critique of the 
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Mexican labor board system, noting that the Mexican government in Baja 
California has used these tribunals to favor the PRI-affiliated unions (US 
Department of Labor 1998b).  Many of the subsequent NAALC submissions 
against Mexico have used this critique to remind the NAO of its position on the 
bias in the labor board system. 
  
Maxi-Switch 
 The Maxi-Switch case was brought as a joint effort by the Communication 
Workers of America and their Mexican counterparts, the Sindicato de 
Telefonistas de la República Mexicana (STRM) to challenge the local labor 
board’s efforts to deny legal recognition to an independent union at a maquila in 
Cananea, Sonora, Mexico.  In 1995, workers at the plant began to consider 
forming a union in affiliation with the Federation of Unions of Service Companies 
(FESEBS), an independent union that represents service workers in Mexico.  On 
November 22, 1995, the nascent union formed and adopted bylaws, which they 
submitted to the state labor board on November 24 (US Department of Labor 
1996).  On January 23, 1996, they learned that the petition for legal registration 
of the union had been denied on the grounds that a collective contract was 
already registered at Maxi-Switch.  Workers later learned that once the union 
organizing drive became public at the plant, management had signed a classic 
protection contract with the CTM (US Department of Labor 1996).  When 
FESEBS lawyers protested, the labor board changed its ruling to deny the union 
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registration instead on technical grounds in the bureaucratic procedures of the 
filing paperwork (US Department of Labor 1996). 
 Supporters of the independent union were quick to call the denial on 
technical grounds a pretext for denying union recognition for political reasons.  At 
this local board in particular, the government and labor representatives were both 
were drawn from the membership of the official union confederation, the CTM, 
and appointed by the PRI Governor (US Department of Labor 1996).  With 
nowhere left to turn, the Maxi-Switch workers approached the Communication 
Workers of America about filing a petition with the US NAO.  The petition alleged 
complicity by the local labor board in denying freedom of association, improper 
conduct surrounding the union registration, and the refusal to reinstate workers 
fired for union activity (US Department of Labor 1996).  The case was accepted 
for review by the US NAO on December 10, 1996, and a public hearing on the 
matter was set for April.  
  After the NAO accepted the case, the labor board ruling was reversed.  
The state labor board changed their ruling under federal pressure to award the 
independent union legal registration, in order to avoid holding the public hearing 
(Borderlines 1997; Pantin 2002).  On April 16, two days before the hearing was 
to take place in Washington, the US NAO received the request to withdraw the 
petition, as the labor dispute had “ended favorably” with the recognition of the 
independent union (Graubart 2008; Borderlines 1997; US Department of Labor 
n.d. [b]).  Organizers of this campaign credited cross-border cooperation and the 
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pressure the NAALC hearing leveraged on the Mexican government as the 
deciding element in the positive outcome (Borderlines 1997; ICFTU 1997).  
 This success was not to last, however, as the company owners opened a 
new plant in Hermosillo during the labor dispute, transferred the work to the new, 
non-union workforce, and then sold the original plant a few months later, 
requiring that the registration process start over again (Finbow 2006; Borderlines 
1997).  Eventually, the plant closed in 1999, and during the interim three years, 
the newly recognized union was never able to negotiate the collective contract 
with the company (Pantin 2002; Daamgaard 1999). 
 The Maxi-Switch case is an interesting outlier because the federal 
government chose to intervene even when we would predict that there would be 
no federal response.  The local labor board was responsible for the denial of 
freedom of association in this case, and no international campaign accompanied 
the case that would have publicized the violations, or otherwise raised the 
reputational costs to the federal government to respond.  Though party rivalry 
may have had some effect on the decision to intervene, as it may have at Han 
Young, Sonora at the time was ruled by the PRI, suggesting that the local 
government and state executive would nominally share an interest in promoting 
the CTM, and thus would use the board to limiting union organizing.  Though 
additional research on this case could establish further why the federal 
government intervened when the causal analysis predicts it would not, one 
possibility may be that this case came after a string of cases against Mexico, 
including SUTSP, ITAPSA and TAESA, each of which included public hearings 
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that were very critical of the Mexican government.  The timing of the withdrawal 
of the petition suggests that the government wished to avoid a public hearing and 
the condemnation of Mexican practices that had accompanied them in previous 
cases (Borderlines 1997; Pantin 2002). 
 Finally, these two cases show that even though the NAALC is not 
designed to award plant-level resolutions of labor rights violations, these were 
possible, even if these gains were short-lived when the factories closed and 
reopened in other areas.  Closing operations to evade union activity repeats a 
pattern from other labor campaigns that focus on a single plant (Anner 2003a), 
and underscores that capital mobility and the power of multinational capital to 
avoid regulation can complicate attempts to use international pressure to protect 
worker’s rights.  63  While plant-level resolutions seem to be the kinds of 
outcomes that labor rights advocates hoped the NAALC would produce at the 
outset (Finbow 2006; Compa 2001; Hovis 1994), these are ironically the 
outcomes with the least impact on labor rights enforcement.  What the case 
studies analyzed here show is that Ministerial Consultations can sometimes 
advance important political processes within Mexico that create more effective 
changes over the long term, even when short-term, immediate resolutions are 
unlikely given the design of the institutions of the agreement.     
 
                                            
63 
 For a review of firm specific versus industry-wide campaigns and their outcomes, see Anner 
(2003). 
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The Gender Case  
 After completing a major study on pregnancy testing as a pre-hire 
screening procedure in Mexico’s maquiladora sector, Human Rights Watch, the 
International Labor Rights Fund and Mexico’s Association of Democratic Lawyers  
filed an NAO petition on the issue in May of 1997 (Hertel 2003).  The US NAO 
took the case under review the next year.  The Gender case serves as a test 
case here for three reasons.  First, while the mechanism presented in the other 
cases centers on violations of freedom of association, the Gender case charged 
violations of discrimination based on sex, and so serves as to test the causal 
explanation in additional issue areas that are not as politicized as freedom of 
association in Mexico.  Second, discrimination is one of the labor rights violations 
that is open to trade sanctions, and therefore, the threat of economic sanctions is 
more credible in this case than for freedom of association cases, where trade 
sanctions cannot be applied.  Third, the federal government in Mexico is fully 
responsible for labor law, and so the process of resolving the issues raised in the 
case illustrates federal level response to both persuasive and coercive 
transnational strategies.  
 The NAALC petition underscored the results of the Human Rights Watch 
report.  Mexican labor law allows for twelve weeks of paid maternity leave, but 
the researchers found that in the maquiladora plants they visited, managers 
attempted to avoid paying these benefits by weeding out workers with pre-hire 
pregnancy tests (US Department of Labor 1997b).  They also found that once 
workers were found to be pregnant, they were routinely subjected to work that 
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was more difficult, in order to force them to resign.  Discrimination based on 
gender is illegal in Mexico, and though theoretically any worker could approach 
the labor board to ask for an investigation on pregnancy as the reason for being 
denied employment, in practice, the labor boards ruled that since the pregnant 
women were never hired, there was no work relationship, and therefore no basis 
for the case.  It was this last point of contention that submitters argued showed 
government complicity in allowing individual firms to discriminate against 
pregnant women in hiring practices (US Department of Labor 1997b). 
 During the investigation, the Mexican NAO protested the review of the 
case in that it challenged Mexican law, not its application.  In fact, Mexican labor 
law did not explicitly prevent pregnancy screening (US Department of Labor 
1998c).  Filers then used the set of ILO conventions, UN declarations and other 
instruments of international law to show that Mexico had made commitments on 
gender discrimination in international forums that were contradicted by its actions 
at home, and to show that simply outlawing pregnancy testing would resolve the 
issues (US Department of Labor 1997b).   
 Once the US and Mexico were engaged in bilateral talks over these 
issues, the Mexican government made public commitments to eliminate gender 
discrimination in line with the international agreements Mexico had signed.  For 
example, Mexico created special issues offices in 1998 to investigate child labor, 
women in the workforce, and the needs of disabled workers (US Department of 
State 2000), and a separate office for equality and gender issues was created in 
1999.  Though the US NAO eventually suggested Ministerial Consultations in 
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October of 1998, even after the case was over at the NAALC, the federal 
government continued to make public commitments to end pregnancy testing.  
Women’s groups in Mexico City had pushed the mayor to criminalize pregnancy 
testing in the capital, and pushed the teacher’s union to negotiate with the 
Ministry of Education and end to the practice for teachers (Hertel 2006a).  By 
2002, the government of Mexico had signed an agreement with the National 
Council of Maquiladora Industries committing members to end the practice, and a 
number of US companies publicly committed to ending pregnancy testing as well 
(Compa 2001).  By 2003, the STPS signed 13 agreements with state 
governments committing them to the same (US Department of Labor 2007).  
Finally, in 2003, the Federal Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination Act 
came into effect, which includes protections against mandatory pregnancy testing 
throughout Mexico, thus formally prohibiting the practice for the first time (US 
Department of Labor 2007).  
 Over the course of this case, transnational advocates showed Mexico that 
its labor code not only contradicted its prior international commitments to prevent 
gender discrimination, but also sent a clear message that allowing pregnancy 
testing was morally unacceptable regardless of what national laws allowed.  The 
way that transnational advocates emphasized the gap between Mexico’s 
international commitments and domestic practices in the treatment of women 
made Mexico especially vulnerable to the moral arguments publicized by 
transnational advocates through both the initial report and the NAALC case.  In 
filing at the NAALC, advocates raised the costs of continued violation by adding 
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the possibility of trade sanctions.  Further, the slow evolution of the end of the 
practice by firms, the maquila sector, and subnational governments created the 
demand for a federal response.  Facing high costs to its reputation and credible 
economic threats, Mexico responded by giving in to transnational pressure --by 
now supplemented by domestic calls for reform-- and outlawed the practice.  
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter reviewed the outcomes of cases submitted to the NAALC to 
illustrate that even though the agreement itself is weak in sanctioning labor rights 
violations, at times, case resolutions went beyond the scope of the NAALC 
agreement to generate resolutions that were favorable to labor.  Transnational 
pressures on states to conform to international labor rights norms can take the 
form of either moral persuasion or coercion.  While transnational advocacy 
networks pressured Mexico with normative arguments as to why labor rights 
protections were necessary, and why Mexico should allow independent union 
organizing, they also introduced coercive elements by filing petitions on these 
cases at the NAALC.  While trade sanctions are the least likely outcome for labor 
violations in the NAALC, in some cases, like Han Young and the Gender case, 
sanctions were still possible (Compa 2001).  The specter of sanctions may have 
increased the costs of continued violation in Mexico to the extent that they 
believed the threat.  At the state level, however, the need to maintain a stable 
investment environment created a preference for continued violation.  For 
example, the economic interest in maintaining labor control through monopoly 
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representation by official unions led the CTM to get involved at Han Young once 
the CROC left, to prevent the STIMAHCS union from holding the collective 
contract.  In effect, the corporatist unions would rather that enterprises close than 
allow independent unions into Tijuana.   
 Whether or not these strategies led to policy change further depended on 
how these pressures shifted the costs of compliance within states and on the 
decisions that domestic policymakers take.  In Mexico, the incentives to comply 
were further complicated by evolving democratization.  In some cases, the 
federal government stepped in to force resolutions when doing so would help 
them rein in government actors in the authoritarian periphery, which had a 
secondary effect in promoting union democracy at the local level.  In all other 
cases, the NAALC process pointed out the major issues and areas where Mexico 
could improve its labor rights enforcement, and Mexico addressed these gaps 
with efforts to improve labor rights protections. 
 Participation in the NAALC process in turn shifted the political dynamics 
within Mexico so that independent unions and their supporters gained access to 
policymakers, and were able to better lobby for reform.  Filing a case conferred 
legitimacy on local Mexican groups, because when they were backed by 
transnational advocates, they became more important actors within Mexico (Kay 
2005; Graubart 2008).  As such, the Mexican government could no longer ignore 
the efforts by domestic groups to gain their attention and discuss these issues 
(Graubart 2008; Hertel 2006a).  Because local advocates were now legitimated 
by the NAO as having important complaints, they become important actors in 
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policy process.  They then gained an opening into that dialogue from within 
Mexico, effectively pushing the government to address labor rights issues 
(Graubart 2008).  As these political dynamics unfolded domestically and over 
time, local labor advocates were able to contribute to policy dialogue and lobby 
for important reforms, even after the NAALC review process had ended.    
 My analysis of selected NAALC case resolutions shows that even in the 
face of criticism that the NAALC cannot adequately address domestic labor 
struggles, the filing process has its own leverage that can promote even firm-
level redress of workers’ complaints, outside of the boundaries of the tripartite 
agreement.  Also, long-term effects were possible in the policy changes that took 
effect once the NAALC opened up dialogue on specific labor rights violations 
inside Mexico.  Even groups that have participated in the NAALC process have 
stated that though they may believe the NAALC as an enforcement body is 
“toothless,” the process itself is helpful for garnering international attention to the 
labor rights violations or union drives as they unfold.64  The labor clause provides 
at minimum another avenue to expose the labor rights abuses to outside 
audiences, even when there is little chance that the NAALC will solve the incident 
on the factory floor, and that channel for mobilization points to the usefulness of 
the process to local workers .65 
 It is difficult to assign the cause and effect of NAFTA to events in Mexico, 
especially when the evolution of democracy also informs state decision-making.  
It is difficult as well as to attribute these changes to the NAFTA cases alone 
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 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, 2006. 
65
 Interview, Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, Canada, 2005. 
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when concurrent citizen advocacy meant some of the NAALC cases were met 
with high levels of political support in the US, Canada and Mexico.  While this 
chapter traces the effects of the NAALC process on changes in Mexican policy, it 
is possible that the pressure on Mexico was felt from transnational civil society in 
forums complementary, but separate, from the NAALC channels.  What does the 
trade-labor linkage add to pressure for political change that sets labor 
conditionality apart from other possible transnational arenas?  Was it the trade 
clause alone that precipitated these changes in Mexico?  I turn to these 
questions in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Four: The Impact and Limitations of Transnational 
Labor Rights Advocacy: Lessons from Puebla, Mexico 
 
 Previous chapters employed both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
show that trade-based labor rights clauses are most effective in promoting labor 
rights when paired with transnational labor rights advocacy.  Yet, the current 
discussion of trade-based mechanisms has yet to consider that pursuing policy 
changes through these mechanisms is just one of a number of venues available 
to workers to press their claims.  Nor has the work addressed that attempts to 
promote changes in state behavior though trade-based mechanisms can often 
work in tandem with other concurrent methods, such as those associated with 
international labor rights campaigns.  Often, workers and advocates that engage 
the trade-based mechanisms are pursuing different options all at once, including 
domestic remedies, transnational campaigns, and international institutions.  
Since advocates can pursue labor rights enforcement in both domestic and 
international arenas at the same time, it is difficult to assess whether case 
outcomes are largely due to pressure provided by the NAALC process, or 
through other possible strategies. 
 This chapter looks at these issues more explicitly.  It provides a qualitative 
analysis of three attempts to organize independent unions in maquiladora plants 
in the apparel export sector in Puebla, Mexico.  Working conditions within the 
factories worsened when the contraction of export markets in the US after 2001 
led to job losses in the maquila sector, and in turn, led to the intensification of 
production and increased competition for orders (Yanz and Jeffcott 2003).  
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Workers in each plant organized to address their concerns, only to find that they 
were already bound through a protection contract to a corporatist union willing to 
sacrifice worker’s interests for managerial prerogatives.  Efforts to replace these 
unions clashed with the historical political alliances between the Mexican State, 
the PRI, and the unions of the corporatist system.  In each of the factories, a 
transnational labor rights network stepped forward to support local workers in the 
unionization effort.  While the struggle at Kukdong resulted in the registration and 
recognition of the independent union in the plant, when this network strategy 
failed to provoke changes at Tarrant Ajalpan and Matamoros Garment, a joint 
petition regarding them was ultimately submitted to NAALC arbitration.  By 
comparing how the strategies and outcomes unfolded when transnational 
advocacy groups pursued brand campaigns as when those when those same 
advocacy groups pursued the NAALC, this chapter attempts to evaluate the 
contribution that trade-based mechanisms may add to the realization of labor 
struggles compared to other available strategies.   
 The comparison of campaigns and trade-based mechanisms as possible 
strategies for protecting labor rights calls for a case selection that can investigate 
both strategies while also minimizing the effects of any contextual factors that 
may also influence outcomes.  Further examination of the possible cases to be 
drawn from the NAALC identified additional factories in Puebla that were not 
brought to the NAALC, allowing for a research design that could investigate the 
effects of these different strategies across factories that were otherwise similar.  
Locating the study at the local level in one state controls for a number of 
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historical, cultural, socio-economic and political variables as well (Snyder 2001).  
In these three factories, the corporatist unions of the Confederación de 
Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), the Confederación Revolucionario de Obreros y 
Campesinos (CROC) and the regional Federación Revolucionario de Obreros y 
Campesinos (FROC-CROC) hold the collective contracts, and each factory is 
under the jurisdiction of the same local labor board, the Puebla Council for Labor 
Conciliation and Arbitration (JLCA).  Further, politics in Puebla are dominated by 
the PRI at the state level where these labor struggles take place.  These 
variables, so important to case outcomes in Chapter 3, are assumed to hold little 
explanatory power for the divergent outcomes in Puebla because they are 
similar, if not the same, for each case.  
 The chapter begins by introducing the political economy of maquila 
production in Mexico, discussing how the North American Free Trade Agreement 
fostered changes in the sector, including geographical dispersion into greenfield 
investment, the introduction of new innovations in production schemes, and 
massive increases in foreign investment.  It includes a discussion of union 
registration in Mexico to show why registering unions outside of the corporatist 
system in Mexico in general, but in Puebla in particular, constitutes a political 
threat to both foreign investment and local political prerogatives.  The chapter 
then follows the course of the three cases and discusses how a transnational 
labor rights network was able to mount brand-based campaigns that resulted in 
union recognition in one of the cases.  I then turn to the process of filing the 
NAALC petition on Puebla to show that engaging the labor mechanisms of the 
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trade accord did not substantially alter the outcome at any of the factories, but 
complemented the campaign strategies by corroborating network claims, 
assigning blame for violations, and compelling Mexican officials to answer for the 
violations in a public forum.  I end with an assessment of these strategies based 
on how they evolved in Puebla that emphasizes that while transnational labor 
rights networks can support workers in their attempts to secure labor rights 
protections, the choice of the materialist strategies to do so is an important factor 
that conditions success.  
 The research draws on fieldwork completed in Canada, Mexico and the 
US from 2005 to 2007, and uses a number of original sources.  These include in-
depth, open-ended interviews with key participants in these cases, including US 
and Mexican NAO officials and the staff of NAFTA’s tri-national Committee for 
Labor Cooperation (CLC), US and Mexican labor organizers, staff at the AFL-
CIO Center for International Labor Solidarity in Mexico City, US, Mexican and 
Canadian labor rights and human rights groups, rank and file workers and their 
representatives at each of the Puebla factories, and workers from other maquilas 
of the Tehuacán region not analyzed here. These interviews are supplemented 
with worker testimony that appears in the NAO case files on Puebla, documents 
produced by the Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador (CAT) in Puebla, and local 
newspaper articles.  The interviews and testimonies are paired with original 
documents relating to each NAALC case, including the original submissions and 
public reviews, public hearing transcriptions, and NAO correspondence.  I include 
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labor rights campaign materials, including e-mail alerts, web-based updates, and 
personal correspondence with network participants as sources as well. 
 
The Maquila Boom… 
 Like other developing countries, since the 1980s Mexico has pursued 
economic development through export led industrialization, foreign investment, 
and technology transfer via foreign partnerships (Sklair 1989).  The passage of 
NAFTA in 1994 changed the incentives for maquila production considerably, 
especially in textiles.  While Mexico already successfully competed for textile 
investment against the Asian producers, and especially China, because of its 
proximity to the US, the new rules for duty-free importation of apparel provided 
the last component to win the competition for the North American market.66  What 
resulted was a massive influx of new investment in apparel production in Mexico.  
In 1994, the total value of FDI in the textile sector in Mexico was valued at 254 
million dollars, rising to 343 million by the last year of the post-NAFTA maquila 
textile boom in 2000 (Juárez Núñez 2004).  Over the same period, the number of 
textile maquila workers registered at the Mexican Social Security Institute 
increased 144%, rising from 542,073 in 1993 to 1,291,231 employees by 2000 
(ITAM 2004). 
                                            
66
 Annex 300B of the NAFTA Agreement essentially nullified the 1974 Multifiber Arrangement for 
textile and apparel trade between Canada, the United States and Mexico, maintaining the 
import quotas for states outside the North American market, but removing quotas within the 
market (Juárez Núñez 2004).  Section 2 replaced the rules of origin requirements of the 
806/807 tariff schedule, removing tariffs for garments assembled in Mexico from inputs 
manufactured in any of the three countries (Juárez Núñez 2004).  
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 At the same time, the decimation of Mexican agriculture in general after 
NAFTA, and its effects in the state of Puebla and the Tehuacán region in 
particular, led to an employment crisis that the state government met by 
promoting the area for maquila investment (Barrios Hernández and Santiago 
Hernández 2004; Juárez Núñez 2002b; Hermanson 2004).67  As other viable 
options disappeared, the Tehuacán Valley could offer maquila investors access 
to a labor force desperate for the work that would keep them from migrating to 
the US (Juárez Núñez 2002b), and at a lower cost than in other Mexican states.68  
 The government of Puebla was willing to facilitate greenfield investment in 
a number of ways, such as by donating the fallow farmland that the government 
had purchased from farmers at low cost, generous tax relief, and an expedited 
legal registration of businesses (Barrios Hernández and Santiago Hernández 
2004).69   State and local authorities were willing to relax social and 
environmental protections to attract investment as well.  For example, though the 
                                            
67 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006.  In Puebla, as in 
other parts of Mexico, farmers could not compete with lower-priced, subsidized US sugar and 
corn crops coming in under NAFTA, and the local farming communities have been decimated 
(Dellios 2003).  Without access to credit to buy inputs, farmers have opted instead for 
subsistence production or abandoned their lands altogether, migrating into the city of 
Tehuacán for work, or as in the Mixteco region, survive on the remittances from the Poblano 
migrants of New York (Barrios Hernández and Santiago Hernández 2004). 
68 Interview, SUITTAR executive committee member, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 21, 2006.  
Puebla is classified by the Mexican tax authority as Zone C, where minimum wages are set at 
an average 5 pesos per day lower than in Zone A (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Publico 
2009). 
69
 Huberto Juárez Núñez first described the Tehuacán investment as greenfield investment, 
meaning primary industrial investment in a new area where little infrastructure exists 
previously (Juárez Núñez 2002).  
 123 
altiplano region just north of the city of Tehuacán is semiarid, it is famous for its 
underground mineral aquifers, bottled since 1928 as Peñafiel mineral water.  The 
water was nationalized by the federal government in 1992.  In 2002, concessions 
were then transferred to the maquila consortiums at low cost, which use the 
water in the jean laundries.  In doing so, they polluted the aquifers, creating a 
major environmental crisis for campesinos using blue-tinted water to grow crops 
(Barrios Hernández and Santiago Hernández 2004).  
 The last part of state assistance to potential investors was a tutorial on 
labor relations in Puebla, which included an introduction to the selected labor 
leaders that would handle union representation at the new plant, and access to a 
labor lawyer to facilitate the contract (Hermanson 2004).  Mexican labor law in 
practice recognizes only one union at a time in a workplace, and since 
workplaces are run as a closed shop, investors were told that an agreement with 
a labor leader would meet the legal requirements to open the plants (Hermanson 
2004).70  Protection contracts were awarded by the Secretary of Economic 
Development to the local PRI-affiliated Federación Revolucionario de Obreros y 
Campesinos (FROC-CROC) at Kukdong, while the contract at Matamoros 
Garment was given to the Confederación Revolucionario de Obreros y 
Campesinos (CROC), and the contract passed between these and the CTM at 
Tarrant Ajalpan.  The FROC-CROC is a regional union central that already had 
control over some of the unions in the maquilas producing automotive parts for 
the Volkswagen plant in Puebla.  With the exception of Matamoros Garment, 
                                            
70
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
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each of the three municipalities where the maquilas under study are located were 
led by the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), who were resistant to allow their 
political rivals in the Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) a 
foothold in local politics (Juárez Núñez 2002).  For the PRI state government, the 
FROC-CROC represented a compromise.  While the PRI-affiliated CROC union 
could take on the maquila contracts in PRI-controlled Izúcar de Matamoros, its 
weaker local representative, the FROC-CROC, would hold the contracts for PAN- 
controlled Atlixco, Ajalpan and Tehuacán. 
 The garment sector in Puebla grew exponentially between 1995 and 2001.  
By 2001, the last year of growth, 1,032 registered apparel maquilas employed 
60,555 people in the areas of the state outside of Puebla city, and 13,000 more 
workers in the city itself (Juárez Núñez 2004; Barrios Hernández and Santiago 
Hernández 2004).  Demand for workers was so high that Tehuacán, where an 
estimated 700 maquilas were located, boasted of zero unemployment rates 
(Juárez Núñez 2002a).  Workers reported improvements in working conditions 
during the boom, including increased health and safety protection and 
improvements in ventilation and lighting (Yanz and Jeffcott 2003).  Though 
workers reported that the high demand allowed them to supplement their wages 
with overtime pay, wages remained low overall, leading to high turnover rates as 
workers moved from job to job seeking better benefits (Yanz and Jeffcott 2003).71  
                                            
71
 Interview, fired Tarrant seamstress, Tehuacán, Puebla, Mexico, August 22, 2006.  
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During the boom years, factories provided transportation and cafeteria facilities, 
costs that otherwise would eviscerate weekly paychecks.72 
 
…And Bust 
 Because nearly 60% of the apparel maquilas in Puebla produce for the US 
market, the economic decline in the US after the September 11 attacks on 
Washington and New York resulted in mass layoffs for Mexican workers.  Levels 
of FDI to the sector nationally contracted by 31% from 2001 to 2002, and sales 
registered negative growth for the first time, down 8% from 2000 to 2003 (ITAM 
2004).  At first, plant managers responded to the lack of orders with temporary 
work stoppages (paros técnicos) and mandatory furlough days, which quickly led 
to mass layoffs, and eventually the closure of a number of factories (Juárez 
Núñez 2004).  In the Tehuacán Valley, 20,000 workers were fired in 2001, and 
about half of the registered maquiladoras shut their doors (Barrios Hernández 
and Santiago Hernández 2004; Yanz and Jeffcott 2003).  
 The workers that remained found that with fewer employees to complete 
the daily quotas, production intensified.  Seamstresses missing the quotas during 
the normal work day then had to stay at the plants until 8 or 9 pm most nights to 
finish, and were forced to work overnight to complete orders on Fridays (Yanz 
and Jeffcott 2003; Rivas Zerón 2003a).73  Labor conditions within plants eroded 
                                            
72 At the time of my visit, transportation was no longer provided free to workers, but a privatized 
system had taken its place.  Transport to work is a major cost that can run between 28 and 40 
pesos per day, or at minimum, 16% of the wage of 1000 pesos for a 6-day workweek.  
73
 Testimony, male ironer at Kukdong, and SITEKIM leader, in La Lucha Sigue, pamphlet 
published by CAT, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico.  Also, testimony of three sisters employed at 
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and took on some of the characteristics endemic to piecework in textiles, where 
plant managers face incentives to minimize the fixed costs of production over a 
greater number of units (Piore 1997).  In order to maintain the high productivity of 
the factory, plant supervisors increased their control over individual workers to 
limit the time they were not working.  This included restricting access to drinking 
water and bathroom breaks, and a reduction of the lunch break to a half hour on 
a ten to twelve hour day.74  Plant owners rolled back some of the benefits to cut 
costs, including subsidized transportation75, medical services, safety 
equipment76, and paper supplies for bathrooms.77  The quality of the foodservice 
began to suffer78, and overall sanitary conditions within the factories 
deteriorated.79  Workers hated the treatment they received by the supervisors 
and owners, who would yell or swear at them to increase their speed80, and 
sometimes engaged in sexual harassment of the female sewers.81 
                                                                                                                                  
Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue.  Interview, fired Tarrant seamstress, Tehuacán, Puebla, Mexico, 
August 22, 2006.    
74
 Testimony, male ironer at Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue, and interview, SUITTAR worker's 
coordinator, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 23, 2006. 
75
 Written testimony, SITEKIM leader, collected by CAT, and testimony, female cutter at Kukdong, 
in La Lucha Sigue.   
76
 Testimony, fired Tarrant worker, US NAO hearing, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2004. 
77
 Testimony, Kukdong seamstress, in La Lucha Sigue, and interview, SUITTAR worker's 
coordinator, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 23, 2006. 
78
 Testimony, male ironer at Kukdong, and testimony, SITEKIM leader, both in La Lucha Sigue.   
79 
 Testimony, Kukdong supervisor, and Kukdong seamstress, in La Lucha Sigue. 
80
 Testimony, male ironer at Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue, and interview, SUITTAR leader, 
Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 20, 2006. 
81
  Testimonies, Kukdong supervisor, and three sisters employed at Kukdong, both in La Lucha 
Sigue. 
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 Workers saw irregularities in the payment of their wages.  Not only were 
workers not now paid overtime for extra hours on contracts based on piece rate 
quotas, but checks were docked for undisclosed reasons82, or were incorrectly 
added.83  At Matamoros Garment, workers received their checks weeks past the 
designated payday.  Some workers discovered upon seeking medical care that 
though deductions were taken from their checks, they were never paid to the 
national social security institute (Juárez Núñez 2004; Barrios Hernández and 
Santiago Hernández 2004).  Finally, though workers stayed overnight to finish 
orders, plant owners claimed economic losses to avoid paying federally 
mandated profit sharing, Christmas bonuses, and severance.84  The Tehuacán 
labor board was inundated with denunciations from workers who had never been 
paid severance (Juárez Núñez 2004). 
 
Politicization of Union Representation  
 When workers in Puebla began to complain about eroding labor 
conditions, they collided with an array of powerful interests determined to 
preserve the labor relations system and the use of protection contracts.  First, the 
state government of Puebla faces economic incentives to resist efforts to 
establish unions outside of the protection system.  Maquila production in Puebla 
was established as a development program for the economically depressed 
                                            
82
 Interview, SUITTAR worker's coordinator, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 23, 2006. 
83
 Testimony, three sisters employed at Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue.   
84
 Interview, SUITTAR worker's coordinator, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 23, 2006; US 
Department of Labor (2004), and testimony, Tarrant worker, US NAO hearing, Washington, 
D.C., April 1, 2004.  
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areas of the state as the answer to job creation.  Investment in these areas was 
predicated on lower labor costs than in other regions of Mexico, allowing Puebla 
to compete for textile investment more handily than other areas where labor 
costs were higher.  Guaranteed labor peace was one additional aspect of 
maintaining a favorable investment climate for textile companies, and to keep 
that investment flowing into Puebla.  With workers’ interests controlled by 
subordinate unions, any aspect of production involving the labor relationship, 
including strikes, compensation, or labor costs, remained stable and predictable 
for the established maquileros and potential investors.  
 There are important vested political interests to maintain the labor 
relations system as well, at both the state and local levels.  One of the answers 
for the decline of PRI dominance nationally is the loss of economic resources to 
support political patronage after the economic crises of the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2009).  With fewer resources, the party is less 
able to provide material benefits and government subsidies to corporatist 
unions.85  As political pluralism evolves, PRI unions are under pressure to play 
the historical role as a mass base for the party, loyal voter bloc, and supporter of 
government initiatives, but with fewer material and political resources nationally 
to offer in exchange for party loyalty.  The CTM unions are unwilling to allow 
independent unions to gain ground in areas where they maintain monolithic 
                                            
85  While the CTM was still able to maintain political representation (Murillo 2001), the declining 
electoral fortunes of the PRI over time means even that channel of power is in jeopardy.  
Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the CTM held around 90 of the seats awarded to the PRI, by 
2000 they never held more than 19 (Shirk and Edmonds-Poli 2009).  
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control over contracts, partly to maintain what remains of the political base of 
party power locally, but also to maintain the party’s fortunes more broadly.  At the 
local level in Puebla, unions are an important source of political influence for the 
PRI in the state, and the union leadership is unwilling to allow competition that 
challenges their political influence and personal power base in local politics.  
These impulses became more important as the PRI lost municipalities to the 
PAN, while still retaining the executive office.86   
 The best tool at the state’s disposal for limiting independent unionization in 
Puebla is control over the administration of the labor boards that regulate the 
labor relations system.  Jurisdiction for textile industries is reserved at the state 
level, and therefore the maquila cases studied here are under the jurisdiction of 
the Junta Local de Conciliación y Arbitraje (JLCA) of Puebla.87  As tri-partite 
structures, the state labor board is composed of three members, including a 
Government representative that serves as the President, a representative from 
the business sector, and a representative from organized labor, each appointed 
by the Governor (Curtis and Gutiérrez 1994).  The labor representative is nearly 
always chosen from the ranks of the most influential union confederation, which 
in the Mexican context almost always results in union representation from the 
                                            
86  The PRI has always held the state executive in Puebla, and holds a majority in the state 
Congress, while at the local level the PAN has made important inroads in holding the seat of 
municipal governments (Luna Silva 2007). 
87 The jurisdiction of the labor board system is divided between State and Federal level boards 
according to industrial sector (Curtis and Gutiérrez Kirchner 1994).  At the state level, there 
are also conciliation boards that serve as mediators only, and Special Boards for claims 
around specific industries, such as for construction workers’ claims.  
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corporatist ranks.88  This arrangement can have two effects.  First, with 
government directly influencing the selection the three representatives to the 
boards, executive branch interests can potentially guide the outcomes of board 
arbitration (Sanner Ruhnke 1995).  Second, the selection of the union 
representative generates conflicts of interest at the board, especially in states 
governed by the PRI, like Puebla.  Given the historical ties between labor and the 
PRI, political conditions are generally unfavorable for independent unions 
seeking resolution at the board, allowing the government to maintain control over 
unions in the state. 
 
Union Recognition at Kukdong/Mexmode 
 The Kukdong factory is the first of the factories in this study to attempt to 
organize an independent union, and as such, is also the factory where the 
transnational network that became active in Puebla first crystallized.  The 
Kukdong factory, located in Atlixco, Puebla, is a state-of-the-art textile assembly 
factory.  Its 30 million dollar investment was one of the largest capital inversions 
to date in the area (Barrios Hernández and Santiago Hernández 2004; Wells and 
Knight 2007).  The Korean owners, Kukdong International, were part of the wave 
of Korean manufacturing investment in Mexico that opened after NAFTA’s tariff 
wall created incentives for Koreans to import to the US directly from factories 
producing in Mexico (Choi and Kenney 1997).  As was customary in Puebla, the 
plant managers signed a labor agreement with the state government in the fall of 
                                            
88
 In Puebla, this is the FROC-CROC.  Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, 
July 10, 2006. 
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1999 before the factory opened, which gave the rights to the collective contract to 
the FROC-CROC union (Hermanson 2004).   
 Working conditions in the factory were acceptable when the plant opened, 
but they began to deteriorate during the summer of 2000.89  The daily quotas 
were set so high that workers finished each piece in less than a minute, and were 
not allowed to take bathroom breaks.  Managers limited access to drinking water 
to limit the need for the breaks, even in hot weather.90  Though seamstresses put 
in extra hours to make the production quotas, the raises that were promised 
every three months never materialized.91  Some female workers reported that 
managers hit them and screamed at them to work faster, and that they faced 
humiliating checks of personal belongings and clothing when they entered and 
left the factory (Bacon 2004).92  But by nearly all accounts, worker complaints 
converged around the cafeteria, where they reported that the food was poorly 
made, sometimes improperly cooked or rotten.93   
 A few of the supervisors approached the FROC-CROC representative 
about the quality of the cafeteria, who ignored their complaints.  After a number 
of workers became ill, the supervisors again raised their concerns, and the union 
representative suggested a boycott of the cafeteria (Hermanson 2004).  The next 
                                            
89
 Written testimony, SITEKIM leader, collected by CAT. 
90
 Testimony, male ironer at Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue, pamphlet published by CAT, Puebla, 
Puebla, Mexico. 
91
 Written testimony, SITEKIM leader, collected by CAT. 
92
 Testimony, three sisters employed at Kukdong, in La Lucha Sigue. 
93 
 Testimony, Kukdong supervisor, three sisters employed at Kukdong, and a Matamoros 
Garment worker, all in La Lucha Sigue, and written testimony by a SITEKIM leader, collected 
by CAT. 
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day, nearly all of the workers brought their own lunch and refused to eat from the 
plant’s subsidized cafeteria.94  When the FROC-CROC representative was called 
to account, he blamed the supervisors for the action, who were then fired (Juárez 
Núñez 2002b).  
 Meanwhile, a new labor advocacy network coalesced in Puebla.  In 
November of 2000, United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) sent a 
delegation to Puebla to investigate working conditions in some of the maquilas in 
the area that produced university-labeled apparel.95  As a supplier to Nike and 
Reebok, Kukdong was on the USAS disclosure list.  The AFL-CIO Solidarity 
Center office in Mexico City introduced USAS students to two local labor 
organizers to help with the investigation (Hermanson 2004).  A nucleus of people 
had already formed at Kukdong around the cafeteria boycott, and the AFL-CIO 
brought these workers together with the USAS students to discuss how to move 
workforce discontent from cafeteria issues to replacing the union.96  From these 
meetings, the Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador (Workers’ Support Center, CAT) 
was formed.97  
 
                                            
94 Testimony, Kukdong supervisor, in La Lucha Sigue. 
95
 This student group pressures universities to sign commitments to source university apparel 
from suppliers that meet internationally recognized labor standards.  In 1999, USAS created a 
codes of conduct monitoring organization, the Worker’s Rights Consortium (WRC), to conduct 
inspections for USAS and its universities. 
96
 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
97
 Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006. 
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Workers Take Action  
 The Kukdong workers responded the next Monday with a two-hour work 
stoppage and a set of demands: a reinstatement of the supervisors by the end of 
the day, and the FROC-CROC removed from the plant (Bacon 2004; CILAS 
n.d.).  After receiving no response from the company, around 600 workers of the 
850 in the plant occupied the factory yard, threatening to stay on strike until the 
supervisors were reinstated (Wells and Knight 2007; CILAS n.d.).  Newspapers 
spread word of the Kukdong strike outside of Atlixco (Meza 2001; 2001d), 
attracting the support of Mexican labor activists (Hermanson 2004).  The next 
morning the strike was declared illegal, and by nightfall, workers were violently 
removed from the factory grounds by the state anti-riot battalion (Juárez Núñez 
2002b; Hermanson 2004; CILAS n.d.).98 
 The violent police response to the strike was one of the factors that 
catalyzed support for the workers within the community, and mobilized the 
transnational network (Bacon 2004).  At the core of the support network that 
emerged, each group played a specific role.  Though the AFL-CIO office had 
been crucial to bringing the network together, they were wary of any perception 
that they were helping to organize unions in Mexico, and stepped back to serve 
as advisors.  In Atlixco, the CAT would assist in organizing the workforce and 
help the union apply for legal recognition.  USAS would use its contacts in the 
US, Canada and Europe to put pressure on the factory to accede to the worker’s 
demands.  
                                            
98
 Under Mexican law, unions must file a notice to strike at the labor board, and have it approved, 
before actually carrying out a strike.  
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 The strategy they developed followed the core logic that was common to 
other worker’s rights campaigns from the 1990s:  the network would engage the 
major clients to get involved in the plant dispute by putting economic leverage on 
them through threats of a boycott.  In turn, client promises to pull orders would 
push the plant owners to allow an independent union.  The USAS interns had 
identified that both Nike and Reebok had corporate codes of conduct, and USAS 
would use codes violations to involve both brands in the Kukdong struggle, but 
would start by pressuring Nike.  USAS would also inform student groups on 
college campuses about Kukdong and organize a number of actions against the 
brands, and would approach university administrations about using Nike and 
Reebok for college apparel.  In effect, the USAS strategy was to use economic 
leverage to make Nike and Reebok responsible for the violations at the plant, 
and responsible for getting them resolved, whether or not Nike or Reebok had 
any role to play in workers' discontent with the protection contract or working 
conditions inside the plant.  
 
Transnational Support  
 The network inside Puebla publicized the violations at the plant 
immediately.  By January 15, the Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) in Canada 
had not just posted news of the strike on their website and email list serve, but 
had started a letter-writing request to inform Nike and the President of Mexico of 
the events at Kukdong (Maquila Solidarity Network 2001b).  Meanwhile, USAS 
organized a series of student actions, both on and off campus.  Among these 
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were creative acts, like mock fashion shows (Carty 2004), and shopping protests 
at Niketown (Featherstone 2002), but the students were also able to organize a 
mass action of 25 simultaneous sit-ins on campuses, demanding universities 
break Nike contracts for school apparel (Hermanson 2004; Carty 2004).  These 
first actions drew international attention to Kukdong that provoked a response 
from the brands.  Both Reebok and Nike sent representatives to Kukdong 
immediately (Hermanson 2004).  The president of Kukdong International came to 
Atlixco personally to inspect the factory, apologized to workers for their 
treatment, and promised to renovate the cafeteria (Sintesis 2001).  USAS 
requested that their monitoring group, the Worker’s Rights Consortium (WRC) 
come to Kukdong to start an investigation.  As the WRC arrived for its preliminary 
workplace report, so did a number of additional solidarity groups, including the 
Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) and Global Exchange (La Jornada de Oriente 
2001:5).  Other prominent labor rights groups disseminated the news from 
Puebla on their websites and email exchanges, including US-LEAP in Chicago, 
Sweatshop Watch in Los Angeles, the Clean Clothes Campaign across Europe, 
and the Campaign for Labor Rights in the US.  
 As events unfolded, transnational advocacy provided crucial support to 
workers that helped them win small gains at key points in the struggle.  First, the 
fired supervisors had attempted to return to work each Monday since the strike, 
but were unable to enter the plant.  On February 13, Nike sent a letter to the 
Governor of Puebla, asking him to intervene in the situation (García 2001).  The 
following Monday, February 19, the factory came to an agreement with the 
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Governor, and the supervisors were allowed to enter the factory and take their 
places on the sewing line (CILAS n.d.).  Second, the reports on factory conditions 
helped sustain the workers’ protests.  As the situation unfolded, network 
participants conducted number of additional investigations, including a second 
WRC report, an analysis by leading labor attorney Arturo Alcalde, and a Verité 
audit for Nike (Verité 2001b; Alcalde 2001).  Each of these reports corroborated 
the claims made by Kukdong workers about working conditions and the cafeteria, 
giving them legitimacy, and rallying more international support around them.  
Following the Verité report, Nike submitted a plan of action for Kukdong 
management and a timeline to complete the changes, demanding that they 
implant the plan of action or risk losing Nike’s orders (Bandy 2004).  
 
Union Registration and Resolution 
 In March, the Kukdong workers held an assembly to constitute the union 
as SITEKIM, the Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de la Empresa 
Kukdong International de Mexico (SITEKIM).  Once the application for 
registration was submitted, the FROC-CROC intimidated SITEKIM supporters 
inside the factory with renewed vigor (CILAS n.d.; Maquila Solidarity Network 
2001).  After one SITEKIM leader was assaulted on company property, the 
network reinforced their support in Mexico by sending more USAS observers (La 
Jornada de Oriente 2001), and in the US, arranged for letters about Kukdong to 
be delivered by hand to each of the 45 Mexican Consulates (Bandy 2004; 
Committee for Labor Rights 2001).     
 137 
 On June 18, 2001, the Puebla JLCA denied SITEKIM’s application for 
union recognition (CILAS n.d.).  Some of the line workers who had signed the 
application had been quietly reclassified as confidential employees after the 
application was filed, which disqualified them from the bargaining unit (CILAS 
n.d.).  Without these workers, the list of signatories dropped to fewer than the 20 
required to form a union under Mexican labor law, and the petition was denied.  
Though workers had received an outpouring of support from the network that 
allowed them to maintain the movement, they fell short of the achieving the goal 
that was most important to the workers themselves: replacing the FROC-CROC 
with a union of their own choosing.  
 Though there was still active support for the SITEMEX union, the labor 
situation inside the factory reached a stalemate.  The ongoing conflict made 
production difficult, and Nike started to pull orders from the factory (Bandy 2004).  
Meanwhile, the Kukdong owners were facing pressure on all sides: from the 
transnational network who blamed them for the violations, from the workers who 
blamed them for allowing FROC-CROC to hold the contract in the first place, and 
from Nike to get past the conflict and fill the orders.  Though Kukdong’s owners 
certainly acted in ways to protect their business interests as the campaign wore 
on, some evidence suggests that the owners were actually amenable to allowing 
the SITEKIM union in, but were under pressure from the FROC-CROC and local 
government not to do so.99   As they began to lose orders, Kukdong recognized 
                                            
99
 For example, when Verité arrived at the factory, the Head of Administration took one auditor 
aside and told him that the company did not like the union, but it had been imposed on them 
from the beginning, and that they actually preferred to replace it (Verité 2001a). 
 138 
that the union, and the government that put it there, were jeopardizing their 
investment.  In order to resolve the situation, it was the state leadership that had 
to be convinced that removing FROC-CROC was necessary.  The government 
was not willing to set a precedent for independent unionization in the maquila 
sector, but neither could it afford much longer to be seen as an interference, 
especially to the Korean community that had invested heavily in Puebla.  The 
JLCA would have to concede to replace the union. 
 The AFL-CIO stepped in to moderate negotiations between the company, 
the state government, the JLCA, and SITEKIM (Hermanson 2004).100  In order to 
facilitate the registration of the union, Kukdong International resorted to a tactic 
that is usually reserved for attempts to block independent unionization, like at 
Maxi-Switch and Han Young.  The owners agreed to close the factory and 
reconstitute it as a legal entity under a new name, Mexmode, thus nullifying the 
existing collective contract with the FROC-CROC.  SITEKIM would then apply for 
registration under a new name, SITEMEX.  The JLCA would approve the 
registration, allowing SITEMEX to apply for title to the bargaining rights, and the 
workers would win their union.  
 The JLCA approved the registration on August 18, 2001 (CILAS n.d.).  
Because there was no opposition to SITEMEX taking the contract, they were 
awarded bargaining rights, and negotiated a collective contract with the help of 
the CAT (Juárez Núñez 2002b; CILAS n.d.).101  On October 2, SITEMEX 
                                            
100 Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006 and interview, AFL-CIO 
Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
101 Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006. 
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submitted the contract to the JLCA, and became the first independent union in 
Mexico’s garment export sector (Juárez Núñez 2002b; Sanchez Hernández 
2001; Maquila Solidarity Network 2001a).  In a final act of solidarity, the MSN 
organized a letter-writing campaign to push Nike to fill new orders at the factory, 
recognizing that without orders, the union would not survive, and Nike obliged 
(Juárez Núñez 2002b; Maquila Solidarity Network 2001a).  Mexmode reopened 
contract negotiations again in April, and SITEMEX bargained for a 38% wage 
increase, making them the highest paid textile workers in Puebla (Hermanson 
2004; Maquila Solidarity Network 2001c).  
 
Transnational Tensions and the Kukdong Aftermath  
 By all accounts, the mobilization of a transnational advocacy network 
around the Kukdong workers is credited for the unprecedented resolution of this 
labor struggle.  Transnational groups provided support at key points during these 
events in ways that favored the workers.  First, the groups that came to Puebla 
gave the workers access to new ideas and new strategies that were unknown to 
them.  Workers were totally unaware of the codes of conduct that were in place 
at Kukdong, but USAS and the network of US advocates were intimately familiar 
as to how these codes commitments could be used to engage the brands at the 
factory (Wells and Knight 2007).102  Second, they had the contacts available to 
quickly pass the information coming out of the factory to influential audiences, 
                                            
102 It is very common that workers are unaware of the codes.  Barrios also shows that in 
Tehuacán, the majority of workers in apparel maquilas do not know that the codes exist 
(Barrios Hernández and Santiago Hernández 2004).  
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including a network of labor rights and human rights advocates in the US and 
Canada.  In turn, the brands were responsive to network demands, 
commissioning independent reports on labor conditions within the factory, and 
stepping in where they could, such as during the standoff over the supervisors.  
More than supplying ideas and organizational resources to get the word out, the 
network also had a physical presence in Atlixco that indicated to local actors that 
the workers were being taken seriously outside of Mexico, and it forced them to 
respond as well.   
 Though this case led to the successful bid to establish an independent 
union, it also created tensions between local Mexican groups over the 
fundamental question of how to parlay the Kukdong victory into a bigger 
movement to spread independent unionization to other maquilas.  While the CAT 
was ready to organize other unions under the SITEMEX registro at the state level 
and expand into other factories in Puebla, SITEMEX was not against the idea so 
much as they were more interested in maintaining their union first.103  Once they 
won the contract, workers wanted to make decisions about strategy and union 
leadership on their own (Bacon 2004), ultimately creating independence from 
their supporters, and distancing themselves completely from the CAT.  
 Eventually SITEMEX won its independence, both from the FROC-CROC 
and the network that helped them to consolidate union, but independence had its 
consequences.  The campaign had relied on transnational networking for its 
success, and the CAT, which had been close to USAS, was the conduit for much 
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of that support.  Without the CAT, SITEMEX had limited connections to those 
supporters and few resources of their own to draw on.  Though the union 
believed that the best way to survive was to develop their organizational 
capacity, in the end, they were mistaken.  In June of 2008, a legitimate concern 
over union leadership resulted in a take-over of the union by Antorcha 
Campesina, a peasant group organized by the PRI.  Though the AFL-CIO 
contacted the WRC for an investigation (Worker Rights Consortium 2008a), and 
the International Labor Rights Fund began a letter writing campaign (International 
Labor Rights Fund 2008), there was very little international mobilization around 
the event, and the groups that earlier had worked to get the union recognized 
were noticeably absent.  The union has still not been able to challenge the 
takeover, and the only independent union in the garment sector has lost its 
presence in the factory. 
 
Pushing Puma Around at Matamoros Garment  
 A new case then appeared at an apparel maquila in Izúcar de Matamoros, 
about 20 miles south of Atlixco.  Matamoros Garment had been sold in 1999 to 
an American investor and his Mexican business partner, and after signing a 
protection contract with a CTM union, the Sindicato Francisco Villa de la Industria 
Textil y Conexos, began production in 2000 (United Students Against 
Sweatshops and Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003).  Working conditions 
deteriorated quickly, and the new owners were unable to supply some of the 
benefits the previous owners had supplied to workers, including the 
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transportation routes.  The cafeteria flooded under heavy rains, but the owners 
could not arrange a permanent fix.  The machines in the factory were older 
models, and workers struggled to make the quotas using them, sometimes 
staying late into the night to finish (United Students Against Sweatshops and 
Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003).  Wage irregularities were the most 
important complaint, as workers were constantly missing payments, or being paid 
after the designated paydays (United Students Against Sweatshops and Centro 
de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003). 
 The CAT read about Matamoros Garment in the local paper (La Jornada 
de Oriente 2003), and approached the AFL-CIO and USAS about the possibilities 
of making this plant their next case.  They contacted the Matamoros Garment 
workers, offering to help.104  With CAT advice, workers held a one-day work 
stoppage at the plant over the wage irregularities (El Cambio  2003), and 
negotiated a resolution with the owner of the factory: if they went back to work, 
the owner would pay back wages and vacation pay the next day, and reinstate 
the transportation benefit (El Cambio 2003).   
 Though this seemed to resolve the immediate concerns of the workers, 
the CAT shifted quickly to the next issue: resolving the other workplace 
complaints by establishing an independent union within the factory.  The workers 
knew that they sewed garments for a number of brands, but the two most 
important clients were Angelica, a division of the uniform company Cintas, and 
the German sportswear company Puma.  Since Puma was the more visible 
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brand and had a code of conduct in the factory, they chose to organize a 
campaign around them, and the CAT contacted the Clean Clothes Campaign in 
Germany for assistance.  
 The network forming around Matamoros Garment was led by the CAT and 
the German Clean Clothes Campaign, but also included some of the groups 
once involved at Kukdong, like US-LEAP, the Maquila Solidarity Network, and No 
Sweat.  USAS took a much less visible role in this network than at Kukdong, 
because Matamoros Garment did not hold university apparel contracts.  The 
AFL-CIO also stepped back to allow the CAT to gain more organizing 
experience.  The network decided to follow the strategy that had been successful 
at Kukdong: engage the brand over violations of the code of conduct with the 
help of transnational allies, and apply for the registro of an independent union.105  
As at Kukdong, they hoped that by making Puma responsible for the conditions 
in the factory, the company would not just pressure the plant owner to improve 
the working conditions and reinstate the benefits package, but also support the 
independent union. 
 Meanwhile, the workers formally constituted a union, SITEMAG, the 
Sindicato Único Independiente de Trabajadores de Matamoros Garment, and 
filed an application for registration as a legal entity-- at the same JLCA as at 
Kukdong-- on January 20, 2003 (SITEMAG 2003).  When the owner then 
harassed some of the workers for union activity later that week, the CAT took the 
lead on publicizing the events (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2001a), contacting 
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allies to list Matamoros Garment news on their websites (Maquila Solidarity 
Network 2003).  
 
Puma Pushes Back  
 The Clean Clothes Campaign contacted Puma about the events at 
Matamoros Garment.  Puma responded with a corporate statement rejecting that 
they were in any way responsible for the events at the plant (Santjer 2001).  
Matamoros Garment had serious financial difficulties after a major client had 
declared bankruptcy without paying for the last shipment of a half-million units, 
and the owners were struggling to make payroll as well as other costs (Santjer 
2001).106  The financial crunch impeded their ability to deliver orders on time, and 
Puma claimed to have subsequently cancelled its production contract with the 
factory.  Puma simply stated they were not responsible for working conditions in 
a plant where they had no longer had a business relationship.    
 When the CAT countered that the plant was still sewing the last of the 
contract in January, Puma relented, and sent representatives to make an 
inspection.107  Yet, when the interviews began, the CAT learned that not only had 
the Puma team singled out workers and interviewed them inside the factory, but 
that they had videotaped the interviews, which SITEMAG leaders reported to 
have seen in the manager’s office.  When Puma sent an email to the CAT with 
the results of the inspection, they found that none of the 22 workers they 
interviewed could corroborate the claims about forced overtime and lock-ins, that 
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all had said there was a union in the plant, and that they denied physical abuse 
by supervisors (Hengstmann 2003a).  Puma also revealed that they had paid the 
owner nearly $15,000 each week in October and November above their contract 
liability to cover these expenses in order to get their last order out of the factory 
(Hengstmann 2003a).  Ironically, though the CAT was blaming Puma for the 
wage irregularities, among other issues, it was actually Puma that was paying the 
workers’ wages.   
 The CAT categorically rejected the results of the inspection given the 
interview methods, and denounced Puma and their investigation in a shrill email 
(Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003b).  In response, Puma promised to place 
new orders only if Matamoros Garment could become a functional factory again, 
and if the CAT could convince additional clients to return (Hengstmann 2003b).  
Still angry about the discovery of the video tapes, the CAT and their allies 
became more determined to smear Puma’s name as a brand that abandons 
workers once they demand their rights, even as Puma offered a compromise 
(Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003b).  The CAT decided to create their own 
report on Matamoros Garment to counter the Puma inspection, interviewing 
SITEMAG supporters in their homes where they would be free to talk about the 
factory.  With the help of student interns, they created a report corroborating 
each of the workers’ complaints (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003c).  When 
they published it through the network, Puma invited the CAT to Germany to 
discuss the situation again (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).   
 146 
 This time, Puma was even more conciliatory.  During the meeting, Puma 
agreed to send new orders to Matamoros Garment, consented to independent 
monitoring through COVERCO, the well-respected NGO-based codes monitor, 
and agreed to support the use of a secret ballot in the anticipated union election 
(Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  The CAT went back to Mexico knowing 
it had won the battle with Puma.108  However, Puma would never fulfill these 
promises.  On March 17, the owners of Matamoros Garment announced it would 
close the plant temporarily through a paro técnico, and asked workers to return 
the next week for their paychecks (United Students Against Sweatshops 2003).  
In the interim, the Mexican Social Security Institute entered the plant and 
confiscated the sewing machines for debts accrued on medical insurance 
contributions, and the American owner fled back to the US to escape a lawsuit.109  
The plant would never reopen.  
 With the collapse of the factory, the brand campaign had essentially 
ended, but SITEMAG still waited for news on the application for the union 
registro.  The JLCA of Puebla denied the registration on March 21st on a number 
of procedural issues, and noted that with the factory closed, the requirement of 
20 active employees could not be met (United Students Against Sweatshops and 
Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  The JLCA knew that Matamoros 
Garment would be closing as of March 17 after their own approval of the paro 
técnico, and stalled for the full 60 days allowed by Mexican law to issue a ruling 
based on the closure, but only after the closure itself.  Further, the ruling was 
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sent to the wrong address, and when the union finally received it on the 26th, half 
of the 15 days allowed to file an appeal had passed (United Students Against 
Sweatshops and Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  Though the CAT 
vowed to follow through on the appeal, organize the workers, and get Puma to 
help reopen the factory (United Students Against Sweatshops 2003), the union 
drive was over.  The campaign strategy had been wholly unsuccessful, and 
workers were denied the union, lost their jobs, and never recouped their 
severance pay. 
 
Evaluating Failure at Matamoros Garment 
 Transnational advocates attempted to recreate the successes at Kukdong 
by following the strategies that had worked well in that factory.  Though the logic 
of the brand campaign strategy was similar, the structural factors that led to 
success at Kukdong were largely missing at Matamoros Garment.  First, the 
transnational network at Matamoros Garment was weaker than the network that 
participated at Kukdong because a number of key players were missing.  The 
CAT acted as the broker between SITEMAG workers and the transnational 
network, essentially replacing the role USAS played in the earlier case.  Because 
they had less experience, it was also more difficult to clearly identify the 
network’s objectives.  It was never made explicit what exact steps the network 
expected out of the owners or Puma, when at Kukdong, the two objectives were 
always clear in every action: rehire the supervisors, then expel the FROC-CROC.  
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  Second, though the CAT may have had support from a number of groups, 
it did not have any independent economic pressure to leverage on Puma.  The 
CAT and their allies could release allegations that damaged the reputation of the 
company, but they had no credible way to threaten the brand economically 
through boycotts.  Matamoros Garment did not hold university apparel contracts, 
and USAS was missing as a key player in the network.  In turn, Puma had little 
economic leverage with the owners, as the owners of Matamoros Garment were 
too preoccupied with their financial problems to respond in any meaningful way 
to workers’ concerns, favorably or otherwise.  The potential loss of Puma 
business to the owner was not enough for him to respond to worker demands, 
and in fact Puma had already canceled its contract with the plant months before 
the work stoppage occurred.  The brand was much more resistant to pressure 
from the network because they credibly rejected that they were responsible for 
working conditions in a plant they no longer used.  Yet, the network still had to 
focus on Puma because they were the most visible brand at the factory, and they 
used codes of conduct that could be used to promote their position.  When the 
Puma investigation was published, the network was less able to inflict damage to 
their reputation, as Puma had evidence that they believed was accurate to deny 
the allegations against them.  When Puma finally recognized the flaws in their 
investigation, their change in position came too late to save the factory, if that in 
fact were possible.110 
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Organizing the Consortiums: Tarrant Ajalpan  
 In June, the CAT learned of another labor struggle unfolding south of 
Puebla city in the Tehuacán region.  Nearly 700 workers staged a work stoppage 
at the Tarrant sewing facility in Ajalpan over the payment of profit sharing (Centro 
de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  Although workers at the plant had been staying 
overtime, even overnight, to meet the daily production quotas, the plant manager 
told workers that the plant had not made any profits for the third year in a row, 
and would not pay profit sharing for 2003.  The walkout turned into a three-day 
strike.  
 Tarrant Ajalpan was one factory in a vertically integrated full-package 
production chain.  Under full-package assembly, all inputs to the manufacturing 
process are sourced by a single consortium, including textiles, thread and 
hardware, and a series of factories handles the production of the garments 
including cutting and assembly, laundering and quality control, and in some 
cases, distribute the finished garments directly from the plant to the point of sale 
(Bair, Martinez, and Gereffi 2002).  The Azteca International consortium owned 
seven sewing facilities and one laundry in the Tehuacán area (Juárez Núñez 
2004), along with packaging operations in the neighboring state of Tlaxcala, 
additional sewing operations in Oaxaca, Tlaxcala and Guerrero, and two textile 
mills in the region (Tarrant Apparel Group 1999; 2001).  Tarrant Ajalpan was the 
largest of the sewing operations in the consortium, capable of producing 6 million 
units each year (Tarrant Apparel Group 2001).  In 1999, Los Angeles-based 
Tarrant Apparel Group (TAG) entered full-package production in Mexico by 
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purchasing some for these holdings from Azteca International.  With the 
purchase of the Azteca plants in Tehuacán, including the Ajalpan plant, TAG 
became the largest and most complete fully integrated manufacturer, able to 
source even the fabric that other Puebla consortiums had to import from China 
(Juárez Núñez 2004). 
 The CAT learned of the walkout, and determined that the labor situation at 
the Ajalpan plant created the opportunity to organize one of the four full-package 
consortiums then operating in Puebla.  In gaining the registro for a single plant 
along the chain, they could affiliate the other factories under the first union 
registration and skip the highly politicized registration process that derailed 
Matamoros Garment.111 The CAT approached the workers with an offer to help 
on the second day of the strike (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  
 
Transnational Support  
 By the first of August, the transnational labor rights network that had been 
involved at Kukdong and Matamoros Garment was informed of the events at 
Ajalpan (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003f).  As before, the CAT took the 
lead on reporting information about Tarrant Ajalpan to their allies, which included 
the Clean Clothes Campaign, US-LEAP, the MSN in Canada, Sweatshop Watch, 
No Sweat, and the Central American Women’s Network.  Again, the AFL-CIO 
took a lesser part in the day-today strategizing of the campaign, a role that was 
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assumed by the CAT.112  International allies would disseminate the information 
from Puebla on list-serves and websites, and publicize the calls for action outside 
of Mexico.  Within Mexico, the core union supporters from the plant, now fired for 
union activity, would work with lawyers from the Red de Solidaridad y Derechos 
Laborales to submit the registration paperwork for the union, the Sindicato Único 
Independiente de Trabajadores de Tarrant (SUITTAR) (Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador and United Students Against Sweatshops 2004).   
 The CAT hoped that a brand campaign would publicize the Tarrant factory 
outside of Mexico, reveal how poorly foreign investors were treating Mexican 
workers, and engage the brands to step in at the factory, if not over violations of 
Mexican law, at least over compliance with their own codes of conduct.113 They 
advanced the two-pronged campaign strategy for Tarrant Ajalpan that had once 
been successful at Kukdong.  The CAT thought material leverage from brand 
pressure might be more effective on a consortium than a stand-alone factory, 
because the entire production chain would be put in jeopardy if orders were 
pulled.  At the same time, economic pressure and international support and 
would help them pressure the JLCA to recognize the independent union.   
 The transnational strategy ultimately took the form of a letter writing effort 
to disseminate information about Tarrant among allies in the US and Canada, 
combined with a number of protest actions in the US and Mexico.  The CAT 
identified a number of current clients that could serve as the targets of the 
campaign, each of which already had codes of conduct that could be used.  Levi 
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Strauss and Company was chosen as the first target for the campaign, because 
they were the plant’s major client, and their sourcing agreement is considered 
uniquely progressive among codes of conduct (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 
2003f).  The Ethical Trading Initiative, the fair trade organization Levi’s used to 
help to monitor their codes, contacted them to apprise them of the labor situation 
inside the plant (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2004).  Meanwhile, the CAT disseminated a review of the events, 
asking national and international allies to write letters to Tarrant Apparel Group 
and Levi’s, asking them to recognize SUITTAR and reinstate the fired union 
leaders (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003d).  Additional clients were 
identified, and by the middle of August, the campaign had widened to include 
three additional brands: Tommy Hilfiger, Limited Brands, and The Gap.   
 
The Brands Respond 
 Levi’s sent a representative to Tehuacán to visit the plant and conduct an 
inspection (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003g).  The CAT worked closely with 
her throughout September, hoping that Levi’s could encourage the other clients 
to pressure Ajalpan management to concede to the workers’ demands.  
However, focusing on Levi’s backfired when Tarrant refused Levi’s investigators 
access to the plant (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003b).  The Levi’s code 
mandates that the company must pull orders when factories could not come into 
compliance, and they did so at Tarrant Ajalpan.  While the letter campaign at first 
caused most of the brands to contact the CAT, it also had the unintended 
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consequence of provoking mass firings of SUITTAR supporters: 150 workers in 
the first two weeks of the campaign, 228 by the end of the month, and 500 by 
December (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003g; Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador 2003b).114   
  The network then learned that Tarrant Apparel Group had leased the 
plant back to the original owner Azteca months earlier, and the plant was in 
transition from subcontracting for TAG clients to the clients of a new joint venture, 
United Apparel Ventures.  The four original brands targeted by the network 
suddenly were no longer clients.  The CAT shifted campaign focus away from 
these original brands to those associated with the new company (Centro de 
Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  The CAT asked its allies to escalate the letter-
writing campaign and disseminated instructions via e-mail each week for sets of 
letters to be sent to each of the brands, Tarrant and Azteca International --the 
partners in United Apparel Ventures-- the Puebla Governor’s office, the JLCA, 
and the Secretary of Industrial Promotion for the State of Puebla (Centro de 
Apoyo al Trabajador 2003b; Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003c).  By 
November, these action alerts became extremely complex, including 20 letters 
for primary and secondary campaign targets, each with eight identifiable talking 
points and 5 additional urgent faxes (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2004a).  
Though each time the alerts urged readers to “step up the pressure” on the 
brands, after so many weeks, these action alerts were no longer the tools of 
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brand pressure so much as weekly check-ins about progress as the network 
struggled to find brands to make responsibility for the factory stick.  
 Further, none of these new brands stepped in, even as the CAT switched 
among them as primary targets.  Meanwhile, United Apparel simply 
subcontracted orders for Ajalpan to local maquilas owned by Azteca International 
in the area (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003o), or shifted the work out from 
Ajalpan to the factories in the neighboring state of Tlaxcala, where there were no 
independent unions (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003f; Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador 2003o).115  Tarrant then pulled out of Mexico, closing a number of the 
plants and firing hundreds of workers from other plants in the chain (Centro de 
Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a).  By November, only Ajalpan and Plant 4 were still 
open, both leased to United Apparel Ventures (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 
2004b).  With so much primary focus on finding a brand to engage, the network 
never switched strategies to confront the last major issues: the closing of the 
factory, severance payments, and the pending registro decision. 
 
The Union Denied  
 SUITTAR eventually signed 736 workers to the union during a house-to-
house organizing drive that unfolded over the following weeks, and submitted the 
registro request (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador and United Students Against 
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Sweatshops 2004b).116  The network was fully expecting that the JLCA would 
wait until the last minute to issue a ruling, and then list technicalities in the denial 
as the easiest way to prevent unionization, as they had at Kukdong and 
Matamoros Garment.117 On the 59th day, the Puebla JLCA ruled against the 
SUITTAR union, denying the petition on procedural requirements as expected 
(Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003l).118  The CAT responded by filing an 
appeal at the JLCA Special Board #3 (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003m), 
and an injunction (juicio de amparo) against the JLCA at the Third District Court 
in Puebla, which if awarded, would force the labor board to award the union its 
registration.  
 With the Tarrant chain closing around them, SUITTAR interjected in the 
campaign, wanting to discuss an exit strategy that could extract full severance 
payments for the workers fired during the course of the campaign and the 
employees who would ostensibly lose their jobs when Ajalpan finally closed 
(Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003o).  The CAT instead was intent on 
following up on the amparo filing.  Tensions between the workers and the CAT 
surfaced over the direction the movement would now take after the denial, and 
the place of the workers in it.  The CAT determined that given the impending 
closure of the plant, the union drive was over, but with the amparo,  they would at 
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least force the government to formally recognize JLCA collusion to prevent 
independent unionization.  For the workers, as long as the plant was still open, 
the movement had not folded, yet they felt that the CAT had abandoned them 
once the workers demanded a more active role in decisionmaking.119    
 In the end, most of the workers could not wait for the amparo decision to 
come.  Some workers were unable to get another maquila job due to a rumored 
blacklist circulating in Tehuacán.120  With economic pressure mounting and the 
registration now denied, a number of workers fired in August opted for severance 
payments (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003m).  As the district court pushed 
the amparo hearing back until December, plant managers approached the 
worker who was named as the sponsor of the filing, threatening that no one 
would receive severance if he did not desist on the amparo.  He caved to the 
pressure, and signed the documents to revoke the amparo in exchange for full 
severance for the rest of workers at the plant (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 
and United Students Against Sweatshops 2004).  This of course had implications 
for the amparo strategy.  When the district court finally made its decision, it ruled 
against the workers: since they had been paid severance the week prior, there 
was no longer a pending labor conflict (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 2003q).  
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In the dispute over the direction the movement would take, SUITTAR and the 
CAT had both lost.  
 
Switching Strategies: The NAALC Submission  
 During the Matamoros Garment campaign, the AFL-CIO suggested to the 
CAT that filing with the NAALC might be one additional way to publicize the 
events at the factory.121  The AFL-CIO stressed that the NAALC could not force 
anyone to reopen the factory, but there could be important benefits to submitting 
a case that might make it worth the effort, especially if that effort was minimal.  
For one, filing a case was an important event that generated media coverage in 
the United States, so a submission would publicize the issues at Matamoros 
Garment.  It was an opportunity to tell a wider audience what had happened at 
Matamoros Garment, beyond who the network could reach in the campaign, and 
an opportunity for the CAT to embarrass the government over the JLCA’s 
conduct.122   If accepted fro review, filing a case could show that the US thought 
the allegations of partiality at the labor board were important to resolve, and 
would take them seriously, something that no one in Mexico had yet done.   
 Further, the scope of the NAALC is to discuss whether the governments of 
states party to the agreement are enforcing their own labor laws, not to discuss 
company activities.  A NAALC submission would allow the network to break away 
from blaming companies as in the campaign to demonstrate the larger issues of 
freedom of association in Mexico.  Because the focus of NAALC was dialogue 
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between governments, if the petition were accepted for review, the network 
would for the first and possibly only time be able to exploit a direct channel to 
federal officials to challenge them over the labor board system (Graubart 2008), 
whereas during the campaign, their attempts to speak with STPS officials and 
others beyond Puebla had been continually rebuffed.  Finally, the NAO process 
would force the Mexican government to answer directly to its counterparts in the 
US government to the charges of partiality in the labor board system in a public 
forum.  
 The AFL-CIO did not consider the tasks of filing especially difficult or time 
consuming, but rather straightforward.123  Because SITEMAG had already 
gathered all the important information and documentation needed to file the 
registro and had created their own report on working conditions to counteract the 
Puma audit, the outlay of additional resources to construct a petition would be 
minimal.  They could fold in the work required to make the petition with the other 
tasks they were already doing to expand the transnational network.124  The CAT 
would decide what information to include, and would write it with help from 
USAS, whose interns would gather additional worker testimony.  The AFL-CIO 
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any additional costs to filing at the NAO for them, these were the costs of “the movement”.  
Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006.  
 159 
would translate the documents and help the group meet the filing 
requirements.125  
 The submission they wrote was carefully crafted to establish that the 
Mexican government acted in ways that failed to enforce national labor laws, one 
of the procedural requirements of the NAALC process.  They established a 
pattern, a second requirement, by arguing that Matamoros Garment was not an 
isolated case, but rather shows that “repeated core labor rights violations in 
Mexico are the effects of a systematic problem on the part of Mexican labor 
authorities to maintain a competent and independent labor law enforcement 
system” (United Students Against Sweatshops and Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador 2003:10).  The section on freedom of association underscored the 
pattern of JLCA collusion in derailing independent unions through a discussion of 
the Matamoros Garment case, references to Kukdong, and a review of other 
freedom of association cases from Mexico before the NAO, including ITAPSA, 
TAESA and Han Young.  
 In order to qualify for a review by a panel of experts (the ECE), the CAT 
included violations to NAALC Article 6 on minimum standards of employment 
regarding the wage irregularities, and Article 9 on occupational health and safety, 
referring to the lack of safety equipment, medical staff and plant inspections at 
Matamoros Garment.  Sixteen appendices were attached to the submission, 
including affidavits from six workers, the registro petition and denial, and network 
letters between the CAT and USAS and Puma, the JLCA of Puebla, the US 
                                            
125 Interview, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, Mexico City, Mexico, July 10, 2006. 
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Embassy in Mexico, the Izúcar agent for the Attorney General’s office, and pleas 
to President Fox of Mexico.   
 The CAT then approached the MSN in Toronto about filing a second case 
on Puebla at the Canadian NAO, in the event that the US office declined to 
review it.  Though the MSN considered the NAALC to be completely worthless as 
a venue for protecting labor rights, they did have experience filing earlier NAO 
cases in Canada, and knew a number of people in Canada who could help with 
the filing procedures.  They arranged for the United Steelworkers of America 
counsel to write up the petition, and only later requested to be included as a 
submitting party.126  After the denial of the SUITTAR registro, the CAT decided 
that the case would provide timely new evidence that further established pattern, 
and filed an amendment to the Puebla Submission at the US NAO regarding 
events at Tarrant Ajalpan (United Students Against Sweatshops and Centro de 
Apoyo al Trabajador 2003a). 
 The structure of the Canadian submission was different than the petition 
submitted to the US NAO.  While the main idea of this submission was again to 
draw general patterns of collusion to deny independent unionization in Mexico, it 
referenced the ITAPSA case --the last freedom of association case to be 
reviewed in Canada-- as the starting point.  After reminding the NAO how 
ineffective they had been in facilitating freedom of association in that case, they 
drew similarities to Matamoros Garment to show that the Mexican government 
was still interfering  in union recognition ten years later (United Steelworkers of 
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 Interview, Director of Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, July 1, 2005. 
 161 
America 2004).  Like the US submission, the Canadian petition asked the NAO to 
take the opportunity to go beyond Ministerial Consultations to invoke a panel of 
experts to review the labor board system in Mexico.  After a number of 
exchanges with the Mexican NAO and the submitting groups, the US NAO 
accepted the case for review, starting with a public hearing in Washington 
scheduled for April 1.  The Canadian NAO accepted the additional petition on 
March 12, with a public hearing scheduled for May 28 in Toronto.  
 
The Review Process and NAO Resolution 
 Representatives from the CAT, MSN, USAS, the AFL-CIO, and the WRC 
prepared written statements for each NAO, and invited Tarrant workers to 
present testimony at the hearings (US Department of Labor 2004a).  While the 
transcripts of the Canadian public hearing have never been made public, written 
testimony from the witnesses and worker testimony from both Matamoros 
Garment and Tarrant Ajalpan was published by the MSN (Maquila Solidarity 
Network 2004).  In it, witnesses discuss the use of protection contracts in Mexico 
and general and Puebla in particular, and retell how the union registrations were 
denied on technical grounds.  The MSN representative reinforced how the events 
in Puebla were endemic to labor relations in Mexico by recounting some the 
results of their 2001 investigation of the maquilas, effectively establishing that 
lock-ins, irregularities in wage payments, the use of protection contracts, and 
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JLCA collusion in preventing unionization was endemic not just to the cases at 
hand, but to nearly the entire textile sector in Puebla.127  
 The US NAO followed the public hearing with a series of questions for 
their Mexican counterparts.  When they refused to answer, the US NAO took the 
highly controversial and unprecedented step of visiting Puebla to gather more 
information from the submitters, the labor board, and STPS officials.128  The 
Mexican NAO protested vigorously, citing that the NAALC does not allow for site 
visits.129  They refused to help the US delegation schedule meetings with STPS 
and JLCA officials, which the network then framed as Mexico’s unwillingness to 
participate in the NAALC process.  The US NAO accepted still traveled to Puebla 
from April 22-28, and the CAT arranged interviews with maquila workers, rather 
than government officials, to collect additional evidence (US Department of Labor 
2004a).130 
 The US NAO issued a public report of review of the Puebla case on 
September 22, 2004 (US Department of Labor 2004a).  In it, the NAO generally 
corroborated the claims made by transnational advocates, but also was 
surprisingly critical of the Mexican government in the review.  In it, the US noted 
that worker testimony collected during the site visit and public hearing supported 
workers’ contention that it was nearly impossible to register an independent 
union in Mexico given the structure of the labor board system  The evidence 
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 Testimony, Lynda Yanz, Coordinator, Maquila Solidarity Network, Canadian NAO hearing, 
Toronto, Canada, May 28, 2004. 
128 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2007. 
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 Interview, NAO of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico, July 16, 2006. 
130 Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006. 
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supported the workers’ allegations that the denials were based justifications 
outside of the bounds of Mexican labor law, and that the JLCA did not inform the 
workers of the technical mistakes, or give them a chance to correct them, 
contrary to the labor code (US Department of Labor 2004b).  The NAO went 
further to characterize the denial criteria as “hyper-technical” and commented on 
some of the justifications as transparently convoluted, and further, that if Mexico 
had done anything to fix these shortcomings in the years since the prior cases, 
that it was not immediately apparent.  On other questions, the US NAO lamented 
that they had not received the requested information from the Mexican NAO to 
be able to evaluate whether allegations from either side could be corroborated.  
The lack of information from the Mexican NAO further impeded US 
understanding of the health and safety and minimum standards issues included 
in the petition.    
 Without a response from the Mexican ministries, the NAO relied instead 
on worker testimony as evidence.  While workers repeatedly stated violations of 
both health and safety and minimum standards as regards to payments and 
working hours in their testimony, the NAO did not find evidence that workers had 
filed complaints with any Mexican agencies to resolve these issues.  Yet, the 
NAO noted multiple instances where the petitioners had shown through 
campaign documents and letters sent by the network to Mexican officials at all 
levels of government that those officials did in fact know about the violations 
taking place at both factories, even when no formal complaints were filed, but 
had not acted to either prevent or rectify them (US Department of Labor 2004b).   
 164 
 For their part, the Canadians echoed the main concerns about freedom of 
association as the US NAO, but added two additional points in their May 11 
review.  The Canadian NAO noted that the delay by the JLCA in adjudication of 
labor rights concerns was especially troubling because at times the delays 
precluded how workers could proceed.  The inability of the unions to file for 
appeal at both Matamoros Garment and Tarrant Ajalpan were taken as examples 
where unnecessary delays precluded appeal in the first case, and led workers to 
desist from reinstatement in the second (Government of Canada 2005).  The 
NAO cited the lack of reporting of either health and safety issues or wage 
payments as evidence that workers had become reluctant to pursue their rights 
in any forum given prior interaction with labor authorities.   
 In the end, the lack of information from the Mexican NAO did not allow the 
US NAO to take concrete evaluations around Article 6 and Article 9 issues, and 
so the US recommended Ministerial Consultations, rather than a review by a 
committee of experts that submitters had asked for.  The Canadian NAO was 
also unable to provide complete reviews of the health and safety allegations due 
to the lack of information by their Mexican counterparts, and ended the review by 
asking for more information about health and safety within 30 days before 
making additional recommendations on Ministerial Consultations (Government of 
Canada 2005).  In recommending these government-to-government talks, the US 
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again took the NAO to task for not fully participating in the review process.131  
The review ends with this statement:  
During the submission review process, the US NAO requested 
consultations with the Mexican NAO under Article 21 of the 
NAALC with a view towards engaging the Government of 
Mexico in effective and frank consultations that would lead to a 
full understanding of the relevant issues and potential resolution 
of the submission.  Regrettably, the Mexican NAO declined the 
request of the US NAO to arrange meetings with the various 
authorities in Mexico responsible for enforcement of the relevant 
labor laws and limited contact to responding in writing to 
questions submitted by the US NAO.  While written exchanges 
are important to the consultations process, limiting consultations 
to written communications is not the most effective method for 
successful consultations (US Department of Labor 2004b:45). 
 
 The submitters’ response to these reviews was mixed.  Though they noted 
the critical language used in the report as a positive new development in the 
NAALC process, they were disappointed that the case would not move to expert 
review, and took this as evidence that US pressure on Mexico through the 
NAALC was becoming inadequate (US-LEAP 2004).  Though US-LEAP noted 
that the report generally supported workers’ allegations, with the plants closed, 
Ministerial Consultations would come too late to make any difference in the 
cases themselves.  
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 The Mexican NAO noted that it had passed the information requests on to the various 
ministries for answers, but had no power to ask them to fulfill the requests, or to respond in a 
timely manner.  Interview, NAO of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico, July 16, 2006.  
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 It would take another two years for the three NAOs to come to agreement 
about what areas the Consultations would cover.  Five years after the initial 
petition was filed, the first government-to-government meetings were held in 
December of 2008 to discuss union-motivated dismissals, the registration 
process and access to collective bargaining agreements in the three states.  The 
meeting was followed by a “stakeholder seminar” with functionaries of the 
Mexican state and local Puebla government, but none of the submitters were 
invited to attend, and the meeting was closed to the public (Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador, United Students Against Sweatshops, and Maquila Solidarity 
Network 2008).  To date, the three Ministers have not signed Ministerial 
Agreements on freedom of association for the Puebla, or any other NAALC case.  
 
Complementary Strategies?  
 In the Puebla factories analyzed here, neither strategy was fully effective 
in achieving what workers wanted most, the right to establish a union of their own 
choosing.  When the campaign strategies that had been successful at Kukdong 
were transposed onto Matamoros Garment and Tarrant Ajalpan, they were 
wholly inadequate against an owner already in deep financial trouble on one 
hand, and one with the ability to isolate the plants with nascent union drives on 
the other.  In the end, workers lost not just the unions, but the factories 
themselves, including Kukdong when the union was unable to maintain its claim 
to the collective contract.   
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 It is fully out of the scope of the NAALC to force owners to pay back 
wages, severance, vacation pay and bonuses as the submitters had asked 
(United Students Against Sweatshops and Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 
2003a).  Nor can the NAALC independently force the labor board to investigate 
the closure of Matamoros Garment, or force the Mexican Government enforce its 
own labor laws, only identify where these actions were not done.  The CAT did 
not expect that the NAO would solve the labor struggles in Puebla.132  Yet, for 
them, filing the complaint was part of a larger campaign strategy of which the 
NAO process, and not the outcome, had its own use in terms of pressuring the 
Mexican government, addressing officials, and attracting attention to both these 
cases and larger issues of freedom of association in Mexico.  Engaging the NAO 
process as a secondary strategy therefore complemented the work of the 
campaign, and the goals of the transnational network, in a number of ways.  
 First, the CAT filed the petitions as a last resort effort to force the 
government of Mexico to listen to them, as all of the attempts to engage the 
government had failed at the time the labor struggles took place.  Filing provided 
a direct channel to the federal officials that the campaign could not reach, and 
placed those officials in the position of having to not just listen to the allegations, 
but answer for the actions of the Puebla labor board in denying union 
representation.  Though the NAALC process may not have resulted in a positive 
local level resolution, it at least forced the Mexican Government to respond to the 
situation in Puebla.  Further, when the Mexican NAO did not provide the 
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 Interview, CAT field organizer, Puebla, Puebla, Mexico, July 25, 2006. 
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requested information, the US NAO took them to task for their unwillingness to 
participate.  Though the Mexican government is not obligated under the NAALC 
to participate in any activities, not doing so damaged their credibility in the US.   
 Second, the NAO process legitimized the workers’ complaints in a number 
of ways.  When the Mexican NAO was less than forthcoming with information, 
the US staff traveled to Puebla to ask workers directly about their experiences, 
and collected the additional information from the filers and workers directly, 
rather than from the NAO.133  Those testimonies, and the written affidavits that 
accompanied the submissions, were referenced throughout the report of review 
as evidence of violations of Mexican labor law, which is the only time this was 
ever done by any NAO.  Including worker testimony in the review materials 
signaled to the Mexican government that even if these workers were not being 
taken seriously by the local officials, that the NAO certainly was listening to them.  
Also, the course of the review clarified where the labor board had overstepped its 
legal obligations, and where the Mexican Government, in its various capacities, 
knew about the labor rights violations but declined to act.  For once, workers, the 
CAT, and their allies were vindicated in that their allegations were not just 
credible, but accurate, and that their concerns were valid.  Although the NAALC 
emphasizes a cooperative spirit in the relationships between NAOs (US 
Department of Labor Public 2004a), the Puebla reports assigned blame for the 
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 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2007. 
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violations, and were so critical that the Mexican NAO felt the need to defend itself 
against the allegations of not cooperating fully.134  
 However, the resolution of this case underscores the most important 
limitation of the NAALC, in that it suffers from the failure on the part of both the 
Mexican Government and US officials to make international labor rights issues a 
policy priority.135  On both sides, the NAO offices are struggling to establish an 
effectual presence within their respective Departments of Labor that would allow 
them to respond more forcefully.  In Mexico, the NAO has a very small role in the 
overall structure of the STPS, itself an agency where the international aspects of 
labor policy are both very recent and very minor.  In the US, the international 
bureau at the Department of Labor is more extensive, but it suffers from at best 
bureaucratic stalemate when an administration does not value pursuing 
international labor rights issues, and at worst, outright scandal when an 
administration uses the office to house political appointees.  The US NAO in 
recent years has endured reorganizations that have increased the workload but 
decreased funding resources, which has affected the office’s ability to function 
effectively (Buchanan and Chaparro 2008).136  As a result, the current perception 
is that the governments of Mexico and the United States are both uninterested in 
promoting international labor rights enforcement, and in turn, submissions to the 
NAALC process have dropped considerably since the Puebla case was filed.  
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 Interview, US NAO, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2007.  Buchanan and Chaparro (2008) note that 
one submission was actually lost by the US office during a reorganization.  It has not been 
recovered.  
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The general perception among labor rights groups is that the NAALC process 
has stalled, and until the US and Mexican governments commit to labor rights 
enforcement as a policy priority, even these modest results may not be 
forthcoming.  
 
Conclusions 
 A review of the transnational strategies pursued at Kukdong, Matamoros 
Garment and Tarrant Ajalpan described here showed that first, brand-based 
campaigns can be effective tools in the struggle to gain union representation in 
Mexico, but that the outcomes are uneven and limited.  At the Kukdong factory, 
transnational support was crucial in pressuring the plant owner and the brands to 
lobby the state government to remove the protection union.  Transnational 
advocates stepped in at key points that helped workers meet their demands to 
get the supervisors rehired, and allowed them to negotiate a departure for the 
FROC-CROC union.  However, once the network attempted a campaign against 
Puma at Matamoros Garment, this strategy was less effective.  While Puma 
eventually relented and offered to come back to the factory, the economic 
problems facing the plant were already too advanced, and the owner was not 
able to respond in any meaningful way to network pressure.  At Tarrant Ajalpan, 
the brand strategy backfired completely when networks either could not identify 
an important brand for the campaign as ownership of the factory changed, or 
pressured brands whose codes of conduct allowed them to leave the factory.  
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Under pressure to allow the independent union in, the owner simply divided 
orders across the production chain to isolate the unionizing plant.   
 These varied outcomes emphasize that even when transnational 
advocates are present in local labor struggles, transnational pressure is not 
always effective at promoting political change within states.  Sometimes 
transnational advocacy groups fail to reach their goals of promoting worker 
rights, even when networks are visible, well funded, credible and determined.  
Firms can sometimes deflect pressure to unionize by closing and relocating 
production, as they did in Tarrant Ajalpan, and in Han Young and Maxi-Switch in 
Chapter 3.  Once transnational advocates switched to strategies that targeted the 
state by filing an NAO petition, there was at least an opportunity to take states to 
account for their behavior, even when the outcomes fell short of what workers 
wanted.   
 The Puebla case is not the first NAALC case to allege that the structure of 
the labor board system denies freedom of association in Mexico.  However, the 
NAO review may be the most comprehensive investigation thus far on how the 
labor board has been used to advance local political interests.  In turn, the 
NAALC process on the whole has created new opportunities for independent 
unionists and their allies to use the resolutions to open a wider political debate in 
Mexico about freedom of association, which otherwise would not have been 
possible in the absence of US-Mexico dialogue in the context of NAFTA 
(Graubart 2008). 
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 If the Matamoros Garment and Tarrant campaigns failed, submitting them 
to the NAALC process still did not resolve any of the labor struggles discussed in 
the course of the events.  Yet, to the workers, these cases were not failures.  
Transnational support was important to the labor struggle in ways that are more 
subtle than can be captured in analysis focused solely on case outcomes.  The 
support that workers received from transnational groups gave them the spark to 
start a workers’ movement that still affects these communities, even though the 
factories never reopened.  In the aftermath of Tarrant, labor relations improved in 
the maquilas that remained.  Tarrant workers that I spoke to said that because of 
the movement, the maquila owners took note of the way that the community 
supported the workers, and started to respect the work contract.  Among the 
changes were that maquilas in the area stopped keeping workers overtime, 
overnights stopped completely, the lunch hour was extended, transportation 
improved and most importantly to them, supervisors stopped swearing and spoke 
to them with respect.  137  
 While the workers of Ajalpan and even their families were blacklisted from 
working in other factories in the region, the workers received full severance pay, 
a major victory in a region where other factories use the paro técnico to avoid 
severance, or the protection unions negotiate payments at a percentage of the 
legal value (Juárez Núñez 2002b).138  Moreso than this, the practice of forming a 
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 Interview, SUITTAR executive committee member, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 21, 2006.  
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 Nearly everyone I met in Tehuacán made mention of extracting severance from Kamel Nacif, 
owner of the Azteca consortium and Puebla’s “King of Denim”, as a major symbolic victory for 
the maquila workers.  
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union, and especially going house to house to organize the workers, gave them a 
sense of power as a community that they had not experienced since the 
maquilas came to Tehuacán.  Though a number of SUITTAR leaders were never 
able to work in the maquilas again, they felt that overall, they had scored a 
victory against the maquila owners because they had stood up for their rights 
against an array of powerful actors determined to deny them, and were taken 
seriously.139  As one blacklisted SUITTAR leader said to me, “A few of us lost 
out, for sure.  I can’t ever get another job.  I do what I can.  But in the end it was 
the community that won, all of us.  Because they can’t do this to us anymore, 
they know that we are watching them.”140  I suggest that we evaluate the success 
of any method for achieving global labor rights protections through a metric that 
also includes these local level effects, rather than the current measures that 
emphasize institutional outcomes above all other possible measures of success. 
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 Interview, SUITTAR executive committee member, Altepexi, Puebla, Mexico, August 21, 2006. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 
 Labor rights commitments have been appended to regional and bilateral 
trade agreements in recent years, each with a differing institutional design and 
enforcement potential.  This dissertation examines the actors, strategies and 
institutions for promoting labor rights in the context of increased economic 
integration, and is one of the few studies that systematically explores the 
incorporation of labor rights conditionality into trade agreements as one potential 
method for promoting labor rights enforcement within states.  I argued that the 
potential for protecting labor rights through trade-based social clauses depends 
as much as on how the clauses are implemented by states, as the kinds of 
outcomes they can encourage within them.  I measured implementation by 
investigating which cases are submitted for arbitration in the quantitative study of 
the NAALC, and developed statistical models that predicted the factors that 
determine whether cases of labor rights abuses are then accepted for review.  To 
assess outcomes, I investigated how states comply with the rules of trade-based 
labor rights conditionality at the domestic level, once they are reviewed for labor 
rights violations through the qualitative study of a range of NAALC cases.   
 In each of the cases explored in these chapters, transnational labor rights 
advocates were involved in developing the strategies used to pressure states to 
improve labor rights protections, whether through brand-based campaigns that 
utilized corporate codes of conduct, as in Chapter Four, or in filing the petitions to 
engage the trade mechanisms as in the other empirical chapters.  In the NAALC 
process there is important variance in the depth of organizational ties and degree 
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of transnational support across cases, and these differences conditioned the 
outcomes.  The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 showed that 
transnational support was an almost necessary but not sufficient condition for 
predicting which cases are reviewed by the tri-national arbitration boards.  I 
argued that transnational success in the NAALC was due to case framing and 
the use of worker testimony, two strategies associated with transnational 
advocacy groups.  Transnational groups had contact with workers that they could 
use to collect evidence and corroborate the allegations in the petition, which I 
argued was key to securing a review from an NAO.  Only when actors without 
transnational ties employed these strategies --including worker testimony or 
mentioning acts of violence against workers in their petitions-- were their cases 
accepted as well. 
 Chapter Three discussed the ways that the persuasive capacity of 
transnational advocacy networks to promote norms compliance among states 
was supplemented with the coercive capacity to apply material leverage once 
advocates turned to using the trade clauses.  In addition to pressuring Mexico 
with persuasive arguments that exposed the disconnect between Mexico’s efforts 
to develop an international reputation as a democratic country while limiting 
union democracy at home, advocates also introduced coercive elements by filing 
petitions at the NAALC.  Transnational advocates were then able to use the 
NAALC process to compel the Mexican government to explain the inability of the 
labor board system to provide impartial decisions, and answer for their 
acquiescence to violations of the right to freedom of association.  Even as the 
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outcomes of the NAALC led to resolutions that were very modest in almost all 
other cases, at Maxi-Switch and Han Young the federal government stepped in 
to force resolutions when doing so would help them rein in actors in the 
authoritarian periphery, and they responded to the issues raised in the TAESA, 
ITAPSA and Gender cases with policy changes.  More importantly, the NAALC 
process unleashed political dynamics within Mexico that shifted the balance of 
power towards the independent unions in negotiating with the federal 
government around labor rights reforms (Graubart 2008), and ultimately made 
the government more responsive to labor.   
 Chapter Four analyzed how the choices of strategy by transnational labor 
rights networks affected the outcomes of three union drives in Puebla.  This 
chapter asks whether engaging the trade mechanisms complements other 
transnational strategies for promoting labor rights, which in the Puebla maquilas 
included the use of corporate codes of conduct to develop brand-based 
consumer campaigns.  When the campaign strategy that was successful in 
achieving union recognition at Kukdong failed at Matamoros Garment and 
Tarrant Ajalpan, transnational advocacy groups then submitted petitions on these 
cases to the NAALC.  After analyzing how plant owners were able to resist 
transnational pressures and thus avoid unionization, I discussed how using the 
NAALC process supported network goals, even when these strategies failed to 
reopen the plants, force the payment of severance, rehire the workers, or 
otherwise change the course of the labor struggle.  While the Puebla case was 
representative of others, in that the institutions of the NAALC created little 
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change within Puebla, the NAALC case had its own function in terms of 
pressuring the Mexican government through international institutions.  Also, the 
NAO review legitimized the claims of violations of freedom of association made 
by the workers, attracted attention to these cases and larger issues of freedom of 
association issues in Mexico, and gave workers and their allies an opportunity to 
address Mexican officials over the systemic discrimination of independent unions 
in the labor board system, none of which had been achieved in the course of the 
campaigns.  
 While this dissertation establishes in each chapter that transnational 
support to local workers in dealing with labor rights abuses was an important 
factor that led to network successes in some cases, transnational involvement in 
labor rights cases also has its limitations.  For one, transnational strategies are 
located outside of the countries where they occur by design, which limits worker 
participation in the campaigns.  Brand-based campaigns are constructed to reach 
consumers outside of the state where the labor rights violations take place.  
Because knowledge about corporate codes of conduct are limited in Mexico, 
transnational advocacy was crucial to contacting the brands to spur an 
investigation, and even then, auditing came from outside the factory, further 
removing worker participation in resolving the labor rights situation.  Finally, 
transnational strategies that focused around firms could backfire when global 
capital can simply evade regulations by relocating, as they did in Han Young, 
Maxi-Switch and Tarrant Ajalpan, and many other cases.141  
                                            
141
 Interview, Director of Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, July 1, 2005. 
 178 
 Transnational advocacy networks have been criticized for usurping roles 
reserved for local participants, and for not developing the local institutions that 
would help workers maintain the gains of transnational campaigns (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2003; Braun and Gearhart 2004; Anner and Evans 2004; Roman 2004; 
Jordan and van Tuijl 2000).  Transnational labor rights campaigns are much less 
able to produce political change if the major labor rights violations concern the 
right to organize, as in the Mexican cases, because union recognition is a 
domestic process, and one not easily reached with proven network strengths in 
developing consumer campaigns.  As in the Kukdong and Tarrant cases, 
campaign strategies may move closer to emphasizing the issues that help keep 
the network functioning, like negotiating with the brands, rather than the issues 
that workers want, partly because the right to organize makes for a less 
sympathetic frame for network organizing and is missing from the codes 
networks use to engage the brands.142  Yet, if transnational advocates instead 
helped to develop the local workers base by allowing them to take a larger role in 
determining strategies, workers might be able to maintain improvements in 
wages and benefits, working conditions and so on after campaigns are over and 
transnational groups move onto other factories.  Instead, in case after case, the 
gains of transnational networks in individual factories have not been sustainable, 
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 Corporate codes almost never refer to wages or freedom of association because companies 
are loathe to include anything in their codes that encroach on domestic laws. Levi’s has 
standards on the selection on country partners in their sourcing agreements (Radin 2003), and 
even they were unwilling to get involved in the conflict over union recognition at Tarrant 
Ajalpan, preferring to pull their orders.  
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and unions have been pushed out once transnational support evaporates, 
including at Kukdong (Anner 2003a; Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Kidder 2002). 
 This analysis of the trade and labor linkage points rather to some of the 
advantages of transnational strategies that engage states over those that target 
firms.  First, if we are interested in impact, the trade and labor linkage has the 
potential to affect more workers because of its wider coverage.  Campaigns and 
cross-border union organization efforts are usually concentrated in single 
factories or on single brands, as in the cases analyzed here, and in many others 
(Anner 2003a; Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Frundt 2002; Kidder 2002).  Any 
successes from the efforts centered on one factory are likely to be shared only 
among workers in that single factory.  Private efforts like corporate codes of 
conduct suffer from the same limitations in that labor protections may extend to 
only the workers that happen to produce certain brands of clothing, if in fact they 
know what the codes are to be able to use them.  The trade-based methods in 
contrast are likely to cut through the limitations of other transnational strategies 
because they largely hold states, not firms, accountable for labor rights 
violations.  Further, if reforms to address labor rights abuses are forthcoming, 
these are long-term effects that reach every worker, not just those that happen to 
produce for a well-known brand, or work for a subcontractor that is held to a code 
of conduct.  Though the outcomes of the NAALC process were generally 
inadequate, when they addressed changes in labor rights policy or practices --
such as when pregnancy testing was outlawed, or when the union registry was 
made public-- they would potentially affect more workers in the long-term, than 
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the few who won the right to be represented (for a time) by a union of their 
choice.   
 Linking trade and labor rights can provide the incentives that increase 
labor rights enforcement while providing market access to developing countries 
(Rodrik 1996).  Even states that are willing sacrifice labor rights in the quest for 
economic growth are not willing to do so when it implicates market access.  By 
making trade benefits contingent on respect for labor rights, developing countries 
get the preferential treatment that they want, and the industrialized countries 
receive if not the labor rights externalities they say they desire, then fair 
competition in trade that is not based on the “race to the bottom” on wages and 
working conditions.   
 This review of the NAALC process also suggests that the weaknesses of 
the NAALC agreement lie in its institutional design.  As a treaty between 
governments, the NAALC agreement responds first to concerns over state 
sovereignty, which is so important to Mexican foreign policy, and was their major 
interest in the negotiation of the agreement.  The NAALC was written in ways 
that emphasize state sovereignty, while at the same time limits its enforcement 
capacity (Weiss 2003).  The agreement does not allow any government to 
mandate changes in policy and practices in another state, and the stages of 
resolution of issues are based on negotiation and cooperative consultation, not 
penalties.  Further, in establishing separate resolutions for different categories of 
rights, and by reserving Ministerial Consultations for the resolution of freedom of 
association issues, the design of the NAALC limits any real resolution of the 
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major barrier to collective rights in Mexico.  Finally, the NAALC lacks avenues for 
the genuine application of trade sanctions, which are poorly defined in the 
agreement, and extend only to a small category of rights violations only after a 
long series of prior resolution stages.  With stronger recourse to trade sanctions 
in the design of the institutions, the coercive capacity of the labor rights clause 
would be strengthened, and might lead to more tangible outcomes.  Would a 
Mexico subject to stronger trade sanctions finally allow union democracy?   
 This research illustrates that concern over labor rights protections are 
subsumed by other foreign policy interests between the US and Mexico, which 
affects implementation of the agreement.  Where conflicts over labor rights could 
bleed into other bilateral issues in the NAALC, both the US and Mexico find 
reasons to avoid dealing with them.  As a result, Mexico makes small reforms 
where and when necessary to maintain the approval of the United States, without 
having to make major reforms to its labor relations system, build its regulatory 
capacity, or even participate in the labor clause any more than necessary.  
Because the NAALC is embedded in the relationship between states, the US is 
also less able to dissuade Mexico from taking these positions, even when they 
limit the agreement’s effectiveness, as the NAALC review of the Puebla cases 
illustrated.    
  Further work on the trade and labor linkage should investigate the design 
of the labor rights enforcement mechanisms to understand how institutional 
design can foment stronger outcomes while at the same time minimizing the 
political context of the NAALC that hampers its effectiveness.  One avenue 
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suggested by this dissertation is to focus on ways that transnational strategies 
can be used within international institutions, where the norms of sovereignty are 
mediated by states’ membership and there is more potential for enforcement.  
This dissertation also demonstrates that citizen participation is a key component 
of the enforcement mechanisms, as it is the petitions process that draws 
government attention to individual cases of labor rights violation that could be 
investigated through the trade clause.   
 As I argued in Chapter Two, governments do not enforce the labor 
clauses until asked to do so by civil society, transnational or otherwise.  Future 
research could describe the ways that the citizen petition mechanisms have been 
included in the labor rights clauses currently available, and how different forms of 
citizen participation have affected compliance among states within them, to 
identify the best institutional designs for promoting enforcement.  Where social 
clauses have mechanisms for policy advocacy, changes in state behavior are 
possible.  It is because of the spillover effects generated by transnational 
pressure that advocates might well continue to pursue labor rights protection 
through trade agreements, as one additional path to improving labor rights 
enforcement in the era of globalization. 
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Appendix A: NAALC Cases and Resolutions 1994-2005 
 
Case Number and Name 
 
Sponsor 
 
Issues 
 
Resolution 
 
Filed against Mexico 
 
US 940001 
Honeywell/ 
General 
Electric 
International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters 
freedom of association, 
minimum standards 
 
Joint hearing with 940002 
 
Insufficient information 
provided to rule 
 
US 940002 
Honeywell/ 
General 
Electric 
United Electrical, Radio, 
and Machine Workers of 
America (UE) 
freedom of association, 
minimum standards 
Cooperative program to 
resolve freedom of 
association issues 
suggested for three 
countries, never convened 
US 940003 Sony 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF), four worker's 
rights and human rights 
organizations 
freedom of association, 
minimum standards Ministerial Consultations 
US 940004 General Electric UE freedom of association withdrawn prior to review 
US 9601 SUTSP 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF), Human Rights 
Watch, Mexican 
Association of Democratic 
Lawyers (ANAD) 
freedom of association, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
Ministerial Consultation; 
public seminar 
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US 9602 Maxi-Switch 
Communications Workers 
of America, Union of 
Telephone Workers of 
Mexico, Federation of 
Goods and Services 
Companies (FESEBS) 
freedom of association 
withdrawn 
“favorable resolution”  
of issues prior to public 
hearing; 
Independent union 
registration granted, plant 
closes.   
US 9701 Gender Human Rights Watch, ILRF, ANAD 
discrimination 
(pregnancy testing in 
maquiladoras) 
Ministerial Consultations; 
conference on the rights of 
working women. 
Four outreach efforts on 
worker’s rights. 
Individual firms pledge to 
stop practice, Mexican 
government “renews 
commitment” to end practice 
after 1998; 
federal law passed in 2003 
US 9702 (I) Han Young (I) 
Support Committee for 
Maquila Workers, ILRF, 
ANAD, Union of Metal 
Industry Workers 
(STIMAHCS) 
freedom of association 
Ministerial Consultations; 
public outreach seminar 
Independent union wins 
bargaining rights, plant 
moves  
US 9702 (II) Han Young (II) 
Maquiladora Health and 
Safety Support Network, 
Work safe!  Southern 
California, United 
Steelworkers of America, 
United Auto Workers 
(UAW), Canadian Auto 
Workers (CAW), 4 
petitioners from US 9702 
Health and safety 
standards 
addendum to US 9702 
 
Ministerial Consultations; 
Found in violation of health 
and safety codes, fined 
$9400 in penalties by STPS 
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US 9703 ITAPSA 
66 sponsor groups, 
including Echlin Worker's 
Alliance (includes 
Teamsters, UAW, CAW, 
UNITE, UE, Steelworkers, 
Paperworkers), AFL-CIO, 
CLC (CAN), UNT (MX), 
additional human rights and 
labor rights groups 
freedom of association, 
health and safety 
standards, impartiality 
of labor tribunals 
Ministerial Consultation; 
public seminar held on  
secret ballot elections; 
collective agreements 
registry made public 
CAN 98-01 ITAPSA Canadian submission for  US 9703  
Ministerial Consultations 
pending 
US 9801 Flight 
attendants 
Association of Flight 
Attendants- AFL-CIO 
freedom of association, 
right to strike declined review 
US 9802 Tomato/ Child Labor Florida Tomato Exchange Child labor in Mexico 
declined review 
 
US 9901 TAESA 
Association of Flight 
Attendants-AFL-CIO, 
Association of Flight 
Attendants of Mexico  
freedom of association, 
health and safety, 
minimum standards, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
Ministerial Consultation 
 
US 2000-01 Auto-trim 
28 labor rights, human 
rights and religious groups 
from MX, CAN and US, US 
unions 
Health and safety 
Ministerial Consultation; 
binational working group on 
occupational safety 
established 
US 2001-04 Duro-bag AFL-CIO, PACE freedom of association 
declined review; 
independent union allowed 
representation on plant 
workers’ committee 
US 2003-01 Puebla 
United Students Against 
Sweatshops, 
Centro de Apoyo al 
Trabajador (CAT) 
freedom of association, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals, health and 
safety, minimum 
standards 
Ministerial Consultations 
pending 
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CAN 2003-1 Puebla 
Canadian NAO submission 
for US Puebla; UAW 
Canada  
 
Ministerial Consultations 
pending 
US 2004-01 Yucatán 
Unite-Here, Centro de 
Apoyo  a los Trabajadores 
de Yucatán 
Minimum standards, 
health and safety withdrawn 
US 2005-01 Labor Law Reform 
Washington Office on Latin 
America, 22 US, Mexican 
and Canadian unions 
Abascal labor reform 
proposal as violation of 
NAALC principles on 
freedom of association, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
declined review 
US 2005-02 Mexican Pilots- ASPA 
Airline Pilots Association of 
Mexico 
freedom of association, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
declined review 
CAN 2005-
01 
Mexican 
Pilots- ASPA 
CAN submission for US 
2005-01  declined review 
US 2005-03 Hidalgo 
WOLA, US-LEAP, 
Progressive Union of 
Textile  Industry Workers 
(MX) 
freedom of association, 
minimum standards, 
health and safety, child 
labor, discrimination, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
Ministerial Consultations 
advised 
US 2006-01 Coahuila United Steelworkers  
freedom of association, 
health and safety, 
minimum standards, 
impartiality of labor 
tribunals 
declined review 
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Filed against the US 
MX 9501 Sprint 
Union of Telephone 
Workers of Mexico 
(Communication Workers 
of America filed 
concurrently with the 
National Labor Relations 
Board) 
Unfair labor practices 
(union motivated 
closure), freedom of 
association 
Ministerial Consultations; 
public forum.  Study into 
effects of plant closings on 
freedom of association 
published; National Labor 
Relations Board ruling to 
reinstate workers appealed, 
reversed 
MX 9801 SOLEC 
Oil, Chemical and Atomic 
Worker's Union Local 
1-675, "October 6" 
Industrial and Commercial 
Worker's Union, Labor 
Community Defense Union, 
Support Committee for 
Maquila Workers 
freedom of association, 
health and safety, 
minimum standards, 
discrimination 
Ministerial Consultation; 
to discuss application of US 
laws as concerns union 
organizing and bargaining 
rights 
MX 9802 Apple Growers 
National Worker's Union 
(UNT-MX), Authentic 
Workers' Front (FAT-MX), 
STIMAHCS, Frente 
Democrático Campesino 
freedom of association, 
protection of migrant 
workers, health and 
safety, discrimination, 
minimum standards 
Ministerial Consultation; 
public outreach sessions; 
Washington state 
implements policy changes 
MX 9803 De Coster Egg 
Mexican Confederation of 
Labor (CTM) 
Protection of migrant 
workers, health and 
safety, discrimination, 
minimum standards 
Ministerial Consultations, 
public forum held in Maine 
as joint resolution with MX 
9802 
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MX 9804 Yale/ INS 
Yale Law School Workers' 
Rights Project, 16 legal 
defense and immigrant’s 
rights associations, SEIU 
and UNITE unions 
protection of migrant 
workers 
Ministerial Consultation; 
US DOL and INS revise 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
CAN 98-2 Yale/ INS Canadian submission for MX 9804  
Case dismissed based on 
implementation of 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
CAN 99-1 LPA Labor Policy Association, EFCO Corporation 
Enforcement of Labor 
Relations Act declined review 
MX 2001-01 New York State 
Chinese Staff and Workers' 
Association, National 
Mobilization against 
Sweatshops, Workers 
Awaaz, Tepeyac 
Association,  
13 named individuals 
workers compensation 
delays in NY State 
Ministerial Consultations 
pending 
 
MX 2003-1 North Carolina 
Farmworker Justice Fund, 
Independent Agricultural 
Workers CIOAC (MX) 
treatment of migrants, 
discrimination, freedom 
of association 
Ministerial Consultations 
pending, ongoing 
cooperation on compliance 
with workplace laws 
between DOL and Mexican 
consulate in Raleigh. 
MX 2005-1 H-2B Visa Workers 
Northwest Workers Justice 
Project, Andrade Law 
Office, NYU Law School 
Forced labor, minimum 
standards, rights of 
migrant workers 
case accepted, resolution 
pending 
MX 2006-01 
North 
Carolina 
Public 
Employees 
FAT (MX), unions of CAN, 
MX and USA  case acceptance pending 
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Filed against Canada 
US 9803 Mc Donald’s 
Teamsters, Teamsters 
Canada, Quebec federation 
of Labor, Teamsters Local 
973 of Montreal, ILRF 
Unfair labor practices 
(union motivated 
closure), freedom of 
association 
case moved to study by 
provincial council 
US 9804 Rural Mail Carriers 
Organization of Rural 
Route Carriers, Canadian 
Union of Postal Workers, 
National Association of 
Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 
Canadian Labour 
Congress, American Postal 
Workers Union, 16 other 
Canadian, US and Mexican 
unions, ILRF 
freedom of association declined review 
 
Name and case number refer to the year and NAO code assigned to the case under the NAALC arbitration 
process, as well as the firm, claimants, or issue that identifies the case.  Sponsors here refer to the group or 
groups that sponsored the submission.  Issue identifies the labor code violations submitted to arbitration.  
Resolution describes outcomes of each case within the parameters of the NAALC process and subsequent 
events, as of July 2009, according to the US Department of Labor Public Report of Review.  
 
Source: US Department of Labor Bureau of International Affairs, “ Status of Submissions”, available online at 
 http:www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm, and interviews at US DOL, July, 2007.   
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